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Abstract
This  thesis  investigates  the  continuity  of  Wittgenstein’s  approach  to,  and 
conception of, philosophy. Part One examines the rule-following passages of 
the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks can only be 
read  as  interesting  and  coherent  if  we  see  him,  as  urged  by  prominent 
commentators, resisting the possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ perspective. 
There  is  real  difficulty,  however,  in  ascertaining  what  the  resulting 
Wittgensteinian position is: whether it is position structurally analogous with 
Kant’s distinction between empirical realism and transcendental idealism, or 
whether philosophical ‘therapy’ is meant to dissolve any drive towards such 
idealism. I argue that both of these readings of Wittgenstein are found in the 
work of McDowell. Part Two argues that related issues arise in respect to the 
Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus  and  the  question  of  realism.  In  the  Tractatus 
Wittgenstein  rejects  the  possibility  of  a  certain  ‘sideways-on’  perspective. 
Again,  I  argue,  it  is  unclear  whether  Wittgenstein  embraces  a  form  of 
transcendental  idealism or,  on the  contrary,  ultimately  reveals  the  idealist 
position  to  be  empty.  Part  Three  connects  ‘sideways-on’  glances  with  the 
threat of idealism by introducing a philosophical ‘measure’. I argue that the 
measure  is  a  useful  tool  in  assessment  of  the  Tractatus,  and  shows  that 
Wittgenstein  was  no  idealist,  but  is  less  useful  as  an  assessment  of  the 
Investigations. It yields the result that Wittgenstein succumbed to idealism, but 
in  doing  so  may  overlook  the  ‘therapeutic’  nature  of  Wittgenstein’s  later 
philosophy.   
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Introduction
This  thesis  is  an  investigation  into  the  continuity  of  the  philosophical 
approach adopted by the early and later Wittgenstein. I will focus on the two 
masterpieces  of  Wittgenstein’s  work.  The  ‘early’  Wittgenstein  will,  for  the 
most  part,  be  the  author  of  the  Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus.  The  ‘later’ 
Wittgenstein  will,  for  the  most  part,  be  the  author  of  the  Philosophical  
Investigations. My interest is not primarily the views espoused in these great 
texts  but,  rather,  the  underlying  conception  of  philosophy  and  the 
philosophical method that informs them. Wittgenstein undoubtedly altered, 
criticised and rejected views in his later work that he himself once held. The 
question is whether such criticisms reflected a deep change in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical approach or, on the contrary, that such an approach remained 
significantly unaltered. 
This  introduction  has  two  tasks.  One:  explain  the  motivation  for 
investigating this topic. Two: set out the structure of the thesis by providing 
signposts as to the direction the discussion will take. I will address these in 
turn.     
The first motivation is the current state of Wittgenstein studies. As I 
see it, one crude view of the relationship between the early and later periods 
is under attack from another, equally crude, view.  Crary, in introducing the 
papers that form The New Wittgenstein, tells us that: 
It  would not  be wrong to  say that  what  is  most  striking about  the 
papers in this volume has to do with their  suggestion of significant 
continuity in  Wittgenstein’s  thought.  These  papers  criticize  more 
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standard interpretations of his work in so far as such interpretations 
furnish a narrative about the development of his thought, which, while 
it leaves room for important similarities between the views he holds at 
different  times,  accents  the  idea  of  a  decisive  break in  his  mode  of 
philosophizing between the Tractatus and his later writings.1
A  number  of  commentators  have  argued  for  a  ‘decisive  break’  in 
Wittgenstein’s thought, although the contrast has been developed in different 
ways. Dummett  2 has claimed that the early Wittgenstein was a ‘realist’ and 
the later Wittgenstein an ‘anti-realist’. Hacker has maintained that the contrast 
is best seen not as a replacement of one philosophical position with another, 
but rather as a deep-rooted change of approach to philosophical questions. 
For the early Wittgenstein, Hacker maintains:
Philosophy is an activity of logical clarification. […] It will consist of 
producing clear presentations of empirical propositions by analysing 
them  into  their  constituents,  ultimately,  if  need  be,  into  atomic 
propositions, and presenting this analysis in a perspicuous notation.3
Hacker reads  the later  Wittgenstein,  in contrast,  as  offering a ‘therapeutic’ 
approach to philosophy. Such an approach is totally at  odds with the one 
adopted in his younger life.
It destroys those houses of cards, which always seem interesting, great, 
and important in philosophy, namely putative insights into the real, 
the metaphysical, structure of the universe, the essence of the world. 
The  importance  of  philosophizing  in  the  new  way  lies  in 
disillusionment, in curing philosophical thought of the madness which 
besets it.4
1 Crary (2000), p.1-2.
2 Dummett (1991b)
3 Hacker (1972), p.26.
4 Hacker (1972), p.116.
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The kind of view that finds voice in The New Wittgenstein complains 
that, contrary to standard readings (however they may be developed), there is 
a substantial and deep continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought.
These papers  have in common an understanding of  Wittgenstein as 
aspiring, not to advance metaphysical theories, but rather to help us 
work  ourselves  out  of  confusions  we  become  entangled  in  when 
philosophizing.  More specifically,  they agree in representing him as 
tracing the sources of our philosophical confusions to our tendency, in 
the midst of philosophizing, to think that we need to survey language 
from an external point of view.5
Thus,  the  ‘new’  interpretation  regards  Wittgenstein’s  philosophy  as 
‘therapeutic’ throughout: that grasping the essence of language, of thought, or 
seeing our relationship to reality,  will  not be achieved by searching for an 
external  standpoint.  We  need  to  recognise  and  accept  the  perspectival 
elements of our investigations. This ‘new’ understanding of Wittgenstein has 
grown in popularity in recent years.
What we have in the literature, then, is a sharp contrast. One school 
of thought holds that there was a radical shift in Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
approach between the early and later periods. The second school of thought 
holds that, in contrast, there is a deep ‘therapeutic’ strand running throughout 
Wittgenstein’s work. It is likely, given the nature and breath of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy, that neither of these crude interpretations is  satisfactory. More 
plausible is the view that Wittgenstein altered certain aspects of his approach 
whilst others  remained constant.  In other words: the truth lies somewhere 
5 Crary (2000), p.1.
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between the two options presented here. In a Wittgensteinian spirit, I propose 
we look and see how matters lie rather than just think how they must be.   
The second motivation for addressing this topic is the nature of the 
philosophical issues this investigation requires. The general question which 
interested Wittgenstein throughout his work (and has concerned all the great 
philosophers)  is  how language and thought  stand in  relation to  reality.  Is 
objective  representation  possible?   Can  we  accept  and  respect  certain 
perspectival  and  relativistic  pressures  without  abandoning  the  familiar 
notions of truth and objectivity? I think the real value in Wittgenstein’s work 
is to be found in his attempt to get beyond the false choice between ‘realism’ 
and ‘anti-realism’ that dominates philosophy. (This will be a recurring theme 
of the thesis.) Understanding quite what Wittgenstein’s position is, whether it 
is  satisfactory,  and whether  it  remained constant  throughout,  should offer 
some guidance in framing our answers to the difficult  questions about the 
relationship between ourselves and reality.
I  turn now to signposts. The thesis has three parts.  Part One is an 
examination  of  the  philosophical  approach  adopted  in  the  Philosophical  
Investigations. I tackle the later Wittgenstein first because the kinds of issues 
that  are  relevant  to  our discussion are more  prevalent  in  the surrounding 
secondary  literature,  and  there  is  a  greater  history  of  entrenched 
interpretative disputes. I take a specific and central topic of the book: the so-
called  ‘rule-following  problematic’.  I  argue,  and  demonstrate  through 
reference  to  influential  interpretations,  that  there  is  difficulty  in  having 
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Wittgenstein’s  remarks  on  rule-following  appear  both  interesting  and 
coherent.  I  search for satisfactory interpretations of Wittgenstein’s remarks, 
concluding that McDowell is the closest to achieving this. McDowell reads in 
Wittgenstein,  as  others  have,  a  rejection  of  the  possibility  of  a  certain 
‘sideways-on’  perspective.  Others  find  little  value  in  the  resulting 
Wittgensteinian position. McDowell, in contrast, clearly finds something right 
about  the  rejection  of  such  a  perspective.  Unfortunately,  however, 
McDowell’s remarks suggest two quite different interpretations. I sketch these 
alternatives,  one  has  Wittgenstein  embracing  a  kind  of  transcendental 
idealism; the other has Wittgenstein as revealing such idealism to be the right 
answer  to  a  question  which  must  itself  be  rejected  through  a  process  of 
therapy.   
Part Two is an examination of the philosophical approach adopted in 
the  Tractatus.  The  task,  framed  by  Part  One,  is  to  see  whether  analogous 
interpretative concerns appear in relation to the early Wittgenstein. Again, I 
investigate a specific  and central  topic:  the saying / showing distinction. I 
argue, after a false start, that similar issues arise when one raises the question 
of realism and the Tractatus. I argue (inspired by a remark by McDowell) for a 
‘middle-way’ interpretation which cuts between realist and idealist readings 
of the book. The  Tractatus  is shown to also rule out a certain ‘sideways-on’ 
perspective. I argue that an analogous problem arises to that encountered in 
Part  One:  it  is  not  clear  whether  Wittgenstein  embraces  a  kind  of 
transcendental idealism, or ultimately reveals such a position to be empty. 
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Part Three connects the previous discussions together and addresses 
the question of continuity. I outline a philosophical ‘measure’,  proposed in 
recent literature, which seeks to connect together the possibility of ‘sideways-
on’ glances with the doctrine of transcendental idealism. Through the help of 
secondary literature I  apply the measure to  both the  Investigations  and the 
Tractatus. The result is that the early Wittgenstein was no idealist, whereas the 
later Wittgenstein did indeed succumb to idealism. I end by questioning the 
viability  of  the  proposed  measure  in  application  to  the  Investigations.  The 
overall conclusion will show that there is significant continuity in the kinds of 
questions  that  motivated  Wittgenstein  throughout  his  work,  but  that  his 
approach to answering those questions differed markedly.  
I conclude this introduction with a warning to the reader. There will 
be no major change in our understanding of Wittgenstein proposed at the end 
of this thesis. There is no, as it were, ‘bombshell’ in the last chapter. I aim to 
offer a clear setting out of the shape of the debate, the positions one make take 
and then raise questions and suggest possible directions for future research. If 
this thesis achieves even these modest aims I will be delighted. 
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Part One:
The Philosophical Investigations
12
Chapter One
The Primary Text: Investigations §§185-242
[1.1] Introduction
This chapter will set out the four central themes of Wittgenstein’s discussion 
of rule-following as they appear in §§185-242 of his Philosophical Investigations. 
Wittgenstein’s  remarks frustratingly fall short of detailed accounts of what 
following a rule consists in or what correctly following a rule amounts to. It is 
left to the reader to connect the pieces together. This has given rise to, as we 
shall see in subsequent chapters, a plethora of differing interpretations as to 
what Wittgenstein was up to in these sections. The local aim of this chapter is 
to get the four themes in play and assess how far Wittgenstein presents the 
relationship between them.  The strategic  aim of  this  chapter  is  to  provide 
markers by which interpretations of Wittgenstein can be assessed. I will argue 
that there is a pressing concern for would-be interpreters: on the face of it the 
four themes do not seem able to sit together in a way that has Wittgenstein 
saying something both interesting and coherent.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: [1.2] is a brief background 
of the issue of rule-following. [1.3] examines, and attempts to make sense of, 
the crucial passages of the Investigations. [1.4] offers an initial reading on how 
these  themes  fit  together  and  outlines  frustration  with  Wittgenstein’s 
apparent failure to explain how he intends them to cohere. It appears that the 
four  themes,  if  they  are  to  be  taken  seriously,  are  incompatible  with  one 
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another. I leave it for Chapter Two to demonstrate that this concern is even 
more pressing when one considers the relevant classic secondary literature. 
[1.2] Why Rule-Following?
That is: why  this issue over and above any of the other issues Wittgenstein 
discusses in the latter period? I think these passages are certainly interesting 
and elusive. What justifies their inclusion, however, is the centrality of these 
sections  to  the  Investigations and Wittgenstein’s  later  work in  general.  The 
undermining of a kind of Platonism which, as we shall see, is at least part of 
Wittgenstein’s intention in these passages intersects philosophy of language, 
philosophy of mind as well as the foundations of mathematics. That is to say: 
any fully  comprehensive  understanding  of  Wittgenstein’s  later  philosophy 
would  involve  assessment  of  and  reflection  on  the  ‘rule-following 
problematic’. It is no wonder, then, that these passages are so hotly disputed 
by rival schools of interpretation. 
We normally think of rules in the context of games or sports. Chess, 
for example, is a game played according to rules. The rule for castling, say, 
stipulates what has to be case for a player to castle – neither the king and the 
rook have been moved, there are no pieces occupying the squares between 
them, the king is not in check,  and so on. The ‘offside rule’  in association 
football is another good example. But rules are an essential part of everyday 
life, not just when we are playing certain games. In mathematics, for example, 
notions  like  addition  and  subtraction  are  governed  by  rules.  There  are 
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stipulations of what is permissible and impermissible practice, what actions 
are in accord with the rules and what are not. Meaning is another example. 
Grasping the meaning of an expression or word involves recognising when it 
is legitimate to use that expression or word. To remain faithful to the meaning 
of the terms involved we must obey the rules of use. Grammar tells us what 
structures  and  combinations  are  legitimate  in  our  language,  what  is 
acceptable and what is not. So rules are central to our everyday lives.
The so-called  ‘rule-following problematic’  has  at  its  core  issues  of 
constitution and epistemology. What the rule requires must in some sense be 
settled;  we  also  must  know what  the  rule  requires.  In  meeting  the  first 
constraint we feel it necessary to conceive the nature of a rule as completely 
independent of our thoughts and practices. The danger being that in doing so 
it can seem mysterious or magical how we can ever have knowledge of what 
the rule requires. But if we bring knowledge of the requirements within reach 
it  can seem to  threaten  the objectivity  of  rules;  whether  we can make the 
distinction between seeming to follow a rule and actually following it.
 
[1.3] The Text
As indicated in the Introduction [1.1], this engagement with the primary text 
is aimed at setting markers by which to judge the various interpretations of 
Wittgenstein’s  remarks  in  the  remainder  of  Part  One.  This  section  is  not 
aimed at giving a fully-fledged interpretation of Wittgenstein’s position. As 
we shall see, Wittgenstein’s remarks do not lend themselves to such clear and 
15
straightforward  exegesis.  The  four  themes  are  as  follows.  One:  the 
relationship between a rule and actions in accordance with it is an internal or 
grammatical one. Two: the rejection of a kind of scepticism about rules. Three: 
the  simplicity  and  straightforwardness  of  rule-following  in  our  everyday 
lives. Four: the appeal to notions of community, convention and practice in 
coming to terms with what correctly following a rule demands. I will take 
these in turn.
[1.3.1] The Internal Relationship Between a Rule and Its Requirements    
The first theme is so obvious and straight-forward it might appear that it does 
not require stating because no-one would seriously want to deny it. A rule 
and actions that are in accordance with that rule (or, as we might put it, a rule 
and the requirements of that rule) are internally related. The rule is the rule it 
is because going a certain way meets its requirements and other ways fail to 
meet those requirements. The rule for castling in chess, for example, would 
not be the rule  it  is  if  castling were permitted when pieces occupy spaces 
between  the  rook and the  king.  If  that  were allowed the  rule  would be  a 
different  rule.  Nothing  in  what  Wittgenstein  says  in  the  rule-following 
passages is meant to undermine these truisms. It is settled by the rule itself 
what  actions  accord  and  what  discord  with  it.  This  is  the  internal  (or 
grammatical) relationship between a rule and its requirements. 
The  early  sections  of  the  rule-following  passages  are  to  be  seen  as 
reactions to those truisms. The general drift of the interlocutor’s remarks is 
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this: ‘Surely there must be more to it that that?’ That is: ‘granted that there is 
an  internal  relation  between  a  rule  and  its  requirements,  there  must  be 
something more to following a rule,  something which one has to grasp in 
following the rule correctly.’ Wittgenstein’s aim, in the passages leading up to 
§197, is to show that nothing does fill that role and this is because there is no 
space to fill.  
Near the beginning of the  Blue Book Wittgenstein asks us to imagine 
explaining  the  meaning  of  a  word  by  means  of  ostensive  definition.  We 
might, to use Wittgenstein’s example, explain the meaning of the word ‘tove’ 
by pointing to a pencil  and saying ‘this is  tove.’  This attempted definition 
admits  of  a  variety  of  possible  interpretations  –  ‘this  is  a  pencil’,  ‘this  is 
round’,  ‘this  is  wood’,  and  so  on.  One  might  object  that  a  variety  of 
interpretations  is  only  available  to  an  individual  who  already  grasps  a 
language.  “And  this  objection  is  significant  if  by  ‘interpretation’  we  only 
mean translation into a word-language”6 We could give an English speaker a 
definition by pointing to  an object  and saying:  ‘this  is  what  Germans call 
‘Buch’.’  The English speaker  will  most  likely  associate  this  with  his  word 
‘book’. In such a case he has interpreted ‘Buch’ to mean ‘book’.
There  are  other  cases,  however,  where  the  subject  may  not  have 
encountered the thing in question, and so has no word for the kind of thing it 
is. Wittgenstein's example is a subject who has never come into contact with a 
banjo.  Perhaps  the  ostensive  definition  ‘this  is  a  banjo’  prompts  him  to 
associate it with the word ‘guitar’, perhaps no word comes to him at all.  The 
6 BB, p.2.
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subject is given the order to pick out the banjo in a group of objects. If he 
picks out the banjo we are inclined to say he has given the word ‘banjo’ the 
correct interpretation – ‘he has interpreted me correctly’. If he picks out some 
other object we are inclined to say he has misinterpreted. The point is that 
even though the subject has no other language to interpret ‘banjo’ into, we 
still say that he has given the word this or that interpretation.
Part of Wittgenstein’s aim in the rule-following passages is to challenge 
the need for an ‘interpretation’ in this sense. He aims to show that there is no 
need for an intermediary phase between a rule and actions in accordance with 
it. We are tempted to think that something other than the rule itself stipulates 
correct or incorrect practice. For example, again from the Blue Book, imagine 
the order ‘fetch me a red flower from the meadow’. How is a person to know 
what sort of flower to bring to comply with this order? I have only given him 
the word ‘red’ to work with. Perhaps we say: the person must bring a red 
image ‘to mind’, and then go into the meadow to compare the sample colour 
with the colour of the flowers.  But now consider the order ‘imagine a red 
patch.’ We are not inclined to think that in order to obey this order the person 
must first bring a red image ‘to mind’ to serve as a sample for the red patch he 
is instructed to imagine. There is simply no work for the sample to do in this 
case; so why think that in other, more standard, cases it is doing any work? 
Wittgenstein’s  point  is  that,  in  fact,  the  role  of  the  sample  is  completely 
empty: “any interpretation still hangs in the air with what it interprets, and 
cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine 
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meaning.”7 The  idea  that  an  ‘interpretation’  or  some  intermediary  phase 
between a rule and action is required appears in different ways in the rule-
following passages of the  Investigations. It is replaced by the realisation that 
the relationship between a rule and actions in accordance with it is an internal 
or grammatical one. 
What is it to correctly follow a rule? “To carry it out correctly! How is 
it decided what is the right step to take at any particular stage?”8 Wittgenstein 
and his  interlocutor  proceed to  discuss  answers  one might  give to  such a 
‘correctness question’. The first specific suggestion is a natural one: the correct 
answer is the one that accords with the order; accords with what the person 
giving the order  meant.  So,  for example,  when a teacher  gives a particular 
order to a student, say carry on adding two to this series, correctly following 
her order will amount to keeping faith with what she meant in giving the 
order. Wittgenstein is unimpressed:  
So when you gave the order +2 you meant that he was to write 1002 
after  1000 – and did you also mean that  he should write  1868 after 
1866, and 100036 after 100034, and so on – an infinite number of such 
propositions?9  
Whilst some might be happy to say ‘yes’ to Wittgenstein’s question (that is 
just what giving the order ‘+2’ amounts to they might say), the interlocutor 
concedes defeat; telling Wittgenstein this is not what was meant in giving the 
order. The teacher did not mean that the student should write 100036 after 
7 PI I §198.
8 PI I §186.
9 PI I §186.
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100034 when she gave the order. Rather, she meant that one should add two 
after this number and that number,  and so on. Wittgenstein’s real point, it 
seems, is that not every step of the series ‘came into the mind’ of the teacher 
when she gave the order. As if every possible step in the series came before 
her minds eye. 
“But I already knew, at the time when I gave the order, that he ought 
to write 1002 after 1000.” – Certainly; and you can also say you meant it 
then; only you should not let yourself be mislead by the grammar of 
the words “know” and “mean”. For you don’t want to say that you 
thought of the step from 1000 to 1002 at that time – and even if you did 
think of this step, still you did not think of other ones. When you said 
“I already knew at the time …..” that meant something like: “If I had 
then been asked what number should be written after 1000, I should 
have replied ‘1002’.” And that I don’t doubt. This assumption is rather 
of the same kind as: “If he had fallen into the water then, I should have 
jumped in after him”.10 
Of course, if we had been asked what number the student should write after 
1000 we would reply ‘1002’. But do not be misled, Wittgenstein is telling us, 
into thinking that each stage came into your mind when giving the order. It is 
wrong to think that in giving the order one’s mind ‘flies ahead’ and takes all 
the steps before we arrive at this or that particular step. It is as if the steps 
themselves  are  already  taken  in  the  act  of  meaning  -  as  if  meaning  can 
anticipate reality. Wittgenstein’s target here is the idea that how the rule is 
meant  or  how  the  rule  is  conceived  ‘in  mind’  explains  the  relationship 
between  the  rule  and  actions  in  accordance  with  it.  It  looks  as  though 
something  is  needed  to  sit  between,  mediate  between,  a  rule  and  correct 
10 PI I §187.
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action.  As  we  saw,  this  falls  under  the  heading  of  ‘interpretation’  for 
Wittgenstein.  Wittgenstein’s  point  is  that  the  mental  could  not  be  a 
satisfactory intermediary. 
We find it natural to think that the steps of a series are determined; that 
it  is  already settled which actions will  be correct,  which incorrect.  We say 
things  like:  ‘The  steps  are  determined  by  the  formula  y =  x2’.  Whatever 
number we substitute for x it has already in some sense been settled what the 
corresponding value of y will be. Even if a number yet to be encountered by 
the human mind is substituted for  x we still  think the formula completely 
settles  the value  of  y –  what  the  correct  answer  is.  In  mathematical  cases 
everything is settled by the formula. We are merely passive observers in the 
process. But we ought to be careful over what we mean by ‘determined’. This 
example concerns mathematical determination. 
There is also causal determination. So, for people trained in a particular 
way to respond to ‘+2’ then perhaps the order completely causally determines 
every step from one number to the next. But other people, who have been 
trained in a different way, or indeed not trained at all, might well act in a 
whole host of different ways. Wittgenstein’s point, at §189, appears to be that 
it cannot be the formula itself which settles correct and incorrect action for the 
formula is open to different interpretations and readings depending on the 
training the individual has received. So, for example, if we took ‘x!2’ to mean 
x2 we would get one answer, if we took it to mean 2x we would get another. 
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But  being  mathematically  determined  or  being  causally  determined 
was  not  the  issue.  We  were  interested  in  determination  by  meaning.  We 
thought that something about the meaning of the order ‘+2’ determined what 
counts as correct or incorrect practice. As the interlocutor responds: ‘The way 
the formula is meant determines which steps are to be taken.’ But this runs 
into analogous problems as before.  How can the act  of  meaning settle the 
correct and incorrect steps in advance? How could, say, my meaning addition 
by ‘plus’ determine the way I go on? 
Wittgenstein’s  point  is  to  again undermine  the  idea  that  something 
needs  explaining  about  the  relationship  between  a  rule  and  actions  in 
accordance with the rule. We are tempted to think that something about the 
very nature of the rule,  the kind of rule it is,  projects onto practice;  settles 
what is correct or incorrect practice. In a sense Wittgenstein is happy with this 
but  warns  against  a  certain  kind  of  distortion.  In  that,  we  think  that 
formulising the rule  provides us with a link between the rule  and correct 
practice  –  as  if  writing  the  rule  down  or  speaking  it  out  loud  did  the 
mediating job. 
But  this  natural  way of  thinking  about  rules  (that  all  the  steps  are 
already settled simply by laying down the rule) remains persuasive. All we 
can do, we imagine, is watch as impartial observers as the rule leads us this 
way and that. This, I take it, is a Platonist conception of rules: the claim that 
rules are independent of us and our practices. It does indeed seem puzzling 
how stipulating a rule can achieve this. Moreover, how could we ever grasp 
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such a thing? “Can’t the use – in a certain sense – be grasped in a flash?”11 
Wittgenstein’s answer appears to be ‘in a sense of course, yes. But in the sense 
in which you mean it, no.’ To illustrate this supposed confusion, Wittgenstein 
describes the movement of a machine. The actions of a machine seem to be 
already there from the start, from when it was constructed – its movement 
appears  to  be  completely  determined.  We talk  as  though the  parts  of  the 
machine can only move in this way. In so doing, we overlook the possibility of 
parts bending, breaking, melting, and so on. We imagine that we could give 
someone the design and drawings of a machine and that he could derive all 
the movements of its parts from it. 
“The machine’s action seems to be in it from the start” means: we are 
inclined  to  compare  the  future  movements  of  the  machine  in  their 
definiteness to objects which are already lying in a drawer and which 
we then take out.12
But, continues Wittgenstein, when we talk about the behaviour of an  actual 
machine in actual circumstances we normally do not overlook the possibility 
of distortion or the breaking of parts. When we reflect that the machine might 
have moved differently, we may suppose that the way a ‘machine-as-symbol’ 
moves is  far more determined than an actual  machine.  Crucially:  we may 
think that it is not enough for the movement to be empirically determined but 
that such movement is already present in the machine.
When do we, then, have the thought that the possible movements of a 
machine are already present in it? “Well, when one is doing philosophy.”13 
11 PI I §191.
12 PI I §193.
13 PI I §194.
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Wittgenstein argues that the way we talk about machines is apt to mislead us 
here.  We  say  that  a  machine  possesses  such-and-such  possibilities  of 
movement. We speak of ideally rigid machinery which can only move in this  
or that way. Wittgenstein argues that we fail to grasp what the possibility of 
movement  actually  is.  It  is  not  the  movement  itself,  nor  the  physical 
conditions  for  moving.  The  possibility  of  movement  is  rather  a  kind  of 
‘shadow’ of the movement itself. 
But do you know of such a shadow? And by a shadow I do not mean 
some picture of the movement – for such a picture would not have to 
be a picture of just this movement. But the possibility of this movement 
must be the possibility of just this movement. (See how high the seas of 
language run here!)14
How actually do we use the phrase ‘possibility of movement’ in regard to an 
actual machine? The answer comes15: I show you the possibility of movement 
by a picture of the movement. We say: ‘It isn’t moving yet, but it already has 
the possibility of moving’ – so possibility is something very near reality. We 
never discuss whether  this  is the possibility of this or of that movement. So 
the possibility of movement is in a close relation to the movement itself. We 
do  not  say:  ‘experience  will  show  whether  this  is  the  possibility  of  this 
movement’. So: it is not an empirical fact that this possibility is the possibility 
of precisely this movement. 
What  can  be  made  of  this  (quite  obscure)  discussion  about  the 
machine? The point Wittgenstein is making, I conjecture, is that we need to be 
much clearer about what we mean by ‘possibility’. He is obviously drawing a 
14 PI I §194.
15 PI I §194.
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distinction between what  is  actually  possible  and what  is  possible  for  the 
machine as symbol – what is in theory possible. An actual machine can move 
this way or that; a machine as symbol has built in possibilities of movement. 
But what is crucial here, I think, is the notion of an internal possibility. Such a 
possibility is one without which a thing cannot be; it is inconceivable that this 
object does not have this possibility of movement. 
The reference to ‘shadows’ is then a reference to the kind of mediating 
entity I have argued Wittgenstein is so keen to expose as empty. Just as we 
think  that  there  must  be  something  sitting  between  a  machine  and  its 
movements – a possibility – we think that there must be something sitting 
between a rule and actions in accordance with it. Wittgenstein’s answer is that 
we ought to recognise the internal relationship in play in both cases. It simply 
would not be this machine without these possibilities of movement; it simply 
would not be the rule it is without these actions being in accordance with it. 
What, then, are we to say about ‘grasping in a flash’? Perhaps, argues 
the  interlocutor,  grasping  the  rule  does  not  determine  what  will  count  as 
correct or incorrect practice. Rather, “in a queer way, the use itself is in some 
sense present”16.
But of course it is, ‘in  some  sense’! Really the only thing wrong with 
what you say is the expression “in a queer way”. The rest is all right; 
and  the  sentence  only  seems  queer  when  one  imagines  a  different 
language-game for it from the one in which we actually use it.17
16 PI I §195.
17 PI I §195.
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Wittgenstein’s point is that we ought not to feel anything strange or queer 
about this process of grasping a rule or grasping the whole use of a word in a 
flash. It only becomes strange if we think the future development of a series, 
or the use of a word, are there as it were ‘in the grasping’. 
The  important  marker  for  future  discussion  is  Wittgenstein’s 
recognition that a rule and its requirements are internally related. 
[1.3.2] The Rejection of Rule Scepticism 
The recognition of the internal or grammatical relationship is reinforced by 
the second of the four central themes: the rejection of a kind of scepticism 
about rules and following a rule. A number of candidates for the ‘shadowy 
intermediary’  have  been  canvassed  and  rejected  in  turn.  Wittgenstein’s 
answer is that the belief that there needs to be such an intermediary is at fault. 
The  interlocutor  struggles  to  see  the  point  Wittgenstein  is  making.  He 
expresses his frustration with the direction of the discussion: “But how can a 
rule shew me what I  have to do at  this point? Whatever I  do, is,  on some 
interpretation, in accord with the rule.”18 If the order is ‘+2’ then going ‘998, 
1000,  1004’  instead  of  going  ‘998,  1000,  1002’  could  be  seen  as  acting  in 
accordance  with  the  rule.  Perhaps  such  an  individual  has  interpreted  the 
order ‘+2’ as:  ‘add two up to a 1000, add four beyond 1000’.  Wittgenstein 
agrees, as we might suspect, that appealing to an ‘interpretation’ here is of no 
18 PI I §198.
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use: an interpretation still ‘hangs’ along with what it interprets. Then, asks the 
interlocutor, “can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?”19 
The  worry  being  expressed  straight-forwardly  leads  to  a  kind  of 
scepticism about rules. If, on some way of looking at it, any course of action 
can be seen to be in accord with a rule the very notion of correct or incorrect 
practice comes under threat. There is no longer any room, as we think there 
must be, between seeming to follow a rule correctly and actually following a 
rule correctly.  If we were to cast this in terms of meaning: there would be 
nothing that would count as incorrect use of a word for there is nothing that 
would count as correct use of that word. We could not maintain that anyone 
means something determinate by the words they use. This worry is repeated 
at the start of §201:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a 
rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the 
rule. The answer was: if any action can be made out to accord with the 
rule,  then it  can also  be made out  to  conflict  with  it.  And so there 
would be neither accord nor conflict here.20
So, if  any  action can be seen, by interpretation, to be a ‘correct’  manner of 
following the rule, then the whole notion of ‘correctness’ appears to have been 
lost. 
It is clear that Wittgenstein wants to reject this kind of scepticism. As 
he goes on immediately to say:
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact 
that  in the course of  our argument  we give one interpretation after 
19 PI I §198.
20 PI I §201.
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another; as if each one contented us for at least a moment, until we 
thought of yet another standing behind it.21 
So far from embracing the scepticism about rules, Wittgenstein claims that it 
is  based on a misunderstanding.  The misunderstanding is the idea that an 
‘interpretation’ (something providing mediation between a rule and actions in 
accordance with it) is the only possible answer to the correctness question. If 
we are tempted to think that it is the only answer then the sceptical worries 
may indeed bother  us.  But  it  is  only  by making the  mistake  Wittgenstein 
precisely warns against that scepticism enters the picture. 
[1.3.3] Rule-Following ‘Without Reasons’
We  like  to  think  that  our  practices  are  grounded  in  deep  and  secure 
foundations.  That  when,  say,  I  answer  ‘1002,  1004…’  I  can explain  to  the 
teacher  why  I  am  going  this  way  rather  than  that,  that  I  can  justify  my 
answers to  her.  Equally,  when I  use terms to communicate  I  think that,  if 
pressed, I could give reasons or justify my use of those terms. It is comforting 
to think of a justificatory structure underpinning our practices. Wittgenstein 
seeks to undermine this idea: for him, there is no deep routed justification to 
be found when it comes to following rules.
How  can  he  know how  he  is  to  continue  a  pattern  by  himself  – 
whatever instruction you give him? – Well, how do I know? – If that 
means “Have I reasons?” the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. 
And then I shall act, without reasons.22
21 PI I §201.
22 PI I §211.
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If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my 
spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”23
When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly.24
These  comments  could  seem  to  point  towards  the  kind  of  scepticism 
discussed in [1.3.2]. If we are following a rule blindly, what sense is there to 
following a rule here at all? If nothing is, as it were, ‘in mind’ when we follow 
rules how can we get any traction on the notion of correctly following a rule 
at all?
Wittgenstein’s  aim,  however,  is  not  to  say  that  rule-following  is 
irrational, or that we are unjustified in going this way rather than that. Rather; 
he wants to undermine a certain conception of that view, a conception that 
there  must  be  ever  deeper  and  more  complicated  explanations.  Instead, 
according  to  Wittgenstein,  we  should  recognise  how  basic,  how  straight-
forward,  and how unreflective  it  is  for  us  to  follow certain  rules  or  obey 
certain orders. “When someone whom I am afraid of orders me to continue 
the series, I act quickly, with perfect certainty, and the lack of reasons does 
not  trouble  me.”25 We  feel  the  temptation  for  complex  definitions  or 
explanations,  but  really  they  serve  no  purpose:  “Our  requirement  is  an 
architectural  one; the definition a kind of ornamental coping that supports 
nothing.”26
23 PI I §217.
24 PI I §219.
25 PI I §211.
26 PI I §217.
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Isn’t there a deeper explanation; or mustn’t at least the understanding of 
the  explanation  be  deeper?  –  Well,  have  I  myself  a  deeper 
understanding? Have I  got more than I give in the explanation? – But 
then, whence the feeling that I have got more?27
The idea that we ought to ‘dissolve’ or ‘diagnose’ the philosopher’s desire for 
ever  deeper  and  more  satisfying  (at  least  thought  to  be  more  satisfying) 
answers – is central not only to Wittgenstein’s comments on rule-following 
but  to  the  wider  project  of  the  Investigations.  The  job  of  philosophy, 
Wittgenstein tells us, is merely to draw attention to what is already known, 
assemble reminders for a particular purpose, rather than advance ever more 
complicated doctrines. This is often referred to as Wittgenstein’s ‘Quietism’.
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view there is nothing 
to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.28
In our specific  case:  Instead of constructing ever more elaborate  structures 
and  theories  concerning  rules,  just  look  at  how  basic  and  simply  rule-
following is. We do not need the complex justificatory structure we imagined 
we did. 
[1.3.4] ‘Shared Agreement in Judgement’ and Convention
The fourth and final theme is, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, the most 
difficult to understand and place in Wittgenstein’s thought. He develops the 
idea that there needs to be shared human agreement in judgements for rule-
27 PI I §209.
28 PI I §126..
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following to take place. Wittgenstein offers the example that human beings 
share a natural reaction to pointing: looking at the direction of the line from 
the wrist to the finger-tip rather than from the finger-tip to the wrist.29  Crucial 
is the idea that not only are such shared judgements, but that there need to be 
for us to communicate with one another:
If  language  is  to  be  a  means  of  communication  there  must  be 
agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in 
judgements.30
And, again, from earlier in the section: “The common behaviour of mankind 
is  the  system  of  reference  by  means  of  which  we  interpret  an  unknown 
language.”31 If  we  observe  some  unknown  tribe,  who  appear  to  have 
intelligible behaviour, but cannot learn their language as it does not contain 
enough regularity  between the sounds they make and their  behaviour we 
will,  according  to  Wittgenstein,  say  that  there  is  nothing  of  sufficient 
regularity to call a ‘language’. The kind of agreement crucial to Wittgenstein 
here is not of opinions or definitions – it is not the kind of agreement one 
reaches at a committee or through some other kind of discussion. It is meant 
to be a much more basic kind of agreement than that. The term usually used 
for this basic set of shared characteristics is ‘form of life’:
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and 
what is false?” – It is what human beings say that is true or false; and 
29 PI I §185.
30 PI I §242.
31 PI I §207.
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they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions 
but in form of life.32
This  is  linked  to  Wittgenstein’s  rather  curious  appeal  to  custom  and 
convention:
I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far 
as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.
To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of 
chess, are customs (uses, institutions).33
And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice.34
This merely  shews what goes to  make up what  we call  “obeying a 
rule” in everyday life.35
As with the last section, part of Wittgenstein’s thought here is to recognise 
how  following  a  rule  is  a  very  ordinary  part  of  our  everyday  lives. 
Wittgenstein seems to think that an answer to the correctness question needs 
to recognise that rules and rule-following only make sense within the custom 
or practice of people following rules, obeying orders, meaning things by the 
words they use and so on. So we need to recognise that the rules we follow 
are dependant (in some way or another) on custom and convention.
It is not immediately obvious what the relationship is between ‘shared 
agreement in judgement’ and the appeal to convention. A natural thought, I 
take  it,  would  be  that  the  shared  agreement  in  judgement  provides  the 
backdrop or framework for there being any conventions at all. This allows us 
32 PI I §241.
33 PI I §199.
34 PI I §202.
35 PI I §235.
32
to see the two aspects of this fourth theme as distinct: What conventions or 
customs we adopt is built upon the shared agreement, but a wide variety of 
options  remain  open  as  to  what  those  conventions  are.  Wittgenstein’s 
thought, I take it, is that there is a much closer relationship between the two 
aspects, such that they are not distinct from one another at all. The idea must 
be  that  the  shared  agreements  in  judgements  impinge  on  or  colour  what 
conventions  there  are.  So,  what  we  find  natural  infiltrates  the  kind  of 
conventions we adopt in a much more direct way than simply providing the 
backdrop.   
[1.4] A Coherent Account?
I have, somewhat artificially, split Wittgenstein’s discussion in these passages 
into four themes. What can we say about the relationship between them? The 
first  part  of  Wittgenstein’s  discussion  seems  negative.  The  interlocutor 
attempts to provide an account of the relationship between a rule and actions 
in accordance with it – how the order is meant, a Platonic conception of rules 
reaching out like rails to infinity etc. – and each is rejected. It is then very 
tempting,  if  one  agrees  with  Wittgenstein’s  arguments,  to  accept  that  the 
sceptical thought – there just is no difference between seeming to correctly 
follow a rule and actually correctly following a rule – must have something 
going for it. But far from embracing the reasoning that leads to the paradox 
Wittgenstein goes on to say that it is based on a ‘misunderstanding’. It is clear, 
then, that he intends the criticism of the mediating entity not to push us into 
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the sceptical paradox. The question then is: how can we accept the argument 
without falling into the trap? The misunderstanding arises from the thought 
that  we  must  interpret  or  infer  what  is  meant  by  a  rule  at  each  stage. 
Wittgenstein’s  conjecture  is  that  the supposed paradox shows,  rather,  that 
“there  is  a  way  of  grasping  a  rule  which  is  not  an  interpretation”36.   For 
Wittgenstein, once we free ourselves of the assumption that following a rule 
will always involve interpretation, will always involve something other than 
the  rule  itself,  the  apparent  choice  between  the  mediating  entity  and  the 
sceptical paradox does not even get a chance to be considered. 
The other two themes developed above in [1.3.3] and [1.3.4] are as close 
as  we  get  to  a  ‘positive’  answer  to  some  of  these  puzzles.  We  ought  to 
remember,  Wittgenstein  tells  us,  how  basic  and  straight-forward  rule-
following is in our everyday lives, how rule-following only takes place within 
the practice of following rules.  And these thoughts,  it  seems, are meant to 
remove  any  frustration  we  have  in  not  being  able  to  find  a  complicated 
answer to the correctness question. Moreover,  the appeal  to convention is, 
somehow, meant to satisfy that question. 
But frustration remains. In particular, it is as yet unclear precisely how 
Wittgenstein’s appeal to custom, practice or convention is meant to figure in 
his thinking; at what level such an appeal is to be made. There is a genuine 
concern for interpreters of Wittgenstein to make this as precise as one would 
like. On the one hand, Wittgenstein’s remarks can appear to admit of a banal 
reading  which  has  Wittgenstein  arguing  for  things  that,  whilst  true,  are 
36 PI I §201.
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hardly  insightful.  This  would  have  Wittgenstein  saying  things  like:  ‘there 
would no such thing as following a rule save for shared human agreement in 
judgement’. We would not be able to communicate with one another; there 
would be no such thing as meaning if it where not for some conventions. But 
that, we might reasonably say, is obvious. Of course the meaning of a word 
depends  to some extent on community or convention. And what conventions 
there are depends on the kind of creatures we are, what things seem natural 
to us,  what limitations we have. If  that  was Wittgenstein’s  message in the 
rule-following passages then he is telling us very little indeed. 
On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s remarks can be read as fantastical; 
by  giving  full  weight  to  the  appeal  of  ‘convention’.  This  would  have 
Wittgenstein arguing that at every stage of following a rule, or using a word, 
a decision is required as to the way to proceed. Moreover, the ‘correct’ way of 
proceeding is established only by our explicitly treating it as the correct way 
to  proceed.  Convention,  community  or  agreement  functions  as  the  link 
between a rule and what counts as accord with it. That would be a radical 
thesis  if  it  were  actually  Wittgenstein’s  view.  But  if  it  were  Wittgenstein 
would have to be read as offering an inconsistent picture, for ‘convention’ is 
now appearing in the place where a mediating entity would sit. As we saw in 
[1.3.1] this is precisely what Wittgenstein was arguing against: nothing can 
fulfil the role of the mediating entity or ‘interpretation’ because there is no 
requirement  for  that  role  whatsoever.  So,  it  seems,  pushing the  appeal  to 
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‘convention’  to  a  point  where  it  becomes  interesting  and  controversial  is 
pushing it to a point that contradicts Wittgenstein avowed views.
This is of course just a sketch of a problem. The next chapter will show 
that  this  problem appears  when one examines  the classic  literature on the 
rule-following  ‘problematic’.  The  remaining  chapters  of  Part  One  will 
examine  whether  a  satisfying  middle  ground  reading  of  Wittgenstein  is 
possible. One, that is, that has Wittgenstein saying something both non-banal 
and coherent. 
[1.5] Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the four central themes of Wittgenstein’s discussion 
of rule-following. These are: [1] The internal relationship between a rule and 
its requirements; [2] The rejection of rule scepticism; [3] The recognition that, 
in a certain sense, we follow rules ‘without reasons’ and; [4] The appeal to 
shared agreement in judgements and social conventions. I have briefly raised 
a concern that these themes do not appear to fit together in a way that has 
Wittgenstein arguing for a position both non-banal and coherent.  The aim of 
Chapter Two is to develop this general concern into a substantial problem.
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Chapter Two
First Attempts to Unify the Four Themes
[2.1] Introduction
Chapter  One  identified  four  themes  in  Wittgenstein’s  discussion  of  rule-
following. These were:  [1] The internal  relationship between a rule and its 
requirements; [2] The rejection of rule scepticism; [3] The recognition that, in a 
certain sense, we follow rules ‘without reasons’ and; [4] The appeal to shared 
agreement  in  judgements  and social  conventions.  I  argued  that,  on a  first 
reading at least,  making these four themes cohere in an interesting way is 
going to be at best difficult.
This  chapter  aims  at  demonstrating  just  how  difficult  the  task  is 
through  examination  of  some  of  the  most  prominent  and  influential 
secondary  literature  on  the  subject.  I  will  argue  that  these  leading 
interpretations of Wittgenstein fall into two camps. On the one side there are 
those who read Wittgenstein as offering a radical and challenging account of 
what it is to follow a rule. This will be labelled the ‘Fantastical Wing’. [2.2] 
will  use  Dummett’s  claim  that  Wittgenstein  was  a  ‘full-blooded 
conventionalist’  about  logical  necessity  as  an  example  of  a  ‘Fantastical’ 
interpretation. Dummett’s Wittgenstein offers a radical thesis which gives real 
content to the appeal to shared biological ancestry and social environment. 
The  problem  with  it,  insofar  as  it  represents  Wittgenstein,  is  that  it 
contravenes  the  other  themes  identified  in  Wittgenstein’s  discussion;  most 
notably the internal relation between a rule and its requirements. On the other 
side of the interpretative divide are those who read Wittgenstein as offering a 
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true  but  utterly  uninteresting  account.  Such readings  dilute  Wittgenstein’s 
appeal  to  convention  and  position  it  in  such  a  way  that  nobody  could 
seriously deny what was being presented as the Wittgensteinian thought. This 
will be labelled the ‘Banal Wing’. [2.3] will use part of Baker and Hacker’s 
analytical  commentary  on  the  Investigations as  an  example  of  a  ‘Banal’ 
interpretation.  What  remains  appears  to  be  a  no-win  situation:  either 
Wittgenstein is offering an account of no interest or, if we build real content 
into  the appeal  to  convention,  he is  offering  an interesting  but  incoherent 
position.  Subsequent  chapters  will  examine  if  it  is  possible  to  read 
Wittgenstein as adopting a position on the knife edge: both interesting and 
coherent. The role of [2.4] is to set out a kind of philosophical ‘roadblock’: one 
that must be avoided by any such position. Nagel’s comments on realism are 
used to question the very possibility of the position at once both interesting 
and coherent. This will serve to highlight just how difficult the task for the 
remainder of Part One will be.
[2.2] The Fantastical Wing: Dummett
I  want  to  use  Dummett’s  classic  paper  “Wittgenstein’s  Philosophy  of 
Mathematics” as an example of a ‘Fantastical’ interpretation of Wittgenstein. 
Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics holds that mathematical objects 
exist  and  stand  in  certain  relations  independently of  us.  The  job  of  the 
mathematician  is  to  discover  these  objects  and  the  relationships  between 
them.  For  the  Platonist  the  meaning  of  mathematical  statements  is  to  be 
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explained  in  terms  of  the  truth-conditions  of  those  statements.  For  each 
statement something in reality settles whether it is true or whether it is false. 
Constructivism, by contrast, holds that we make or construct the entities of 
mathematics  ‘as  we  go  along’.  For  the  constructivist,  the  meaning  of 
mathematical statements is to be explained in terms of justified assertion. The 
crucial  part  of Dummett’s  paper for our discussion is the interpretation of 
Wittgenstein on offer. Dummett’s paper proceeds by taking a specific issue: 
logical necessity. 
Logical  necessity  throws  up  familiar  problems  of  constitution  and 
epistemology to those encountered with rule-following in Chapter One. First, 
what is the source of the necessity? In what way is it settled that something 
holds not just in this world, but across all possible worlds? Second, how do 
we know that something is necessary? We can discover whether something is 
true. But how are we to discover that it  must be true? Dummett argues that 
Wittgenstein  is  a  ‘conventionalist’  about  logical  necessity.  Such  a  view 
provides the following answer: ‘Necessity is imposed by us on language. A 
statement is necessary by virtue of our having chosen not to count anything 
as falsifying it.’  
Dummett  claims  that  a  weak  conventionalist  account  of  logical 
necessity is widespread. “On this view, although all necessity derives from 
linguistic  conventions  that  we have adopted,  the  derivation  is  not  always 
direct.”37 Some necessary statements are straight-forwardly set down; others 
are  merely  consequences of  conventions.  Dummett’s  example  is  colour. 
37 Dummett (1959), p.328.
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‘Nothing can at the same time be green and blue all over’ is a direct register of 
convention. This is because there is no training in the use of colour words that 
demonstrates that we should not call something on the borderline between 
green and blue ‘both green and blue’. On the other hand, ‘Nothing can at the 
same time be  green  and red all  over’  is  a  consequence  of  convention –  a 
consequence of the meaning we assign to the colour words involved. There is 
no need to train someone to recognise that we should not call something ‘both 
green and red’, for it is implicit in understanding the meaning of ‘green’ and 
‘red’.  When  applied  to  mathematics,  this  conventionalist  thought  runs  as 
follows:  the  axioms  of  mathematics  are  necessary  because  they  are  direct 
registers of conventions. The job of the mathematician, then, is to discover the 
various consequences of our having adopted such-and-such conventions. 
Dummett thinks that this ‘standard’ conventionalism will simply not 
do: “This account is entirely superficial and throws away all the advantages 
of conventionalism”.38 The objection is that ‘standard’ conventionalism leaves 
an  unexplained  and  embedded  necessity  at  work,  so  cannot  itself  be  an 
account of logical necessity. We are told that that some things are logically 
necessary because they are consequences of certain conventions. But given the 
conventions, there must be an explanation of why certain consequences must 
follow,  why  the  consequences  are  necessary.  ‘Standard’  conventionalism 
cannot provide us with an answer to this question as it “leaves no room for 
38 Dummett (1959), p.328.
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any  further  such  convention”39 which  would  account  for  this  embedded 
necessity. 
Dummett  understands  Wittgenstein  as  avoiding  this  objection  by 
adopting  what  is  called  ‘full-blooded’  conventionalism.  For  him,  logical 
necessity is always a direct expression of a linguistic convention:
That  a  given  statement  is  necessary  consists  always  in  our  having 
expressly decided to treat that very statement as unassailable; it cannot 
rest on our having adopted certain other conventions which are found 
to involve our treating it so.40
The example Dummett offers is that of counting. The first criterion we would 
adopt  for  saying  there  are  a  certain  number  of  children  in  a  room is  the 
process of counting. If, however, we found out that there are five boys and 
seven girls in the room we would then say there are twelve children in total, 
without bothering to count them all. This second way is a new criterion for 
saying there are twelve children from simply counting them all.  Dummett 
claims that because we have what appear to be genuinely distinct criteria for 
the  statement  ‘there  are  n children  in  the room’ we thereby  appear  to  be 
accepting the possibility of a clash. A clash, that is, of the results when the 
distinct  criteria  are  applied.  But,  the  conventionalist  will  respond,  “the 
necessity of ‘5 + 7 = 12’ consists just in this, that we do not count anything as a 
clash”41.
Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following are taken to support such an 
interpretation. A mathematical proof proceeds according to certain rules of 
39 Dummett (1959), p.329.
40 Dummett (1959), p.329.
41 Dummett (1959), p.329.
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inference. It is natural, as expressed in [1.3.1], to think that once the ‘wheels 
are in motion’, once the proof starts, we are passive spectators of the process. 
For Dummett, Wittgenstein holds that it is up to us to decide, at any given 
stage of the process, whether we will accept or reject the proof: we have a 
decision to make at each stage.
It  would  almost  be  more  correct  to  say,  not  that  an  intuition  was 
needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every 
stage.42  
On this understanding, for Wittgenstein there is nothing which forces us to go 
this way or that, there is no super-rigid machinery or rules as rails to which 
we attach our minds and hold on. Wittgenstein, in Dummett’s eyes, is saying 
that  if  we  accept  the  proof  we  thereby  confer  necessity  on  the  theorem 
proved. “In doing this we are making a new decision, and not merely making 
explicit a decision we had already made implicitly.”43
By way of example Dummett asks us to imagine a statement of some 
mathematical theory. The Platonist will hold that there exists either a proof or 
a disproof of that statement.  If  the statement is  true the fact that it  is true 
consists  in  an  independently  existing  proof  –  even  though  we  are  yet  to 
discover such a proof. Suppose that there is, somewhere, an actual piece of 
paper (unseen by man) on which is written something that claims to be a 
proof of the statement. Dummett reads Wittgenstein as maintaining, against 
the Platonist, that there still does not exist a proof – for when we discover the 
42 PI I §186.
43 Dummett (1959), p.330.
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document “it is still up to us to decide whether or not we wish to count it as a 
proof.”44
Dummett claims that, for Wittgenstein, it is up to us to decide whether 
or  not  to  regard  a  statement  as  holding  necessarily:  in  laying  down  that 
something holds necessarily we can in some way determine the sense of the 
words used;  and we can attach whatever  sense we wish to  the words we 
employ. “Against this one would like to say that the senses of the words in 
the statement may have already been fully determined”45. Dummett’s concern 
is that the sense of a particular word may already have been settled such that 
no further determination is possible. This concern will be shared by almost all 
in  this  discussion.  The  realist  will  explain  the  sense  of  a  statement  by 
appealing  to  the  truth-conditions  of  that  statement.  He  might  say,  for 
example,  that “it is by reference to the truth-tables that one justifies taking 
certain  forms  as  logically  true.”46 The  ‘intuitionist’  replaces  the  notions  of 
truth and falsity with the idea that what explains the sense of a statement is 
the criteria for justified assertion of that statement. For example, specifying 
the sense of ‘or’ comes to saying: we are justified in asserting ‘P or Q’ only 
when we are justified in asserting P or justified in asserting Q. “A logical law 
holds in virtue of these explanations; by reference to them we see that we 
shall always be justified in asserting a statement of this form.”47 Wittgenstein, 
according  to  Dummett,  is  unimpressed.  Wittgenstein  thinks  that  we  need 
have no regard for the previous employment of  the words contained in a 
44 Dummett (1959), p.332.
45 Dummett (1959), p.336.
46 Dummett (1959), p.337.
47 Dummett (1959), p.337.
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statement, that we need not abide by any senses attached previously to those 
words: for, in fact, there is nothing to be abided by at all. 
“If  Wittgenstein  were  right,  it  appears  to  me  that  communication 
would be in constant danger of  simply breaking down.”48 If  we decide  to 
regard a statement as holding necessarily we not only affect the senses of the 
terms  used  in  that  statement.  Other  related  statements  will  be,  to  use 
Dummett’s term, ‘infected’ by our decision. Thus, in order to account for the 
senses of other statements we would need to refer to our taking the original 
statement as holding necessarily.
Thus it will become impossible to give an account of the sense of any 
statement without giving an account of the sense of every statement, 
and  since  it  is  of  the  essence  of  language  that  we  understand  new 
statements, this means that it will be impossible to give an account of 
the use of our language at all.49
We might well think that language and our ability to communicate with one 
another  are  fragile  things,  in  danger  of  breaking  down  at  any  moment. 
Dummett’s point is that they cannot be this fragile though.
Against [Wittgenstein] I wish […] to set the conventional view that in 
deciding to regard a form of words as necessary, or to count such-and-
such as a criterion for making a statement of a certain kind, we have a 
responsibility  to  the  sense  we  have  already  given  to  the  words  of 
which the statement is composed.50
48 Dummett (1959), p.337.
49 Dummett (1959), p.337.
50 Dummett (1959), p.340.
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Here  Dummett  is  endorsing  the  natural  view  that  when  we  count  an 
expression as being necessary we must remain faithful to the meaning the 
terms of the expression already have.
It  is  easy to sympathise with Dummett’s  worries  about the view he 
finds in Wittgenstein. The idea that at each stage of a mathematical proof, at 
each step of acting on the instruction of a rule, indeed whenever we use a word 
or expression to communicate, it is somehow a matter of decision to go this 
way rather than that strikes one as at best odd. If it were the case why would 
we  bother  adopting  certain  rules?  What,  we  might  say,  would  the 
‘ceremonies’ of attaching names to things be for? There would be no point in 
teaching the child what ‘addition’ meant if we were free at any point to decide 
it means something in no way related to its previous meaning. The important 
question for  us,  of  course,  is  whether  Dummett’s  interpretation represents 
what Wittgenstein actually thought. I think it clearly does not.
I argued in [1.3.1] that one of the central claims of the rule-following 
passages  is  that  there  is  an  internal  relationship  between  a  rule  and  its 
requirements. The rule is the rule it is because certain ways of proceeding are 
in accordance with it, others not. It is tempting to assume that there must be 
something more to it than that. Wittgenstein, as we saw, is at pains to point 
out that nothing does occupy the space of mediation between a rule and its 
requirements  because  there  is  no  such  space  to  occupy.  Wittgenstein,  as 
Dummett understands him, conflicts with this thought. There is something 
that provides a link between a rule and its requirements: convention. It is our 
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deciding (as opposed to the rule itself settling matters) that such-and-such a 
way of proceeding is in accordance with the rule that settles that it is in fact 
the  correct  way  of  proceeding.  ‘Convention’  is,  for  Dummett’s  reading  of 
Wittgenstein, what glues together a rule and its requirements. It is for this 
reason that Dummett’s interpretation appears so unsatisfactory: it so blatantly 
contradicts one of Wittgenstein’s central claims about rules.
It  is  worth  pointing  out  the  positives  of  Dummett’s  interpretation. 
Dummett engages with and gives a central role to Wittgenstein’s appeal to 
custom and convention. Any satisfactory interpretation of the rule-following 
passages  must  do  this.  In  doing  so,  Dummett  ascribes  to  Wittgenstein  a 
challenging and novel  thesis;  albeit  one that  would strike many as simply 
wrong. The problem, as was suspected in [1.4], is that in making the appeal to 
convention central it is hard to see how the other themes, in particular the 
internal relationship between a rule and its requirements, is to be respected. 
Unless  we  are  willing  to  read  Wittgenstein  as  succumbing  to  an  obvious 
contradiction, Dummett’s interpretation is to be resisted.   
It  is  also worthwhile  to  point  out that  Dummett  is  being used as a 
figurehead for a family of interpretations which stand on the ‘Fantastical’ side 
of the divide I am attempting to draw. There are others who fall into this 
camp (although I  will  not  have  space  to  discuss  them here).  Kripke51,  for 
example, reads in Wittgenstein an extreme form of scepticism like that briefly 
discussed  and  rejected  in  [1.3.2].  Wright52 develops  a  strikingly  similar 
51 Kripke (1981)
52 Wright (2001)
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interpretation. Both authors share, just as Dummett, the fault of latching onto 
a part of Wittgenstein’s discussion and developing it in such a way that it 
conflicts  with  other  aspects  of  Wittgenstein’s  thought.  Both  authors  are 
heavily influenced by Dummett, in particular the ‘anti-realist’ conception of 
the later Wittgenstein’s thought.   
[2.3] The Banal Wing: Baker and Hacker
Baker and Hacker argue against Dummett’s attribution of conventionalism to 
Wittgenstein:
If  ‘moderate  conventionalism’  and  ‘full-blooded  conventionalism’ 
exhaust the possible forms of conventionalism, then there can be no 
doubt  that  Wittgenstein’s  explanations  of  the  character  of  necessary 
propositions should not be pigeon-holed as ‘conventionalism’.53
Backer  and  Hacker  claim  that,  in  some sense,  there  is  justice  in  calling 
Wittgenstein a conventionalist. But it turns out to be neither ‘full-blooded’ nor 
‘moderate’  so conceived.  For Baker and Hacker,  to think that Wittgenstein 
advances conventionalism in either of its established forms displays a serious 
misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s remarks on following a rule. The task for 
this section is to discover in what sense Baker and Hacker read Wittgenstein as 
a ‘conventionalist’ and question whether, as they put it, the view they develop 
“avoids the anxiety that something deep has been trivialized.”54 I will argue 
that there is such an anxiety and it is not avoided.
53 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.345.
54 Baker and Hacker (1985) p.92.
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Our question has been this: What is Wittgenstein doing in the remarks 
on following a rule? Baker and Hacker accept that it is tempting to interpret 
Wittgenstein as advocating a kind of scepticism about rules. We have seen 
why  there  is  temptation  towards  a  kind  of  scepticism  in  Wittgenstein’s 
remarks  in  [1.3.2].  Baker  and  Hacker  think,  rightly,  that  interpreting 
Wittgenstein as embracing such scepticism is wrong:
Wittgenstein did not urge us to abandon the convictions that we know 
what acts accord with a rule and that a formula (expression of rule) 
does determine what steps are to be taken.55
This, Baker and Hacker tell us, cannot be intelligibly disputed. These theses 
are simply part of the grammar of the concepts  rule and following a rule. 
Wittgenstein thought it wrong to suggest that what determines whether an 
act  accords  with  a  rule  is  something  other  than  the  rule  itself.  The  drive 
towards  scepticism  is  resisted  by  an  understanding  of  the  internal 
relationship between a rule and its requirements: only if one thinks that there 
must be a mediating entity does one start down the path to scepticism. So, 
contrary  to  Dummett,  the  rule  does  indeed  determine  what  acting  in 
accordance with the rule will amount to. It is not ‘up for grabs’ at each stage 
of  the  process.  To  understand  Wittgenstein’s  actual  intentions,  Baker  and 
Hacker  suggest  we  need  to  trace  the  development  of  his  thought  on  the 
question of what is called the “harmony between language and reality.”56 The 
relationship between a rule and acts in accord with it is but one example of 
55 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.82.
56 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.85.
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the relationship between language and reality – others include fulfilment of 
an expectation, satisfaction of a desire and so on. In each of these cases there 
seems to be a correspondence between something in language and something 
in the world. 
Baker and Hacker argue that  the representational theory of meaning 
developed  in  the  Tractatus was  designed  to  answer  the  question  of  the 
relationship between language and reality.  The theory – at least according to 
Baker and Hacker – held that an elementary proposition is a model of reality; 
a logical picture of a state of affairs which would make the proposition true if 
the states of affairs were actualised. The proposition determines reality except 
for a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’. The relation between a true proposition and the fact that 
verifies it is  internal. A relation is internal if it is unthinkable “that  these two 
objects should not stand in this relation.”57 So, it is inconceivable that the state 
of affairs pictured in the proposition be actualised and the proposition not be 
true.  This  turns  out  (for  Baker  and  Hacker)  to  be  a  version  of  the 
correspondence theory of truth.
Setting aside whether this is a plausible interpretation of the Tractatus, 
how exactly would this view resolve the relationship between language and 
reality? Baker and Hacker’s answer is this: “The possibility of propositions 
depends on their being essentially connected with situations because they are 
composed of signs which represent objects.”58 Whilst not actually functioning 
as  an  intermediary  between  the  two,  Baker  and  Hacker  have  the  early 
57 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.86, footnote.
58 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.86.
49
Wittgenstein holding that possible situations are, as it were, “shadows that 
mediate between propositions and facts.”59
When Wittgenstein returned to these matters in the 1930’s, Baker and 
Hacker  continue,  he  initially  extended  the  scope  of  apparent  harmony 
between  and  language  and  reality  to  include  examples  such  as  the 
relationship  between  an  expectation  and  its  fulfilment.  For  example,  my 
expectation  that  a  gun  will  go  off  seems  to  anticipate  its  fulfilment.  The 
expectation cannot  contain the event of the gun going off because it has not 
happened yet, and may never happen. The expectation nonetheless pictures a 
possibility (the gun going off)  realisation of  which is  the fulfilment of  the 
expectation. Here Wittgenstein was deploying a shadowy intermediary – a 
possibility  –  to  link  language  and  reality.  This  reference  to  shadowy 
possibilities should remind us of §§193-4 which were examined (and puzzled 
over) in [1.3.1]. Those remarks make more sense when viewed as an attack on 
Wittgenstein’s own earlier position, for it might there have seemed strange 
that  anyone  would  posit  possibilities  as  an  answer  to  the  ‘correctness 
question’.
Baker and Hacker argue that the discussion of rule-following in the 
Investigations is  designed  to  shatter  these  “logico-metaphysical  illusions”60. 
The apparent harmony between language and reality is actually, they say, ‘an 
echo of grammar’; what appears to be a metaphysical correspondence is really 
a  grammatical  articulation.  For  example,  ‘the  expectation  that  p’  =df. ‘the 
59 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.86.
60 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.88.
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expectation that is fulfilled by the event p’. Instead of something ‘shadowy’ or 
‘hidden’ the harmony between language and reality is completely transparent 
in grammar. An expectation and its fulfilment are connected in language. The 
same strategy is applied to the relationship between a proposition and a fact. 
“Facts and true propositions are connected in various ways by familiar rules 
of grammar.”61 For example, ‘it is a fact that  p’ is interchangeable with ‘it is 
true  that  p’  or  ‘the  proposition  that  p is  true’.  Wittgenstein’s  point,  argue 
Baker  and  Hacker,  is  that  there  is  no  fitting  of  entities  from  different 
metaphysical realms – language and reality; rather true propositions and facts 
belong to each other: they make contact in language.
It is in language that a rule and the act in accord with it (or a rule and its 
‘extension’)  make  contact.  This  point  […]  is  fundamental  to 
understanding the discussion of following rules in the Investigations.62
Baker and Hacker quite nicely clarify the claim that a rule and what accords 
with it are grammatically (or internally) related. Nothing mediates between a 
rule and what accords with, they argue, precisely because no third thing is 
needed to cement  an internal  relation.  To say that  A and B are  internally 
related is to say that it is inconceivable that they should not be related so. It is 
“of the essence of A and B to be thus related.”63 An internal relation between 
two objects is different in kind to an external relation. One ought not to think 
that there are relations between A and B and we need to investigate which are 
61 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.89.
62 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.91.
63 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.104.
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internal and which are not. This would be absurd because we could not grasp 
what A and B were without grasping that they are internally related. 
Baker and Hacker caution against interpreting Wittgenstein as offering 
a “deeply distasteful form of irrationalism.”64 It may initially look otherwise:
How  can  he  know how  he  is  to  continue  a  pattern  by  himself  – 
whatever instruction you give him? – Well, how do I know? – If that 
means “Have I reasons?” the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. 
And then I shall act, without reasons.
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my 
spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”65
What Wittgenstein says is that one’s reasons will  soon give out,  not that I 
have no reasons. For Baker and Hacker, I can give my reasons for acting in a 
certain way when presented with an instruction, but I do not need to provide 
reasons  for  my  reasons.  If  pressed  I  will  quite  quickly  reach  what 
Wittgenstein describes as ‘bedrock’ – a place where justification gives out and 
all I am left with is saying ‘this is what I do’ or ‘this is what is called doing 
thus-and-so.’  This  does  not  entail  that  I  lack  justification  for  my  way  of 
proceeding. On the contrary, argue Baker and Hacker, I can cite the rule I am 
following as  ample  justification.  No  further  justification could  possibly  be 
required “for it makes no sense to justify a grammatical nexus.”66 Equally, to 
say that in basic cases rule-following is a blind practice is not to compare it to 
someone stumbling along the hillside with no idea in which direction to turn. 
It is meant rather to highlight the straightforward and unreflective aspects of 
64 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.105.
65 PI I §211, §217.
66 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.105.
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following certain rules – I know exactly which way to go, the rule always tells 
me the same thing67, and so on. 
These remarks do not signify yawning chasms or irrationality beneath 
our rule-governed activities. On the contrary, they point towards the 
firm grounds of grammar and of our practices of using language. To be 
sure, these have no support, but they no more need support than the 
globe itself.68
So  far,  so  good.  Baker  and  Hacker  have  accounted  for,  and  given 
justice to, the first three themes spelt out in [1.3]. First, they have shown that 
the relationship between a rule and its requirements is internal [1.3.1]. Second, 
they have shown that Wittgenstein thinks there is such a thing as correctly 
following a rule; scepticism is rejected [1.3.2]. Third, they have accounted for 
anti-theoretical strand in Wittgenstein’s thinking [1.3.3]. But this discussion 
has  not  yet  got  us  closer  to  the  sense  in  which  Baker  and  Hacker  think 
Wittgenstein can legitimately be called a ‘conventionalist’: how to incorporate 
the fourth theme [1.3.4].
Of  course  Wittgenstein  stressed  the  importance  of  regularity  and 
agreement for the application of the concept of following a rule. […] 
The issue is not whether it is important, but what its importance is. To 
interpret his observations as parts of a proposal to define ‘accord with a 
rule’ in terms of agreement is unsupported by sound textual evidence 
and it conflicts with his Grundgedanke, that accord is an internal relation 
of an act to a rule.69
67 PI I §223.
68 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.106.
69 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.179.
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Baker  and Hacker  do not  wish to  deny the  importance  of  agreement  and 
consensus  in  Wittgenstein’s  discussion.  They  merely  seek  to  assign  it  the 
proper role within Wittgenstein’s view. Baker and Hacker see it as being part 
of the framework within which the language-game is played. 
But this must be understood to refer to the framework within which the 
concept  of  following  a  rule  has  intelligible  employment,  not  to  the 
explanation of what ‘following a rule’ means.70
If it were not for normal or natural reactions to various gestures, to reading 
charts, and so on the practice of communicating with one another would fall 
apart. But Baker and Hacker want to distinguish the framing possibilities of 
our language-games from the rules and logical laws of those particular games 
we play. Or, in their words:
The grammatical relations that constitute logic are constructed within 
the framework of common agreement, but that consensus in action is 
not the cement that binds together those grammatical relations.71
The general direction of this interpretation must be correct. Wittgenstein did 
not take the appeal to convention to mediate between, or cement together, a 
rule and its requirements. But given the importance Wittgenstein places on 
the  notions  of  agreement,  custom  and  practice,  Baker  and  Hacker  are 
committed to saying that, in  some sense, Wittgenstein was a conventionalist. 
But once we start to put some pressure on what, exactly, one might mean by a 
70 Baker and Hacker (1985) p.248.
71 Baker and Hacker (1985), p.249.
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‘framework’ or in what sense meaning rests on convention, matters seem less 
clear.
The claim that meaning rests on convention, that there would be no 
such thing as meaning without  shared human agreement  in judgement,  is 
liable to strike one as trivial. It is this triviality that Baker and Hacker wanted 
to avoid. Of course it is a matter of convention to do with shared biological 
ancestry and social environment that certain noises or marks on a page mean 
certain things.  If  human beings lacked the ability to see or hear the world 
around them their  systems of  communication would be different  from the 
way they actually are. Signposts, to repeat Wittgenstein’s example, play on 
the shared human reaction of reacting to  the arrow in a certain way. It  is 
matter of shared agreement that we apply certain labels to certain concepts. 
So, for example, it is a matter of convention that ‘+’ means addition. We might 
easily have adopted a different symbol to attach to the concept addition. These 
are trivialities that nobody, including the Platonist, would seek to deny. Our 
question is then: how is notion of a ‘framework’ supposed to be something 
more than trivial? 
We are struggling to see what the appeal to the notion of a ‘framework’ 
is doing if it is not simply to remind us of the obvious. A claim beyond the 
obvious is this: that the meaning of addition is what it is depends on shared 
agreement. That there is that concept at all depends on such agreement. There 
would not be the concept of addition save for shared human agreement in 
judgement:  the concept comes into being by virtue of the shared biological 
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and social agreements. This is offers the hope of something more than mere 
banalities. It holds out the possibility of an opposition to a realist conception 
of reality; that, as it were, there are concepts ‘out there’ and it is our job to 
discover or reach out to them. 
We  need  to  be  careful,  however,  as  to  what  this  non-banal  claim 
actually  means.  One  line  leads  to  standard  conventionalism:  that  certain 
conventions are laid down by our shared agreement in judgements and that 
our task is to map out the consequences of those conventions. This would run 
into the problem discussed above, namely: we would need to explain why 
certain consequences followed and not others. There would be an embedded 
feature at work that the conventionalist could not explain.
Anything more that standard conventionalism (and its problems) will 
end  up  looking  very  like  Dummett’s  interpretation  of  Wittgenstein.  In 
building real content into Wittgenstein’s appeal to the shared biological and 
social  agreements  we  create  serious  interpretative  difficulties.  ‘Agreement’ 
has been pushed to the point where it is no longer banal – no longer a claim 
that everyone would accept – but actually fantastical. The rules are brought 
into being and sustained by us and our practices. What the rule requires is 
settled not by the inherent nature of the rule itself but by us. That places us in 
opposition to the internal relationship between a rule and its requirements. 
This  puts  would-be  interpreters  of  Wittgenstein  in  a  difficult  position:  It 
seems that  either Wittgenstein is offering an account of no interest or, if we 
build  real  content  into  the  appeal  to  shared  agreement,  he  is  offering  an 
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interesting but incoherent position. It would be nice if we could avoid this 
supposed choice. 
[2.4] A Roadblock: Nagel
Subsequent  chapters  will  assess  recent  attempts  to  find  a  middle  ground 
between ‘Fantastical’ and ‘Banal’ interpretations. In this section I want to set 
up the worry that we will not find any middle ground as there simply is no 
conceptual space for such a position to occupy.  
Nagel  seeks  to  defend  a  certain  form  of  realism:  the  world  is 
independent of, and extends beyond the reach of, our minds.
there may be aspects of reality beyond [our] reach because they are 
altogether beyond our capacity to form conceptions of the world. What 
there  is  and what  we,  in  virtue  of  our nature,  can  think  about  are 
different things, and the latter may be smaller than the former.72 
Nagel takes idealism to be the view that what there is is what we can think 
about or conceive of. The idea of something that we could not think about or 
conceive of makes no sense whatsoever for the idealist. Put like that, idealism 
seems to require an inflated sense of self-importance. We are such small and 
contingent parts of the universe – why should we think that the world is our 
world? Indeed, argues Nagel, idealism is so odd no one would hold it unless 
they had good reason to deny what he calls the ‘natural picture’.
The ‘natural picture’ is this: human beings have gradually developed 
the capacities to think about, to know about, more and more aspects of reality. 
72 Nagel (1986), p.91.
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In the course of such development there will have been things of which we 
could not conceive of which we can conceive of today. It is natural to assume, 
then, that there are things which we cannot currently conceive of yet might 
one day come to grasp. 
and there are probably still others that we lack the capacity to conceive 
not  merely  because  we  are  at  too  early  a  stage  of  historical 
development, but because of the kind of beings we are.73
That is, there are some things or aspects of reality of which we can never have 
a conception. 
Nagel claims the idealist argument against the natural picture is this: If 
we try to make sense of the idea that there are things we cannot and could 
never  conceive  of,  we  must  deploy  notions  like:  something  existing, 
something being the case, and so on. The idealist will argue that these basic 
ideas cannot go beyond specific ideas of certain things existing, certain things 
being the case.
We do not,  in other words, possess a completely general concept of 
reality that reaches beyond any possible filling in of its content that we 
could in principle understand.74
Nagel  cites  Davidson75 as  an example of  someone who holds this  kind of 
idealism. Davidson argues that we do not possess a general concept of truth 
that goes beyond the truth of all possible sentences in any language that we 
could understand, or that could be translated into a language that we could 
73 Nagel (1986), p.92.
74 Nagel (1986), p.94.
75 Davidson (2001)
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understand. He rejects the idea of a conceptual scheme that genuinely applies 
to the world but is so removed from our own: if we try to get some grip on 
something we could never  conceive we find that we have to deploy ideas 
which  imply  that  we  could  (at  least  in  principle)  think  about  it  after  all. 
Realists are deluded, then, in thinking we have a stable idea of reality above 
and  beyond  the  reach  of  human  thought.  Either  our  ideas  about  the 
inconceivable  will  turn  out  to  be  empty,  not  genuine  ideas  at  all,  or  will 
simply display that what was supposed to be beyond us was, after all, within 
our grasp all along.
Nagel thinks that the idealist is wrong. His strategy is to provide an 
analogy that undermines the idealist thought. We think that there are plenty 
of  human  beings  who  simply  lack  the  capacity  to  think  about  (know, 
conceive) things which other members of the species can. For example, those 
who have a permanent mental age of nine cannot come to understand various 
complex mathematical theorems. It is natural to imagine that there are beings 
that are related to us as we are to the nine year olds. Such beings would be 
capable  of  understanding  aspects  of  the  world  that  our  beyond  our 
comprehension. Whether these beings exist is irrelevant, what matters is that 
if such creatures exist what they say about reality is true. 
Nagel  expands the analogy by asking us to  imagine a realist  and a 
Davidson  emerging  in  the  community  of  nine  years  olds.  Realist  junior 
wonders whether there are things about the world that he and others like him 
are incapable of  ever finding out about or understanding. Would we really 
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want to deny the nine year old realist has a genuine belief? If he did think that 
there are things about the world beyond his ken, the junior realist would not 
only be having a significant belief, his belief would also be true: that there are 
concepts usable by other types of minds, which apply to the world and can be 
used to formulate truths about it. “Wouldn’t a nine-year-old Davidson who 
rose among them be wrong?”76 If we conclude that Nagel is right, then it is 
supposed to follow that our Davidson is wrong too.
It is not the aim of this section to resolve the dispute between Nagel 
and Davidson. It might be questioned, for example, to what extent (if any) it is 
right to call Davidson an idealist. Our task, however, is to see what this has to 
do with Wittgenstein and the desire, expressed at the end of the last section, 
that we find a middle way between ‘Fantastical’ and ‘Banal’ interpretations of 
the rule-following passages. 
Nagel  thinks  that  the  Investigations provides  contemporary  idealism 
with much of its popularity.  He explicitly draws our attention to the rule-
following passages:
it  is  only  within  a  community  of  actual  or  possible  users  of  the 
language  that  there  can  exist  that  possibility  of  agreement  in  its 
application which is a condition of the existence of rules, and of the 
distinction between getting it right and getting it wrong.77  
76 Nagel (1986), p.97.
77 Nagel (1986), p.105.
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This  remark  suggests  that  Nagel  is  on  the  side  of  the  ‘Fantastical’ 
interpretations. Indeed, he explicitly allies himself to readings of Wittgenstein 
offered by Dummett and Kripke. Wittgenstein’s view, Nagel tells us,
clearly implies that any thoughts we can have of a mind-independent 
reality must remain within the boundaries set by our human form of 
life, and that we can’t appeal to a completely general idea of what there 
is  to  defend  the  existence  of  kinds  of  facts  which  are  in  principle 
beyond the possibility of human confirmation or agreement.78 
Nagel takes this to stand in direct opposition to his realist account. We could 
not  hold,  Wittgenstein  is  being  understood  as  saying,  thoughts  entirely 
divorced from human minds and practices. 
But  in  what  sense  do  we  have  a  ‘roadblock’?  The  thought  being 
presented is that a rejection of the kind of realism under discussion entails 
idealism.  So,  the  thought  runs,  either  Wittgenstein  is  appealing  to  shared 
biological and social judgements in an interesting and developed way or not. 
If he is, he must be an idealist. There is no space for a position that makes a 
genuine appeal to shared judgements and also retains a realist perspective. 
But  commitment  to  the  internal  relationship  between  a  rule  and  its 
requirements is a commitment to a form of realism. In short, there is no space 
for a ‘middle-ground’. 
[2.5] Conclusion
78 Nagel (1986), p.106/7
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I  have argued that the secondary literature on Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
rule-following demonstrates just how difficult it is to make the four central 
themes  cohere  in  an  interesting  and  plausible  way.  [2.2]  used  Dummett’s 
attribution of ‘full-blooded conventionalism’ to Wittgenstein as an example of 
a  ‘Fantastical’  reading.  If  it  were  a  true  interpretation  it  would  mean 
Wittgenstein was arguing for a blatantly incoherent position. [2.3] used Baker 
and Hacker’s view as an example of a ‘Banal’ reading. It gave no real content 
to  Wittgenstein’s  appeal  to  convention.  The problem is  that  in giving real 
content to that appeal we ‘topple over’ into something ‘fantastical’. What we 
want is  a view that  balances on the knife-edge:  is  at once both more than 
banal yet coherent.  [2.4] offered a ‘roadblock’ to this desire.  Nagel holds a 
certain kind of realism. Rejecting that realism immediately commits one, in 
Nagel’s eyes, to a kind of idealism. There is no middle ground. In the terms of 
Wittgenstein’s  discussion this  comes out as:  either  Wittgenstein  appeals  to 
shared biological and social agreement is some way settling the requirements 
of a rule or he does not. If he does he is committed to idealism: there is no 
‘wiggle room’.  
The remaining two chapters of Part One will assess interpretations of 
Wittgenstein  on whether  or  not  they offer  a  position both interesting  and 
coherent.  Chapter  Three  will  examine  two  attempts  from  ‘Fantastical’ 
interpreters – one by Dummett, another by Wright – to modify their readings 
of  Wittgenstein.  I  will  argue  that  both  of  these  attempts  fail  to  offer  a 
satisfactory middle way. Chapter Four will examine McDowell’s attempt to 
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move from a ‘Banal’ reading towards the centre ground. I will argue that this 
is more promising; although there is great difficulty in working out precisely 
what McDowell is saying.    
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Chapter Three
Modifying the Fantastical: Dummett and Wright
[3.1] Introduction
Chapter  Two  argued  that  initial  and  influential  interpretations  of 
Wittgenstein’s comments on rules fall into one of two camps: the ‘Fantastical’ 
or the ‘Banal’.  Philosophers  in the latter  camp do not,  I  argued,  recognise 
Wittgenstein’s  appeal  to  shared biological  ancestry  and social  background 
beyond mere trivial reminders that nobody could sensibly dispute. They do 
not do so because it seems they cannot do so; on pain of reading Wittgenstein 
as offering an incoherent account. Philosophers in the first camp attribute to 
Wittgenstein  radical  and  challenging  theses  (Dummett’s  ‘full-blooded 
conventionalism’ was our example) but in doing so they run headlong into 
such  incoherence.  The  question  for  the  remaining  chapters  of  Part  One, 
framed by Nagel’s challenging contention that there is no conceptual space 
for such a view, is whether Wittgenstein actually held a view both coherent 
and non-trivial.
Chapter’s Three and Four are designed to work together at answering 
this  question.  Chapter  Four  will  start  from  the  ‘Banal’,  with  Baker  and 
Hacker’s claim that the appeal to shared agreement functions as recognising 
the ‘framework’ within which the practice of rule-following proceeds, and see 
if  something  more  substantial  can  be  offered  without  slipping  into 
incoherence.  This  will  involve  an  assessment  of  McDowell’s  perplexing 
interpretation of Wittgenstein. Here, in Chapter Three, the aim is to examine a 
move in the opposite direction: starting from the ‘Fantastical’ and attempting 
64
to modify (or, we might say, soften) the reading to the point where all four 
themes  indemnified  in  [1.3]  can  be  held  consistently.  Both  Dummett  and 
Wright have, in recent years, attempted such moves. 
I  will argue that there is symmetry between Dummett and Wright’s 
modified  interpretations.  Both  seek  to  reconcile  the  fantastical  aspects  of 
Wittgenstein’s  remarks  with  the  trivialities  and  both  fail  in  this  attempt. 
Dummett characterises Wittgenstein as accommodating the truism that a rule 
and  its  requirements  are  internally  related  with  the  appeal  to  shared 
agreement in judgement in a way that allows us to keep the words but loses 
the  whole  content  of,  the  whole  point  of,  the  internal  relation.  Wright 
characterises Wittgenstein as accommodating the rejection of rule-scepticism 
with  the  appeal  to  the  ungroundedness  of  rules  in  a  way  that  points  to 
scepticism  rather  than  resists  it.  Neither  of  these  attempts  can  hide  their 
‘Fantastical’ roots and both collapse back into that camp. The conclusion will 
not,  however,  be  entirely  negative.  Both  Dummett  and  Wright  highlight 
notions  which  will  require  more  investigation:  the  notion  of  a  view from 
‘sideways-on’, and a kind of Quietism. Chapter Four, by way of McDowell, 
will carry out that investigation. 
[3.2] Dummett
I protested against Dummett’s initial interpretation of Wittgenstein [2.2] not 
only that the view on offer was implausible but that it could not possibly have 
been  Wittgenstein’s.  Dummett’s  reading  did  account  for  Wittgenstein’s 
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appeal to shared agreement in judgement [1.3.4], and it did so in a way that 
made Wittgenstein’s view challenging and interesting. But this came at the 
price of incoherence. Dummett’s initial interpretation holds that convention 
or  custom  holds  a  rule  and  its  requirements  together;  it  is  only  by  our 
expressly deciding that a rule has such and such requirements that it actually 
has those requirements.  The actual  Wittgenstein  held that  the rule  and its 
requirements are internally related [1.3.1]: nothing functions, because nothing 
could possibly be required to function, as an intermediary between a rule and 
its requirements.
Dummett’s  initial  interpretation  has  been  criticised  by  various 
commentators. The best way to introduce the new, refined, interpretation is to 
examine some of this criticism and what might be said on Dummett’s behalf. 
One of the most influential commentators has been Stroud.
[3.2.1] Stroud’s Objection
Despite  suggestions  of  […]  “standard  conventionalism”  in 
Wittgenstein, I agree with Dummett that he does not hold such a view, 
although it is not always easy to see how what he says differs from it.79
Stroud’s  aim  is  to  show  that  Wittgenstein  was  neither  a  standard 
conventionalist nor, as it will turn out, a full-blooded conventionalist. Stroud 
asks us to consider Wittgenstein’s examples of peculiar groups or individuals, 
such as the pupil who when ordered to continue the series +2 beyond 1000 
answers: ‘1004, 1008, 1012 …’. Wittgenstein describes the pupil as finding it 
79 Stroud (1965) p.505.
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natural to go that way, natural to think that this is the same as going ‘996, 998, 
1000 …’. Giving the pupil the same old training is pointless. It would be just 
like trying to teach someone to ‘go in that direction’ by pointing where that 
person naturally looks at the direction from the fingertip to the wrist rather 
than wrist to fingertip. Or, to use another of Wittgenstein’s examples, a tribe 
who find it natural to sell wood on the basis of the area covered by a pile of 
wood, ignoring the height of the pile. 
How could I shew them that – as I should say – you don’t really buy 
more wood if you buy a pile covering a bigger area? – I should, for 
instance, take a pile which was small by their ideas and, by laying the 
logs around, change it into a ‘big’ one. This might convince them – but 
perhaps they would say: “Yes, now it’s a lot of wood and costs more” – 
and that would be the end of the matter. – We should presumably say 
in this case: they simply do not mean the same by “a lot of wood” and 
“a little wood” as we do[.]80
The  natural  response  to  such  examples  is  that  these  people  simply  mean 
different  things to  us  by expressions  such as  ‘a  lot  of  wood’.  The strange 
wood-sellers  could not remain faithful  to  meaning of such expressions we 
have and deploy them in the way they do. 
Dummett’s initial interpretation of Wittgenstein, Stroud argues, would 
have  it  that  such  strange  people  differ  from us  in  that  they  have  simply 
decided  to  adopt  different  ways  of  proceeding  from  us.  Stroud  is 
unimpressed: “Can the people in Wittgenstein’s examples properly be said to 
differ  from  us  only  in  having  adopted  different  conventions?  I  think  the 
answer is “No”.”81 It is, Stroud continues, implied by saying that our current 
80 RFM I 150.
81 Stroud (1965), p.509.
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ways of proceeding are based on biological and social contingencies that there 
are alternative ways that  could be put in their  place:  it  could so easily be 
otherwise. But in the simple mathematical case this looks very odd indeed: 
There is no alternative to writing ‘1002, 1004, 1006 …’ if we are to keep faith 
with the instruction +2. 
The  point  of  these  strange  examples,  Stroud  claims,  is  to  make 
plausible the idea that there are ways of counting, inferring and so on which 
are different from ours, but maintain that this does not show that the way we 
actually carry on in our practices is a result of our deciding to adopt particular 
ways of proceeding to which we had genuine alternatives. Such examples do 
not demonstrate that at each step we are free to accept or reject  a way of 
continuing a series, or that the necessary truth of a statement resides in our 
deciding to treat that statement as unassailable. 
When  we  reflect  more  on  the  examples  of  the  strange  people 
Wittgenstein introduces us to – wood sellers, our pupil, reverse pointers – we 
think that we can understand them, come to know what such people would 
be  like.  If  such  examples  represent  clear  alternatives,  then  it  seems  our 
inferring, calculating etc. in the way we do is simply a matter of choice. But, 
argues  Stroud,  such examples  are not  as  intelligible  as  we first  suspected. 
Their initial intelligibility derives from their being isolated and restricted. We 
suppose that we can conceive of these alternatives as genuine only because, 
Stroud thinks, the wider-reaching consequences of counting, calculating etc. 
in  such  ways  are  not  fully  developed.  “When  we  try  to  trace  out  the 
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implications  of  behaving  like  that  consistently  and  quite  generally,  our 
understanding of the alleged possibilities diminishes.82”
Consider again the tribe who sell wood by the area covered by the pile 
of  wood.  They  would,  it  seems,  believe  that  an  ordinary  plank  of  wood 
increased in value from lying on its side to lying flat on the ground. There 
would be an odd conception of quantity for such people. Someone could find 
that,  in  dropping  some wood he  was  carrying,  the  amount  of  wood had 
increased  from  when  he  picked  the  pile  up.  These  people  might  regard 
themselves as shrinking when they stand on one foot as opposed to two. And 
so on. The point is that we really do not grasp what it would be like to sell 
wood (and be justified in doing so) in the way Wittgenstein describes. Stroud 
claims that in order to move towards understanding such people and their 
practices we must necessarily move away from our own:
to live in their world inevitably leads us to abandon more and more of 
our own familiar world and the ways of thinking about it upon which 
our understanding rests.83 
In  successfully  projecting  ourselves  into  such  a  world,  the  fewer  of  the 
resources of our way of thinking can be deployed to understand it. This is not 
to  say  that  such  examples  are  logically  impossible  or  contain  some 
contradiction. The examples, for Stroud, are designed to oppose Platonism, by 
highlighting that counting, inferring, calculating etc. might have been done 
differently. It is contingent that such processes are carried out in the way they 
82 Stroud (1965), p.512.
83 Stroud (1965), p.513.
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currently are, just as it is contingent that there are any such practices at all. 
But we can acknowledge this, continues Stroud, without understanding what 
those different ways might have been. If so, then there is no genuine set of 
alternatives that we might choose. Therefore, Stroud continues, Wittgenstein 
is not a full-blooded conventionalist. For:
This  does not imply that  we are free to  put  whatever  we like after 
“1000” when given the instructions “Add 2,” or that our deciding to 
put “1002” is what makes that the correct step.84
Stroud is clearly attempting to perform a very delicate balancing act. 
As indicated at the start of this section Stroud explicitly agrees with Dummett 
that Wittgenstein was not a standard conventionalist. We have now seen why 
Stroud thinks that  Dummett  is  wrong to claim that  Wittgenstein  is  a  full-
blooded conventionalist.  So what position does Stroud see Wittgenstein as 
adopting?
What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural  history of 
man: not curiosities however, but rather observations on facts which 
no-one has doubted, and which have only gone unremarked because 
they are always before our eyes.85
Stroud highlights the ‘facts of our natural history’ and that Wittgenstein takes 
them to be contingent and constitutive of mankind. Such facts obtaining are 
responsible for human nature being the way it is. It is a contingent fact that 
we take ‘1002, 1004 …’ as going the same way as ‘998, 1000 …’, it could have 
been otherwise. Since such people might naturally have followed the rule in a 
84 Stroud (1965), p.513.
85 RFM, I §142.
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different way, the rule itself does not make the strange ways of following it 
impossible, since, for Stroud, a rule is not something which stands apart from 
our  understanding  of  it,  and  which  contains  within  it  all  the  future 
applications. Rather:
How we naturally understand and follow the rule determines which 
applications  of  it  are  correct,  and  the  way  a  rule  is  followed  will 
depend in part on what we take to be “going on in the same … The use 
of the word ‘rule and the use of the word ‘same’ are interwoven”86
Stroud’s key contention appears to be this: that we take the step we do after 
‘1000’ is a contingent fact, but not one the result of decision. It is not a course 
of action to which there are alternatives amongst which we could choose.  
There is a possible concern for the reader that Stroud is keen to resolve: 
that  there  is  really  no  difference  between  Dummett’s  initial  reading  of 
Wittgenstein and his own. Somebody might think that  our sharing certain 
judgements is to be read as saying that we all agree that certain propositions 
are true. Both views point to our all agreeing that certain propositions are true 
or unassailable.  Stroud’s  answer is  that  this  ‘agreement’  is  not unanimous 
acceptance.  Presumably,  he  means here  that  we all  have  not  all  explicitly 
decided that certain things are true or unassailable.  The agreement,  Stroud 
says, resides in human practices – practices the engaging in which makes a 
creature human. 
One of the questions that motivates Dummett’s more recent paper is 
whether  there  actually  is  a  substantive  disagreement  between  Stroud’s 
86 Stroud (1965), p.514.
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interpretation and his own. Putnam, in a long passage quoted by Dummett, 
attempts  to  dissolve  away  any  conflict  between  Stroud  and  Dummett. 
Putnam points out that Stroud’s contention that Wittgenstein was not a full-
blooded  conventionalist,  because  he  did  not  maintain  that  we legislate  or 
explicitly decide to accept proofs, is accepted by the majority of Wittgenstein 
scholars.  But,  continues  Putnam,  Dummett’s  central  contention  about 
Wittgenstein still stands.
It  appears  to  me that  Stroud’s  reply,  while  correct  as  a  response to 
Dummett’s  interpretation,  does  not  speak  to  the  real  philosophical 
point Dummett was making. The real point is that if either Dummett or 
Stroud is right, then Wittgenstein is claiming that mathematical truth 
and necessity arise in us, that it is human nature and forms of life that 
explain mathematical truth and necessity. If this is right, then it is the 
greatest philosophical discovery of all time. Even if it is wrong, it is an 
astounding  philosophical  claim.  If  Stroud  does  not  dispute  that 
Wittgenstein advanced this claim – and he does not seem to dispute it – 
then  his interpretation  of  Wittgenstein  is  a  revision  of  Dummett’s 
rather than a total rejection of it.87
To push this idea a bit further it is worth considering what Dummett actually 
takes this ‘decision’ of radical conventionalism to be. Stroud, as we have seen, 
complains at the notion of our going around and all agreeing to adopt such 
and such rules. Dummett is well aware that mathematicians, in general, do 
not engage in legislative discussions as to whether this follows or that doesn’t 
follow. Equally, we do not normally legislate over whether a certain way of 
using a word keeps faith with that words meaning. In the Preface to The Seas  
87 Putnam (1983), p.117.
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of  Language,  Dummett  characterises  the  Wittgensteinian  position  in  the 
following way:
Every new application of the word, even to something resembling in 
every way things to which he has applied it before [will] demand a 
decision,  in  a  logical,  though doubtless  not  in  a  phenomenological, 
sense.  That  is  to  say,  there  is  nothing  in  whatever  constituted  his 
attaching a certain meaning to the word that logically entails that, if he 
fails to apply it to some one or another object, he will be attaching a 
different meaning to it.88
What is striking here is an attempted distinction between a ‘logical decision’ 
and a ‘phenomenological decision’. If this distinction can be drawn we might 
indeed  be  able  to  regard  the  apparent  difference  between  Stroud’s 
interpretation and Dummett’s initial interpretation as one that dissolves away 
on  reflection.  Stroud  can  be  seen  as  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that, 
psychologically,  it  is  not normally a matter  of our having decided,  say, to 
regard  a  proof  as  unassailable  that  makes  it  unassailable.  We are,  rather, 
moved to accept the proof as such because of a combination of biological and 
social  contingencies.  Nothing  Dummett’s  interpretation  of  Wittgenstein 
maintains  challenges  this.  But  from  a  logical  perspective  Wittgenstein,  in 
Dummett’s eyes, is maintaining that there is a decision to be made at each 
stage. There remains space to decide different courses of action and nothing 
settles  the right or the wrong way but  the decision being made.  Roughly: 
Stroud is drawing attention to the psychological conditions and Dummett is 
drawing attention to the logical conditions. The conflict vanishes.
88 Dummett (1993), p.xv.
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[3.2.2] The Modified View
Dummett  thinks  that  there  is a  genuine  disagreement  between  his  initial 
interpretation of Wittgenstein and that of Stroud.  Stroud’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein,  Dummett  tells  us,  acknowledges  something (namely:  human 
nature or ‘form of life’) that determines the consequences of the basic necessary 
truths,  or  of  the  conventions  that  directly  confer  necessity  upon  them. 
Granted, the determining is within us, not external. But given basic necessary 
truths it is determined what we shall take as their consequences, we cannot 
but draw the consequences we in fact draw. Dummett accepts that we do, by 
and large, agree on what the consequences are. This is a fact about our form of 
life  and  without  it  mathematics  could  not  exist.  But  for  Dummett’s 
Wittgenstein this is a brute fact, nothing explains it.
Wittgenstein  himself  thought  that  nothing determines  it  in  advance: 
only when we have accepted the proof and put the theorem in the 
archives does it become a consequence of the initial conventions.89
What of the distinction between a logical decision and a phenomenological 
decision? Dummett is unhappy to accept Putnam’s move at reconciliation. I 
think this is because Dummett sees Stroud as someone unwilling to accept the 
neat division offered between logical and phenomenological decisions. Or, in 
other words: when Stroud draws our attention to Wittgenstein’s appeal to our 
shared agreements in judgement he is not making just a psychological point. 
89 Dummett (1993c), p.449.
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Our  shared  ‘form  of  life’  actually  shapes  the  logical  space,  shapes  what 
options are open to us from a logical perspective.  This, I take Dummett to 
think, pushes one back into a kind of standard conventionalism. 
Dummett’s new paper (like the old) maintains that, for Wittgenstein, a 
statement being necessarily true consists in it being treated as necessarily true: 
being unassailable,  or  providing a standard for  other  truths  to  be  judged. 
Mathematical proof, on this account, is a procedure that induces us to treat 
the theorem as unassailable – ‘to put it in the archives’. In doing so, we adopt 
a new criterion for the application of some mathematical concept.
For  instance,  when  we  first  encounter  the  proof  that  a  cylinder 
intersects a plane in an ellipse, we acquire, provided that we accept the 
proof,  a  new criterion  for  the  application  of  the  term  “ellipse”;  we 
might  for  example,  appeal  to  the  theorem  in  a  particular  case  to 
establish that a certain figure, which, perhaps, did not look quite like 
an ellipse, must be one.90
 
The core of Wittgenstein’s arguments, Dummett continues, is the observation 
that  the  mathematical  proof  provides  us  with  a  new criterion  for  how to 
proceed. The worry Dummett raises is that this is susceptible of being totally 
banal:  When we know the theorem, our accepting  this  is  a cylinder,  that a 
plane gives a reason for saying the figure determined by their intersection is 
an ellipse. This is a reason we did not have before. 
If this is all that is meant by saying that we have a new criterion, it is 
indisputable; but it tells us nothing about what a mathematical proof 
is, or about the status of the theorem that it proves.91
90 Dummett (1993c), p.446.
91 Dummett (1993c), p.450.
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Wittgenstein’s  official  description  of  his  philosophical  method  is  that  it 
consists in assembling truths that no one could dispute. But, argues Dummett, 
the observation would tell us ‘precisely nothing’: “[I]f, so understood, it is an 
example of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, then that philosophy is incapable of 
throwing  any  light  on  anything.”92 It  seems,  therefore,  that  the  official 
description  of  Wittgenstein’s  philosophical  method cannot be the true  one 
and, continues Dummett, that the observation about new criteria is not meant 
to be understood as a mere platitude.
It is a platitude if we assume that whenever we apply the new criterion 
correctly, we should have been justified by the original criteria in making the 
assertion that we do, even if we had failed to notice that fact.
For instance, whenever we rightly judge, by the old criteria, that this is 
a cylinder and that a plane, and, applying the new criterion, judge their 
intersection to be an ellipse, we should have been justified by the old 
criteria in declaring it to be an ellipse, even though, had we not known 
the theorem, we might not have noticed that  it  was or even,  as the 
result of some mistake, have judged it not to be one.93
But  this  obvious,  banal,  realisation  is  not  something  we  could  coherently 
oppose. As Dummett puts it: these remarks are “precisely what we take the 
force of the proof to be.”94 We take a proof to show that whatever is judged by 
the new criterion to be an ellipse must be an ellipse by the means of the old 
criterion too. Denying this would mean saying that the new criterion alters or 
adjusts what an ellipse actually is. And that is plainly wrong. Any attempt, 
92 Dummett (1993c), p.450.
93 Dummett (1993c), p.450.
94 Dummett (1993c), p.450.
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then,  to  go  beyond the  banal  interpretation  of  the  observation about  new 
criteria appears a hopeless task. In other words, the observation is banal or so 
revisionary it  cannot  be  accepted.  We are  left  with  no space  to  move.  As 
Dummett  puts  it:  “[I]t  is  not  merely  a  delicate  matter  to  state  the 
Wittgensteinian alternative, but an impossibility.”95
Dummett suggests that one might try to avoid the dilemma by saying 
that it must be possible for there to be an apparent counter-example to the 
theorem  whose  description  as  being  a  counter-example  involves  no 
specifiable mistake in the application of the original criteria for applying the 
terms (e.g.  ‘ellipse’  ,  ‘cylinder’  and ‘plane’).  The new criterion would then 
allow us to see the apparent counter-example as merely that – an apparent 
one  –  by  showing  a  specifiable  mistake  in  its  description.  But,  responds 
Dummett, we are saying that there isn’t a counter-example, and hence any 
description of something as one must involve a mistake. This is an expression 
of our acceptance of the theorem, “and, since we do accept it, we do say that, 
and there is no questioning our correctness in saying it.”96 Obviously there 
may be mistakes that we cannot specify,  but,  for Dummett,  every mistake 
must be intrinsically capable of being specified. We might try saying that that 
we are not warranted in claiming that, in arriving at a judgement in conflict 
with the theorem, any particular mistake comes to light. This, Dummett says, 
is  again banal.  What is  needed,  rather,  is  that  there need be no particular 
mistake that comes to light. But this is incoherent – there cannot be a mistake 
95 Dummett (1993c), p.450.
96 Dummett (1993c), p.451.
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that is not a particular mistake just as there cannot be a donkey that is not a 
particular donkey.
This dilemma is not something new. It is, in fact, Dummett’s way of 
characterising the problem of finding an alternative to the ‘Fantastical’ and 
‘Banal’ readings of the rule-following passages that has driven Part One. It is 
worthwhile  making  the  connection  explicit.  Dummett  claims  that  the 
recognition about  a  new criterion  can  appear  banal.  The first  two  themes 
identified in Wittgenstein’s discussion of rules were, I argued, banalities. The 
first [1.3.1] is the internal relationship between a rule and its requirements: the 
rule  is  the rule  it  is  because  certain  actions  are in accordance  with it  and 
others not. Different requirements equals different rule. The second [1.3.2] is 
that  there  is  no  place  for  scepticism:  the  requirements  of  the  rule  are 
determined.  Dummett  claims  that  any  attempt  to  move beyond the  banal 
recognition looks  doomed to  failure.  We would have to  say that  the new 
criterion for recognising of a shape that it is an ellipse modifies what it is to be 
an ellipse. This not only looks odd but abandons the banalities that cannot be 
disputed.  The  two  latter  themes  identified  in  Wittgenstein’s  discussion  of 
rules  are  exactly  parallel.  The  appeal  to  shared  agreement  in  judgement 
[1.3.4], if it is to mean anything interesting, appears to abandon the internal 
relationship between a rule and its requirements. The recognition of the basic, 
ungrounded,  nature  of  rules  [1.3.3]  could appear to  threaten the idea  that 
there is a determinate requirement of a rule at all. Our question is whether a 
satisfying middle position – accommodating both the trivial and controversial 
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claims Wittgenstein makes – can be found. As Dummett himself points out, 
this is starting to look not merely delicate but impossible. Up to this point of 
the more recent paper, then, we can simply see Dummett tracing out in his 
own way the very problem that has been bothering us. 
It  is  here  that  Dummett’s  paper  offers  a  modification  of  the 
interpretation  of  Wittgenstein;  a  departure  from  Dummett’s  previous 
interpretation. Wittgenstein is to be seen, Dummett now tells us, as rejecting 
an ‘external’ or ‘superhuman’ standpoint. We tried to differentiate the banal 
interpretations  of  Wittgenstein  from something  less  trivial  by  speaking  of 
mistakes we might in fact make, although we do not detect them or possess 
any reason for  thinking they have occurred;  “in general,  by  talking about 
what would have been  true  even though we had not recognised it as true”97 
But this is doing the very thing Dummett takes Wittgenstein to be attacking: 
an ‘externalist’ standpoint. That is: the “attempt to step outside the situation 
in which we are placed, and thus to pass beyond the limits of language and 
say what can only be shown.”98 We can only, rather, describe the criteria for 
the application of our words, and the interaction between them. We want to 
say:  in cases of  apparent  counter-examples  to  the theorem,  God could see 
what mistakes we have made in applying our own criteria, even if we cannot. 
But,  argues Dummett,  saying this leads to banality.  The reaction to this is 
internalism: to say that, on the contrary, there need not have been any specific 
mistake for God to notice. This, thinks Dummett, would make us unfaithful to 
97 Dummett (1993c), p.451.
98 Dummett (1993c), p.451.
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our acceptance of the theorem. Because such a position would be self-refuting 
- to state the general thesis (e.g. internalism or relativism) would run foul of 
that  actual  practice  it  claims  to  be  the  source  of  necessity  and  truth.  As 
Dummett puts it: “it is an attempt to view our language and our thought from 
that external vantage-point which it declares to be inaccessible”99
The resolution of the difficulty, this interpretation of Wittgenstein goes, 
is to accept the impossibility of our even talking intelligibly about how things 
are in themselves independently of what we treat ourselves as having reason 
to say. If we accept this, then we no longer have two distinct interpretations of 
the thesis about new criteria to bring into conflict. This is apparently banal, 
vindicating  Wittgenstein’s  philosophical  method.  But:  it  uses  the  only 
resources we have, therefore has to be the account of mathematical proof and 
the source of mathematical necessity. “All we can do is to describe our own 
practices as we can view them through our own eyes.”100 The proof ‘induces’ 
us to accept a new criterion as being justified by the criteria we already had.
That, therefore, is the sole and sufficient account of mathematical proof 
and the  necessity  of  the  mathematical  theorems.  We are  not  to  ask 
whether the new criterion is really so justified: justification is whatever 
we count as justification.101
This,  if  correct,  reads  Wittgenstein  as  offering  a  full-blown  internalism 
“internalism with a vengeance”102 – which cannot be labelled ‘realism’. Truth, 
here,  becomes  equated  with  being  recognised  or  being  treated  as  true.  It 
99 Dummett (1993c), p.452.
100 Dummett (1993c), p.452.
101 Dummett (1993c), p.452.
102 Dummett (1993c), p.452.
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stands opposed to externalism – which attempts  to  say how things are in 
themselves, independently of how they appear to us. 
How are we to understand this in the terms of reference laid out in 
Chapter One? The principal target of Dummett’s remarks should be seen as 
an  attempt  to  reconcile  Wittgenstein’s  appeal  to  shared  agreement  in 
judgement [1.3.4] with the truism that the relationship between a rule and its 
requirements is an internal one [1.3.1]. Dummett’s earlier interpretation was 
faulty,  I  argued,  because  in  appealing  to  shared  agreement  it  abandoned 
Wittgenstein’s insistence on the internal relationship. Nothing in Dummett’s 
revised view is meant to downplay the depth to which Wittgenstein’s appeal 
to  convention runs.  So how are the banalities  to  be faithfully maintained? 
Dummett’s  point,  I  think,  is  that  raising  the  question  ‘is  there  really  an 
internal relationship between a rule and its requirements?’ is attempting to 
adopt  the  external  standpoint  Wittgenstein  dismisses.  We  want  to  know 
whether  really,  independently  of  our  taking  it  to  be  so,  the  rule  and  its 
requirements are so related. But, Wittgenstein is being represented as saying, 
this is an attempt to step outside of language as a going concern and represent 
things how they really are.  This is  impossible.  All  we can do, the thought 
runs, is map the workings of our language from the inside. And from within 
language it will be obvious that there is an internal relationship between a 
rule  and its  requirements.  The question whether  this  keeps  faith with our 
previous understanding of the rule cannot be asked.
Dummett is deeply opposed to the view he finds in Wittgenstein.
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Thus [Wittgenstein’s view] can make our linguistic practices the whole 
source of necessity and of truth only by discrediting those practices, 
and, indeed, the concepts of necessity and truth themselves: that is its 
incoherence. […] [It] will lead us to dismiss as pointless the practices 
on which it so heavily insists.103
Our learning various linguistic  practices  has led us to  believe that  we are 
talking about how things really are, how the world is actually constituted. We 
are interested in what constitutes the truth of certain statements: we think this 
is to do with the way the world is and not with our ways of representing the 
world. We do not maintain certain practices in their current form “because it 
is what society expects us to do: we do so because it appears to us to have a 
rationale, that is, to be a method of ascertaining how things in fact are.”104 
It is natural to sympathise with Dummett. We take our practices to be 
aimed at and informed by the way, in fact, the world is. This points us in the 
direction of the fault in Wittgenstein’s position, as Dummett represents him, 
in terms of the themes identified in Chapter One.  We have seen a way of 
reconciling  the  first  of  Wittgenstein’s  themes  with  the  fourth:  a  way  of 
appealing to shared agreement in judgement that allows us to still say that 
there is an internal relationship between a rule and its requirements. But it 
does  so  simply  by  relegating  the  internal  relationship  into  the  appeal  to 
convention.  We  have  the  right  words,  but  we  have  missed  the  very 
underlying point of the internal  relationship:  it  is  meant to  say something 
straightforward  and  uncontroversial  about  the  way  the  world  is.  But  if 
103 Dummett (1993c), p.457.
104 Dummett (1993c), p.457.
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Dummett  is  right  about  Wittgenstein  we  have  to  abandon  the  natural 
motivation  to  talk  about  how  the  world,  in  fact,  is  altogether.  Shared 
agreement is still in the driving seat. This cannot be a satisfactory position for 
anyone to adopt.
[3.3] Wright
Dummett  argues that  Wittgenstein is  right to  observe that  for most of  the 
fundamental rules we follow there is nothing by which we judge something 
to be a correct application of them. But from this it does not follow that there 
is  no  specific  thing  that  would  be  a  correct  application.  In  other  words: 
Wittgenstein is right to highlight the basic, ungrounded, nature of the rules 
we follow but this does not lead to a kind of scepticism about rules. Themes 
two [1.3.2] and three [1.3.3.] can be reconciled. Wright’s recent return to the 
issue of rule-following is, in part, an attempt to reach the same conclusion. I 
will argue that it does not succeed.
 Wright’s aim is to show that, for Wittgenstein,
there is no well-conceived issue about the ‘constitution’ of facts about 
what rules require, instance by instance, or about what enables us to 
keep track of such facts. There is no real dilemma between platonist 
and  communitarian  views  of  the  matter,  and  no  constructive 
philosophical work to do by way of attempting to steer between its 
horns.105
Wright argues that Wittgenstein presents to the reader a series of negative 
results about rules and their requirements. The requirement of a rule is not 
105 Wright (2007), p.489.
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constituted by communal agreement, as this would threaten the objectivity of 
rules,  nor  is  the  requirement  constituted  by  the  rule  itself,  as  this  would 
threaten our ability to grasp what the rule requires.
But we have not been told what does constitute it; all we have been told 
is that there would simply be no such requirements were it not for the 
phenomenon of actual,  widespread human agreement in judgement. 
How can he possibly have thought that this was enough?106  
Wright goes on to argue this ‘Quietism’ on Wittgenstein’s behalf does rest on 
some  theoretical  basis  and  seeks  to  demonstrate  it.  The  shape  of  the 
suggestion  is  straightforward.  It  would  be  incumbent  on  Wittgenstein  to 
respond to his rejection of Platonism about rules if Platonism had given a bad 
answer to an intelligible and pressing question: we would naturally want an 
answer  to  that  question.  But,  argues  Wright,  Wittgenstein  regarded  the 
question  itself  as  problematic.  The  correct  course  of  action is  to  reject  the 
question to which Platonism was a bad answer. 
This  suggestion opens up the possibility  of  a  position distinct  from 
both  the  ‘Fantastical’  and  ‘Banal’  camps.  Against  the  former  the  Quietist 
reading  would maintain that  Wittgenstein  was not advancing some grand 
thesis  such as Dummett’s  full-blooded conventionalism or Kripke’s  radical 
scepticism. Against the latter the claim would be more subtle: Wittgenstein’s 
remarks do indeed look banal and he is to be seen as assembling reminders 
that no-one could dispute. But there is a real philosophical lesson to be found 
in why only saying that is enough; working through the basis Wittgenstein 
106 Wright (2007), p.488.
84
has for not answering the seemingly pressing questions. That is just a general 
shape  of  a  suggestion.  The  details  of  Wright’s  account  are  a  lot  more 
complicated.
Wright reminds us that the rule-following problematic has at its core 
issues of constitution and epistemology. What the rule requires must in some 
sense be  settled; we also must  know what the rule requires. It is tempting to 
assume that there must be a ‘focal point’ for such issues. That is: that there has 
to be some fact about what the requirement of a rule is before we can sensibly 
ask what constitutes this fact and how we have knowledge of it. But, argues 
Wright, in basic cases of rule-following there is no such fact - a fact, that is, 
that can be extricated from the practice of following rules. The assumption 
that there must be such a fact, knowledge of which is an essential part of our 
being  guided  by  the  rule,  is  a  mistaken  one  coming  from  “an  over-
rationalisation – an implicit attempt to impose on rule-following everywhere 
a rational structure which can only engage the non-basic  case.”107 What we 
need to accept, rather, is that “in the basic case we do not really follow – are 
not really guided by – anything.”108 
 Central to this thesis is Wright’s claim that there is no such thing as 
‘pure’ rule-following. Consider the following structure of judgement: 
RULE: If x has moved neither King nor Rook … etc., then x may castle.
PREMISE: I have moved neither King nor Rook … etc. 
VERDICT: I may castle.
107 Wright (2007), p.498.
108 Wright (2007), p.497.
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Wright  calls  this  the  modus ponens (MP)  model  of  rule-following.  It  neatly 
characterises the kind of judgement one might go through when castling in 
chess.  Note  that  knowledge  of  the  rule  is  just  one  element  in  coming  to 
correctly  follow the rule.  Indeed,  one could correctly  understand what the 
rule  requires  yet  still  not  reach  the  correct  verdict.  Also  required  is  the 
premise – the relevant features of the circumstances, the particular situation 
one is in when attempting to follow the rule. And, of course, one could be 
greatly mistaken about their current situation. Wright claims that this result 
applies across the board. Even in simple cases, such as the continuation of an 
arithmetical  series,  rule-following is  essentially impure.  In  the arithmetical 
case there might be no perceptual  input at all,  but the judgement will still 
depend on one’s memory – not losing track of where one is. To say that rule-
following is impure, then, is to say that correctly following a rule will always 
amount to a combination of correct grasp of the rule and correct grasp of the 
relevant circumstances.
Why does this matter? Wright’s claim is that if there is no such thing as 
pure rule-following we cannot conceive the facts about what rules require as 
resting on particular applications of rules - as they are necessarily imbued with 
information to which the rule itself is applied. Wright is surely correct in this, 
for particular instances of rule-following will always be coloured by context, 
history and so on. The obvious response, however,  is that even if  all  rule-
following is essentially impure one can still straight-forwardly separate the 
rule from the specifics of the individual case. Indeed, it is explicit in the very 
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structure of the MP model. What belongs to the rule is contained in RULE, 
what belongs to the situation is contained in PREMISE. The questions which 
motivated  the  rule-following  problematic  –  about  constitution  and 
epistemology – are clearly concerned with the former. So, the thought would 
run, we can happily take Wright’s claim about the impurity of rules: in order 
to  address  the  rule-following  problematic  we  should  just  filter  out  the 
specifics of the case.
This brings us to Wright’s central claim: in basic cases the MP model 
‘lapses’  and  so  the  neat  separation  afforded  between  rule  and  input  in 
complex cases is lost.
The clean separation effected by the modus ponens model  between 
what belongs to the rule and what belongs to the situation to which it 
is  applied  is  possible  only  in  (relatively  complex)  cases  where  the 
conditions which trigger the application of the rule – those described in 
the  antecedent  of  the  relevant  conditional  –  can  be  recognised  and 
characterised in innocence of a mastery of the rule. That cannot be the 
situation in general.109
In the chess case, one could recognise the conditions in the antecedent of the 
conditional in ignorance of the rule. That is: one could recognise that neither 
the King nor one of its Rooks has moved in the game thus far, that the squares 
between them are unoccupied (and so on), without already grasping the rule 
for  castling.  Not  only  does  this  not  happen  in  basic  case  but  also  “the 
contribution of grasp of the rule to the responses it informs is inextricable from 
the contribution of one’s grasp of the prevailing circumstances.”110 So, if we 
109 Wright (2007), p.494.
110 Wright (2007), p.494.
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attempted to construct a model of basic rule-following akin to the chess case, 
we wouldn’t  be able to separate the rule from the inputs of the particular 
situation. The two would necessarily be bound up together.
This is how we get to Wright’s claim that,  in basic cases,  we follow 
rules ‘without reasons’. It is important to spell out what this claim does and 
does  not  amount  to.  Following  a  rule  ‘without  reason’  is  not  a  matter  of 
immediacy,  like  a  good  chess  player  might  make  a  great  move  without 
consciously  going  over  his  grounds  for  making  that  move.  Neither  is  it 
Wright’s claim that basic rule-following is arational. It is “still to be appraised 
within the categories of rationality – justification and truth.”111; it still requires 
intentionality  and  willingness  to  accept  correction.  What  following  a  rule 
‘without reason’ does mean, however, is that the MP model will not apply to 
such a case. And that model is the only possible way one could extricate the 
fact about what the rule requires from the specific instance of rule-following. 
That is, the MP model is the only one that would allow us to find the ‘focal 
point’  which the constitution and knowledge questions seemed to require. 
That is why Wright takes Wittgenstein Quietist approach to be justified in this 
case.
The  problematic  invited  us  to  try  to  construct  an  account  of  what, 
when  we  follow  a  particular  rule  constitutes  the  facts  about  the 
direction in which, step by step, it guides us and how we are able to be 
responsive to its guidance. But in basic cases the invitation emerges, 
from  the  perspective  on  the  matter  just  adumbrated,  as  utterly 
misconceived;  for  it  presupposes  a  false  conception  of  the  sense  in 
which basic rule-following is rational.112
111 Wright (2007), p.492.
112 Wright (2007 p.497.
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Wittgenstein, in Wright’s eyes, takes the problematic itself to be based on a 
mistake: the failure to recognise that in basic cases we are not guided in any 
such way. All rule-following is, on this picture, rational but that is not to say 
in  basic  cases  we grasp the requirements  of  a  rule  in  terms of  a  series  of 
instructions.
It  is puzzling why, exactly,  Wright thinks that,  for Wittgenstein,  the 
MP must lapse for basic cases and thereby why there is  no guide in such 
cases. Take Wright’s own example: where one “stubbornly [tries] to assimilate 
predications of ‘red’ to the modus ponens model.”113 
RULE: If …x…, it is correct to predicate ‘red’ of x
PREMISE: …a…
VERDICT: It is correct to apply ‘red’ to a.
What would be wrong with this? One suggestion is that there is something 
wrong with the rule. In order to grasp what the rule demands of us we have 
to grasp an anterior concept ‘…x…’. “But now it stares us in the face that this 
concept can hardly be anything other than:  red!”114  To say such and such 
about x just is to say that it is red. So we already must have the concept red in 
play before we can grasp the rule. But the rule is meant to tell us when it is 
legitimate to predicate red to a certain object. But this, as yet, wouldn’t show 
why PREMISE and RULE in our judgement are inextricable from one another. 
It just tells us that something is suspect about the rule for predicating red to 
113 Wright (2007), p.495.
114 Wright (2007), p.495.
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an object. This invites the question: what is supposed to be inextricable from 
what  in  the  colour  case?  At  first  glance,  the  problem  seems  to  be  that 
PREMISE and VERDICT cannot be separated from one another.  ‘Such and 
such about a’ is equivalent to saying ‘a is red’.  So we would have a premise 
that said ‘a is red’ and a conclusion that said ‘it is correct to apply ‘red’ to a’. 
The point about ‘no pure rule-following’ is that coming to a correct verdict is 
always  a  matter  of  combining  the  rule  and  the  input  of  the  particular 
situation.  Verdict equals rule plus premise. If the verdict  just is the input of 
the particular situation then, perhaps, Wright’s thought is the rule cannot add 
anything  to  the  judgement.  To  all  intents  and  purposes  the  rule  itself  is 
empty. As such, it cannot possibly provide the kind of guide we were looking 
for – the kind of guide the rule-following problematic demanded.
Wright is clearly correct in saying that there is a difference between 
how the chess case functions and how the colour case functions. As we have 
seen, for the relatively complex chess case the rule can inform or rationally 
underlie our move – in the sense that it can guide us step by step in the moves 
we make. In the basic case of predications of ‘red’ this just isn’t possible.  If 
that was all ‘lapsing’ amounted to we could readily accept it. But does that 
show that, in basic cases, there is no guide, nothing that underlies or guides 
us in our moves? This must come down to what one takes a genuine ‘guide’ 
to be. If one thinks that the only thing that could serve as a guide is a set of 
instructions to be grasped independently of the concepts  the rule  governs, 
then  in  basic  cases  there  will  be  no  such  thing.  But  if  one  denies  this, 
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maintains that a set of instructions graspable only by those who understand 
the concepts the rule governs can indeed be a guide, one can say basic rule-
following is guided. The latter thought is more likely to be Wittgenstein’s. Let 
me try and spell this out a bit more.
We are being told that there is a theoretical position for a guide that 
informs  us  in  following  rules.  This  position  is  occupied  by  the  rule  in 
relatively complex cases. At the same time, Wright is arguing that in basic 
cases this position is not occupied. A more a natural reading of Wittgenstein 
would be to say this conception of the theoretical position is itself at fault. 
Take, again, Wittgenstein’s example (in the Blue Book) of the instruction ‘Bring 
me a red flower’, discussed in [1.3.1].   Wittgenstein is attacking the idea that 
to obey that order one must first create an image in mind of a colour sample 
by reference to which one could go out and select a flower of the right colour. 
It  is  tempting to think that something like this must be the case.  But now 
consider the instruction ‘Imagine a red patch’.  The idea seems to fall apart. 
Have I now got to create an image of red in my mind to act as a sample to 
correctly  imagine  a  red  patch?  Wittgenstein’s  point  is  that  the  role  of  the 
sample  is  empty.  That  is:  it  is  a  mistake  to  think  that  there  need  be  a 
theoretical  place  as  the  one  the  sample  was  supposed  to  occupy. 
Wittgenstein’s point is not that the place for the sample is fine and that, in the 
case of ‘Imagine a red patch’,  there just  is  nothing in that place.   But that 
seems precisely Wright’s thought in the rule case.   “To express the matter 
dangerously, we need have nothing ‘in mind’ when we follow rules”115 ‘In 
115 Wright (2007), p.486.
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mind’ must mean something like ‘in the place the sample was supposed to 
be’.  This, it seems, leaves the theoretical place the imaginary sample was to 
occupy untouched – saying only that in basic cases there is nothing in that 
place.   To find nothing in the only place a genuine guide could be would 
certainly  amount  to  applying the  rule  ‘without  reason’.  But  that  does  not 
appear to be a Wittgensteinian thought. What does seem right to say is that to 
obey the order ‘Bring me a red flower’ I must have in mind – I must know - 
the colour of the flower I am to bring.  
My concern with Wright’s interpretation is that, at its core, it demands 
on Wittgenstein’s  behalf  a kind of reductionism. We have a demand for a 
particular kind of guide: one in ‘splendid isolation’ that can serve to inform 
our applications of  rules.  Wright clearly  thinks that  recognising that  basic 
rule-following  is  blind  and  ultimately  ungrounded  need  not  lead  us  into 
scepticism about the nature of rules and their requirements. In short: themes 
three and two can be reconciled. My worry is that Wright’s characterisation 
does the exact opposite. Wittgenstein warns us that failure to recognise that 
no mediating entity – no ’interpretation’ – is required to sit between a rule 
and its requirements if we are to avoid scepticism. The paradox of §201 comes 
about  only  if  we  think  that  there  must  be  a  mediating  entity.  Wright’s 
reductionism is an attempt to find space for an ‘interpretation’ when there is 
no  space  for  it.  As  such  it  invites  scepticism  rather  than,  as  Wittgenstein 
clearly intended, rejecting the line of thought that generates it.  
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[3.4] Conclusion
The two attempts to modify the ‘Fantastical’ interpretations into something 
more palatable considered in this chapter fail. Dummett’s interpretation still 
has  Wittgenstein  as  offering  an  incoherent  account  of  the  relationship 
between a rule and its requirements. Wright’s reading of what it is to follow 
rules  ‘without  reasons’  gets  Wittgenstein’s  intentions wrong.  But  there are 
positives to be taken from this chapter. Discussion of Dummett has brought 
into  play  the  notion  of  an  ‘external’  or  ‘sideways-on’  perspective  and 
Wittgenstein’s  apparent  hostility  to  it.  This  notion  will  be  developed  in 
Chapter Four. Wright claims that Wittgenstein was a Quietist. Whilst I do not 
agree  with the  actual  way Wright  motivates  this,  the  notion that  it  is  the 
questions themselves that lead to the problems does appear to be a plausible 
interpretative stance. We will both of these thoughts taken up in Chapter Four 
in working out the details of McDowell’s interpretation.
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Chapter Four
Moving Beyond the Banal: McDowell
[4.1] Introduction
Chapter Three examined two attempts to amend ‘Fantastical’ interpretations 
of Wittgenstein to a point where the rule-following passages could be seen as 
offering both a coherent and non-banal account. I argued that both of these 
attempts failed. This chapter will examine a move in the opposite direction: 
working out  from a ‘Banal’  reading to  a  satisfactory middle  ground.  This 
move is, as I understand him, attempted by McDowell.
The conclusion of Chapter Three was negative:  these interpretations 
simply will not do as they stand. It would be wrong to think, however, that 
no  progress  has  been  made.  Dummett  neatly  highlighted  Wittgenstein’s 
interest  in  a  kind of  external  standpoint  –  the  view from ‘sideways-on’  – 
where one as it were divorces oneself from the domain in question to examine 
that  domain.  Dummett  claims  that  it  is  Wittgenstein’s  aim  to  resist  the 
possibility  of  such  a  perspective.  Wright’s  suggestion,  at  a  general  level, 
sounds very Wittgensteinian:  we should not search Wittgenstein’s  remarks 
for a positive answer as to what the correctness conditions for following a rule 
are. Wittgenstein wants to say, rather, that it is the question itself that is at 
fault. I expressed concern at the detailed way Wright develops this thought, 
but the general picture was not rejected. McDowell’s interpretation features 
both  a  concern  with  the  view  from  ‘sideways-on’  and  recognition  of 
Wittgenstein’s Quietism.
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The conclusion of this chapter will be less clear-cut. I will argue that 
something along the broad lines of McDowell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein 
must  be  right.   He  is  the  closest  of  any  interpreter  to  identifying  in 
Wittgenstein  a  coherent  and  non-banal  view.  There  is  great  difficulty, 
however, in working out precisely what McDowell is actually claiming. I will 
attempt  to  show  that  McDowell’s  remarks  lend  themselves  to  two  quite 
different interpretations of Wittgenstein. One view attempts to steer a course 
between  the  ‘Fantastical’  and  the  ‘Banal’,  not  by  rejecting  both,  but  by 
accepting  both.  What  keeps  the  view  coherent,  this  interpretation  of 
Wittgenstein  suggests,  is  recognition  of  different  levels  of  discourse.  This 
view attributes to the author of the Investigations a combination of views that 
share  at  least  a  structural  parallel  with  Kant’s  combination  of  empirical 
realism  and  transcendental  idealism.  The  second  view  suggested  by 
McDowell’s  comments accepts  the drive towards idealism, but  claims that 
this  is  only  a  stage  to  be  passed  through  to  Wittgenstein’s  final,  settled, 
position. Roughly, on this account, transcendental idealism would be the right 
answer if the question made sense, but this question does not make sense, and 
so  idealism  is  to  be  rejected.  Thus,  Wittgenstein  is  to  be  read  as 
therapeutically ‘dissolving’ what philosophical concerns there are with rules 
and their requirements.  This chapter will develop these two interpretations 
out of McDowell’s remarks. I will not reach a settled conclusion on which of 
these  is  McDowell’s  view,  or  whether  either  accurately  represents 
Wittgenstein.  Part  Three  will  examine  the  latter  question.  There  will  be 
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enough in play, however,  to begin a comparison with Wittgenstein’s  early 
work. This will be the focus of Part Two.
The  structure  of  the  chapter  is  as  follows.  [4.2]  provides  an  initial 
engagement  with  McDowell  via  discussion  of  the  paper  “Wittgenstein  on 
Following a Rule”. The crucial sections of the paper are deeply puzzling. My 
engagement  with them is  therefore to  be seen as an opening skirmish;  an 
attempt to raise questions and issues to be addressed in further detail later. 
[4.3]  aims at  illumination by examining McDowell’s  broader  philosophical 
themes, with a view to locating the discussion of rule-following within the 
broader  project.  [4.4]  questions  to  what  extent,  if  any,  McDowell’s 
interpretation  is  genuinely  a  departure  from  other  interpretations.  [4.5] 
sketches the view that the author of the  Investigations was a transcendental 
idealist. [4.6] sketches the alternative: Wittgenstein ultimately found a way to 
reject such idealism. 
[4.2] “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule”
I  begin  with  McDowell’s  “Wittgenstein  on  Following  a  Rule”.  The  early 
sections of this paper cover similar ground to that covered in Chapter One. A 
brief summary of the relevant parts will still be useful here. 
McDowell  identifies  in  Wittgenstein  the  rejection  of  the  need  for  a 
mediating entity to combine a rule and its requirements. As McDowell puts it, 
Wittgenstein aims to “exorcise the insidious assumption”116 that there must be 
an ‘interpretation’ standing in between – doing, as it were, ‘the gluing’. This is 
116 McDowell (1998g), p.239.
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the recognition of the first theme outlined in Chapter One [1.3.1], the internal 
relation between a rule and actions in accordance with it that is emphasised 
by  Baker  and  Hacker.  McDowell  is  also  explicit  in  pointing  out,  against 
Kripke, that Wittgenstein rejects rule scepticism. The paradox of §201 – that 
no  course  of  action could  be  determined by a  rule  because  any course  of 
action  could  be  made  out  to  accord  with  the  rule  –  is  introduced  by 
Wittgenstein;  but,  as  Wittgenstein  himself  says,  it  is  based  on  a 
“misunderstanding”.
The right response to the paradox, Wittgenstein in effect tells us, is not 
to accept it but to correct the misunderstanding on which it depends: 
that is, to realize “that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation.”117
This coheres with the second theme identified in the rule-following passages 
in Chapter  One [1.3.2].  McDowell  also shows sensitivity towards the third 
theme:  the ungrounded basic-ness of following rules  [1.3.3].  He points out 
Wittgenstein’s insistence on ‘bedrock’ – a place where justification gives out 
and  we  are  simply  left  saying  ‘this  is  what  I  do’.  But,  quoting  from  the 
Investigations  itself:  “To  use  an expression  without  a  justification does  not 
mean to use it without right.”118 
In  combining these themes,  McDowell’s  interpretation comes out as 
roughly this: Wittgenstein’s aim in the rule-following passages is to steer a 
middle  course  between  two  unpalatable  extremes,  labelled  ‘Scylla’  and 
117 McDowell (1998g), p.229.
118 PI I §289.
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‘Charybdis’.  Scylla is the insidious assumption that a mediating entity – an 
interpretation – is required between a rule and actions in accordance with it. If 
we  are  drawn  to  this  view  then,  argues  McDowell,  we  are  forced  into  a 
dilemma:  either  we  must  embrace  rule-scepticism  and  the  paradox 
Wittgenstein highlights or we must accept  the Platonist’s  account of  rules. 
This  cannot  be  acceptable  to  Wittgenstein,  the  thought  goes,  because  he 
precisely  was rejecting Platonism and he clearly states that rule-scepticism is 
based on a  misunderstanding.  In  rejecting  Scylla  we need to  explain  how 
genuinely  following a  rule  can be something other  than an interpretation. 
McDowell fears that this risks steering onto Charybdis – an attempt to get 
below ‘bedrock’ and hence lose all semblance of normativity and objectivity 
in meaning. McDowell contends that it is only by rejecting that attempt that 
we can reach a position which allows for the immediacy and basic-ness of 
rule-following yet retains the objectivity of rules.  
It is at this point that the appeal to shared agreement in judgements, 
the fourth theme identified in Chapter One [1.3.4], is meant to contribute to 
the discussion: “the key to finding the indispensable middle course is the idea 
of a custom or practice.”119 Objectivity is somehow to be retained through the 
recognition  that  rule-following  is  a  practice  or  institution  that  takes  place 
within a community. To summarise:
119 McDowell (1998g), p.242.
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What I have claimed might be put like this: Wittgenstein’s point is that 
we  have  to  situate  our  conception  of  meaning  and  understanding 
within a framework of communal practices.120
This  talk  of  a  ‘framework’  should  remind  us  of  Baker  and  Hacker’s 
interpretation.  In  Chapter  Two I  argued  that  the  notion  is  as  yet  unclear; 
depending on the role assigned to this framework Wittgenstein’s appeal to it 
either comes out as true but banal or interesting but incompatible with other 
aspects of Wittgenstein’s discussion.  An immediate worry one might have is 
whether McDowell has advanced matters beyond the appeal to framework 
offered  by  Baker  and Hacker.  McDowell  accepts  that  he  will  need  to  say 
more:
Until more is said about how exactly the appeal to communal practice 
makes  the  middle  course  available,  this  is  only  a  programme for  a 
solution to Wittgenstein’s problem.121
McDowell  attempts  to  “discharge the unfinished business”122 of  this 
interpretation in §§11-12 of “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule”, and it is on 
these puzzling sections of the paper that I most want to focus. Here McDowell 
aims to define the interpretation he recommends by contrast with the ‘anti-
realist’ views put forward by Dummett and Wright. §10 sees McDowell offer 
what he calls the ‘transcendental argument against anti-realism’. The general 
thought appears to be this: once we go down the anti-realist route we cannot 
properly account for the normative character of, and hence the objectivity of, 
120 McDowell (1998g), p.243.
121 McDowell (1998g), p.242.
122 McDowell (1998g), p.249.
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meaning. As McDowell puts it: “a condition for the possibility of finding real 
application for the notion of meaning at all is that we reject anti-realism.”123 
But  this,  as  yet,  does  not  tell  us  why  anti-realism  goes  wrong,  or  what 
McDowell takes Wittgenstein to be offering in its place. That task is left for the 
next section. In completing that task McDowell will indeed have discharged 
the unfinished part of his interpretation.
McDowell  begins  §11  by  accepting  the  appeal  of  anti-realism  and 
acknowledging that the motivation behind it is surely correct. In particular, 
McDowell thinks anti-realists are on the right track in rejecting the idea that 
meaning is, as it were, ‘hidden’ or concealed below the surface of a person’s 
linguistic behaviour. That view would amount to saying that the meaning of a 
word or expression resides in some inner state of the person in question. If 
this idea were right, the best we could ever achieve would be a hypothesis 
about  another’s  meaning  –  ‘it  seems as  though  he  means  such  and such.’ 
McDowell clearly thinks that this is wrong. But the anti-realist goes wrong, 
continues McDowell, in the view he develops out of that rejection. The anti-
realist thesis, McDowell argues, retains the confused contrast between states 
of  mind  hidden  behind  the  visible  surface  behaviour  and  the  empty 
conception  of  that  behaviour  on  which  the  anti-realist  places  meaning. 
McDowell argues that the correct response is to reject this particular notion of 
visible surface behaviour:
123 McDowell (1998g), p.249.
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According  to  this  different  view,  the  outward  aspect  of  linguistic 
behaviour  –  what  a  speaker  makes  available  to  others  –  must  be 
characterised in terms of the contents of utterances (the thoughts they 
express).124 
What this actually means, what it actually amounts to, is one of the issues I 
will return to in the next section.
McDowell  claims that we are meant to feel  some unease in reading 
Wittgenstein’s comments on following a rule. Wittgenstein tells us not to dig 
below ‘bedrock’, but at the same time various trends in his discussion tempt 
us to inquire as to what lies ‘down there’. If we did, we would most likely be 
stuck by the sheer contingency of our ways of carrying on – how they depend 
on  the  kind  of  creatures  we  are.  McDowell  draws  our  attention  to  the 
following reading of Wittgenstein:
We  learn  and  teach  words  in  certain  contexts,  and  then  we  are 
expected,  and expect  others,  to  be able  to  project  them into further 
contexts.  Nothing  insures  that  this  projection  will  take  place  (in 
particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of 
rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the 
same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing 
routes of interest and feeling, senses of humour and of significance and 
of fulfilment,  of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, 
what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, 
when  an  appeal,  when  an  explanation  –  all  the  whirl  of  organism 
Wittgenstein calls “forms of life”. Human speech and activity, sanity 
and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It 
is  a  vision  as  simple  as  it  is  difficult,  and as  difficult  as  it  is  (and 
because it is) terrifying.125
124 McDowell (1998g), p.249.
125 Cavell (1969), p.52.
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This supposed ‘terror’ which Cavell brings out is, argues McDowell, induced 
by the suggestion that there is nothing that keeps our practices in line except 
the reactions and responses we develop in learning them. This generates the 
feeling that  the ground has been removed from beneath  our feet.  For,  the 
‘forms  of  life’  Cavell  highlights  are,  one  might  think,  insufficient  for  any 
conviction that some action really is going the same way with a practice as 
before. 
Both  the  anti-realist  and  McDowell’s  ‘non-anti-realist’  accept  the 
feeling  of  terror  or  vertigo  that  the  quotation  from  Cavell  is  meant  to 
engender.  McDowell’s  position  (and  the  position  being  attributed  to 
Wittgenstein) is that
When I understand another person, I know the rules he is going by. 
My right to understand him is precarious, in that nothing but a tissue 
of contingences stands in my way of losing it. But to envisage its loss is 
not necessarily to envisage its turning out that I never had the right at 
all.126
I think this has to be the correct thing to say on these matters. The fact that we 
communicate at all with one another does rest on contingency – on the kinds 
of beings we are. But those contingencies do not rule out the possibility of 
genuine and secure communication. I  do not think anyone would sensibly 
want to deny that. Thus far the ‘non-anti-realist’ position is an appealing one. 
What are we to make of Wittgenstein’s appeal to shared agreement in 
judgements?  McDowell  argues  that  anti-realist  interpretations  correctly 
126 McDowell (1998g), p.251/252.
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identify  that  Wittgenstein makes such an appeal  but  misrepresent  it.  This, 
again, is meant to show a contrast between the anti-realist and McDowell’s 
‘non-anti-realist’.  The anti-realist,  in McDowell’s eyes, describes a linguistic 
community as a collection of individuals that present to one another certain 
exterior patterns that match, or so far have matched, in observable ways. This, 
argues  McDowell,  simply  is  not  enough  to  account  for  meaning.  For,  it 
degrades into a “mere aggregate of individuals whom we have no convincing 
reason  not  to  conceive  as  opaque  to  one  another.”127 There  is  simply  not 
enough,  for  McDowell,  on  the  ‘surface’  on  this  conception  to  account  for 
content.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  follow  McDowell’s  reading  we  are 
supposed to recognise the possibility of not just matching in exterior patterns, 
but of actually making “our minds available to one another”128.
We  have  been  struggling  to  accommodate  Wittgenstein’s  appeal  to 
shared  agreement  in  judgement  with  the  thought  that  a  rule  and  its 
requirements are internally related. McDowell presents the ‘non-anti-realist’ 
interpretation  as  offering  us  a  way  forward.  Wittgenstein  maintains  that 
understanding what another person means can be something other than an 
interpretation.  McDowell  argues  that  ‘non-anti-realism’  allows  us  to  make 
sense of that thought:
shared  command  of  a  language  equips  us  to  know  one  another’s 
meaning  without  needing  to  arrive  at  that  knowledge  by 
interpretation, because it equips us to hear someone else’s meaning in 
his words.129
127 McDowell (1998g), p.253.
128 McDowell (1998g), p.253.
129 McDowell (1998g), p.253.
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The anti-realist cannot have this explanation, at least according to McDowell, 
because  of  their  ‘wooden’  conception  of  what  a  linguistic  community 
amounts to. Where the anti-realist can aspire at best to a matching of exteriors 
within  a  community,  the  ‘non-anti-realist’  acknowledges  a  “capacity  for  a 
meeting of minds.”130 
Again, I want to flag up this passage as something that requires further 
attention as we move on. It is worth noting here, though, a puzzle over how 
McDowell has characterised the debate. Initially it seemed that the anti-realist 
interpretation was guilty of slipping into Charybdis – a loss of objectivity. But 
now it seems the anti-realist cannot avoid Scylla – it fails to account for a way 
of following a rule that is not an interpretation. Indeed, my complaint with 
Dummett’s initial interpretation [2.2] was precisely that it placed ‘convention’ 
as a mediating entity. On the way McDowell has carved things up the anti-
realist goes wrong in both ways.
§12 of the paper provides a more general conception of the shape of 
McDowell’s  ‘non-anti-realist’  interpretation.  McDowell  presents  a 
(supposedly natural) picture of how facts and truths line up. A genuine fact is 
a  matter of how things are in and of  themselves,  independent  of how we 
perceive those things to be. So, for example, it is either a fact or not that my 
coffee mug is on the desk, irrespective of what I perceive to be the case. So, 
the thought runs, a true judgement must (at least potentially) be ‘pure’, in that 
if  something  about  the  nature  of  human  beings  is  part  and  parcel  of 
130 McDowell (1998g), p.253.
104
(inextricably bound-up in) the formation of the judgement it would threaten 
to undermine the idea that the fact is really a proper fact at all. 
One of the reasons such a view might be found attractive lies in the 
assumption  that  meanings  take  care  of  themselves  –  we  need  make  no 
contribution to settling what they require. If we make that assumption
we can let the judging subject, in our picture of true judgement, shrink 
to  a  locus  of  pure  thought,  while  the  fact  that  judging is  a  human 
activity fades into insignificance.131
McDowell takes Wittgenstein’s comments on following a rule to undermine 
the idea that meanings take care of themselves.  The idea is that our being 
governed by the constraints rules place on us is not a matter of being forced 
this  way  or  that  by  the  rigid  ‘rules  as  rails’,  but  that  we  act  within  a 
framework of shared agreement. In doing so we must abandon the picture of 
a  genuine  truth,  in  which  a  ‘pure’  thought  abstracted  from  anything 
intrinsically human is possible. Instead we must recognise that judgements 
are inextricably bound up in the kind of beings that we are. That is to say: 
Wittgenstein’s  remarks  oppose  a  certain  extreme  form  of  realism,  where 
meaning is taken to be completely independent and autonomous of us. That 
kind of realism imposes a metaphysically inflated reading on the thesis that 
the facts are not up to us.
McDowell agrees with the anti-realist that Wittgenstein is rejecting this 
particular heady realism. But McDowell argues that rejecting such an extreme 
131McDowell (1998bg, p.254/255.
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form  of  realism  need  not  push  us  immediately  into  the  anti-realist 
interpretations  offered  by  the  likes  of  Dummett  and  Wright.  First,  in 
‘recoiling’ from the extreme form of realism we have said nothing against the 
truth-conditional  account  of  meaning,  which,  I  take  it,  is  meant  to  be  a 
characteristic  of ‘realism’ in contemporary debates.  We can accept  that the 
truth-conditions  of  a  statement  are  given  by  us.  So,  using  McDowell’s 
example, when we say “ ‘Diamonds are hard’ is true iff diamonds are hard”, 
we can accept that we are involved on the right-hand side. It is not, as it were, 
that  the right-hand side  is  an unconceptualised fact.  Second,  crucially,  we 
need  not  abandon  altogether  the  insight  that  facts  are  not  up  to  us.  The 
common  sense  view  that  a  rule  extends  in  application  to  new  cases 
independently of our ability to ratify that fact does not force us to accept the 
Platonist picture of ‘rules as rails’. 
Take  the  example  of  meeting  an  object  for  the  first  time  and  a 
community coming to a consensus as to whether or not to call it ‘yellow’:
we must say that the community “goes right or wrong” according to 
whether  the object  in question is,  or is  not,  yellow;  and nothing can 
make its  being  yellow,  or  not,  dependent  on our  ratification  of  the 
judgement that that is how things are.132
This looks like simple common sense. Or, perhaps it would be better to say, it 
would require a substantial and persuasive argument to make us reject this 
picture. The target here for McDowell is the idea (in, for example, the earlier 
work of Wright) that appeal to community will only offer temporary solace, 
132 McDowell (1998g), p.256.
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as the community itself fares no better than the individual: the community 
has no authority it must meet. That claim – ‘for the community itself there is 
no authority, so no standard to meet’– is at very best, argues McDowell,
an attempt to say something that cannot be said but only shown. It 
may  have  some  merit,  conceived  in  that  light;  but  attributing  it  to 
Wittgenstein as a doctrine can only yield distortion.133
What is interesting here is the introduction of what seem to be different 
levels of investigation. On the one hand McDowell wants to say: ‘of course, 
whether something is yellow or not depends on the thing in question, it is not 
dependent on our ratifying it as such.’ At another level, however, McDowell 
appears to be rejecting the idea that we can, as it were, step outside of our 
own practice, or that of the community of which we are a member, and assess 
the relationship between ourselves/community and the world. At that level, 
McDowell is arguing, the best we could ever hope for is that the limitations of 
the community reveal  themselves in the language we use,  for they cannot 
intelligibly be put into words as we cannot occupy the position that would 
require.  Nonetheless,  McDowell  appears  to  be  saying,  conceived  as  an 
attempt  to  occupy  that  position  Wright’s  remarks  would  have  “some 
merit”134.    
To repeat: I do not imagine this summary to capture all that is present 
in the crucial passages of McDowell’s paper. Some headway has been made 
though. It is clear that McDowell’s interpretation fits within the boundaries 
133 McDowell (1998g), p.256.
134 McDowell (1998g), p.256.
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established in Chapter One, and that he seeks to do justice to all four themes 
there identified. The crucial question for McDowell is the crucial question for 
us:  how is  it  possible  to  make the fantastical  claims about rules  and their 
requirements  cohere  with  the  basic,  common  sense,  banalities?  McDowell 
insists on the internal relationship between a rule and actions in accordance 
with  it  whilst  also  incorporating  the  appeal  to  shared  agreement  in 
judgement.  McDowell has Wittgenstein rejecting a certain extreme form of 
realism on the one hand, yet rejecting anti-realism on the other. And part of 
this middle course is a re-conception of what it is to belong to a linguistic 
community. 
I  think  this  shape  is  admirable  and,  indeed,  the  very  kind  of 
interpretation we have been looking for. The problem so far is the detail; it is 
not clear yet how all of this is supposed to work. 
[4.3] Broader McDowellian Themes
I  want  to  try  to  fill  out  these  details  through examination  of  McDowell’s 
wider philosophical work. The key passage we will need to work towards is 
the  final  section  of  his  “Anti-Realism  and  the  Epistemology  of 
Understanding”. But it will take some serious work to get there. Two ideas 
need to be developed and connected. The first is McDowell’s conception of 
content residing on the surface of linguistic behaviour. This will take us into 
some of McDowell’s epistemological standpoint. The second is the rejection of 
a view from ‘sideways on’. I want to show that McDowell is making the same 
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move  that  we  saw  Dummett  make  in  Chapter  Three  [3.2],  although 
McDowell, contrary to Dummett, finds something persuasive in the resulting 
position. 
[4.3.1] Content ‘on the surface’ 
In my initial ‘skirmish’ with McDowell I  simply stopped at phrases like ‘a 
meeting  of  minds’  and  ‘content  residing  on  the  surface  of  linguistic 
behaviour’. Here I want to see if we can make something of this imagery. In 
other works McDowell uses the terms ‘psychologism’ and ‘behaviourism’ to 
identify the two extremes between which he wants to offer a middle course. 
Behaviourism  is  the  view  that  various  types  of  content  –  meaning, 
understanding,  intending  and  so  on  –  consist  in  publicly  observable 
behaviour.  The problem with behaviourism is that it risks leaving out any 
account  of  how  the  mind  is  involved  with,  say,  meaningful  speech. 
Psychologism is the claim that content resides, as it were, ‘below’ or ‘beneath’ 
the publicly observable phenomena. That is: in some ‘inner’ or ‘private’ state. 
The worry which such a view is that if meaning resides in such an inner state 
the best we could ever get about another’s meaning is a hypothesis about him 
and what he means, rather than actually direct access to such content. Such 
hypotheses would not rule out deviant cases, such as Wittgenstein’s pupil, 
where it appears as though my interlocutor and I are ‘marching in step’ with a 
particular term, yet it turns out that we are in fact not (he continues 1004, 
1008,  etc.).  Such  a  worry  would  therefore  undermine  my  confidence  in 
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communicating with anyone at all. This clearly mirrors McDowell’s remarks 
in “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule”.  There McDowell was concerned to 
show that resisting the idea that meaning resides in a hidden state does not 
commit one to a ‘wooden’ kind of behaviourism.
But how, exactly, are we supposed to perform the balancing trick?
Our attention is indeed drawn to the contents of the used sentences, 
rather than the mere words […]: but not as something “beneath” the 
words,  to  which  we  are  to  penetrate  by  stripping  off  the  linguistic 
clothing;  rather,  as  something  present  in  the  words  –  something 
capable of being heard or seen in the words by those who understand 
the language.135
The idea, then, in meaning ‘being on the surface’ is that a speaker really does 
put their thoughts into the words they use, and others can hear or see those 
thoughts: come into direct contact with them. What is essential to McDowell’s 
case is a recasting of what linguistic behaviour is. Linguistic practice need not 
be characterizable from ‘outside’ of content. Rather, McDowell wants to insist:
that the outward aspect of linguistic behaviour is essentially content-
involving, so that the mind’s role in speech is, as it were, on the surface 
– part of what one presents to others, not something that is at best a 
hypothesis for them.136 
Crucial  to  McDowell’s  discussion  is  the  notion  of  a  ‘perceptual 
capacity’:
135 McDowell (1998d), p.99.
136 McDowell (1998d), p.101.
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Command of a language is partly constituted by just such a perceptual 
capacity;  one  whose  acquisition  makes  a  new  range  of  facts,  not 
hitherto within one’s perceptual ken, available to one’s awareness.137
How  are  we  to  understand  this  notion?  There  is  an  innocuous  way  of 
understanding the claim that certain capacities allow us to take in facts about 
the  world  we  would not  be  able  to  if  we  lacked  those  capacities.  So,  for 
example, that I have eyes and the ability to see the world around me makes 
available  a  certain  range  of  facts  that  otherwise  would  be  unavailable. 
McDowell clearly means something more than such a trivial claim. A further 
thought would be that the capacities that interest McDowell are not those we 
have in virtue of  mere biological  contingencies,  but  are  somehow brought 
about by something akin to training. So, for example, careful study and work 
experience  in  a  garden  centre  might  get  me  to  a  point  where  I  can 
discriminate  between  azaleas  and  rhododendrons.  If  I  acquire  such  a 
discriminating capacity I could see that a certain plant is an azalea. This is 
something that without the training would have been beyond my perceptual 
ken. Similarly, if I learned how to read German I would then have an ability 
to come into contact with the content of sentences written in German. Without 
an understanding of that language I would not be able to do so.
Again,  however,  one  is  likely  to  think  that  these  claims  are 
uncontroversial.  Understanding  German  or  acquiring  a  discriminating 
capacity for plants brings things into my perceptual awareness that I did not 
have  before.  But  how are  we  to  get  from  that  point  to  McDowell’s  odd-
137 McDowell (1998b), p.332.
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looking claims that  we should conceive of  content  lying on the surface of 
linguistic behaviour and that communication involves a genuine meeting of 
minds?  McDowell  wants  to  offer  a  different  conception  of  perceptual 
capacities to the two so far considered:  
I  mean to be offering a more radical alternative:  one that rejects the 
assumption, common to both horns of the dilemma, that our genuine 
perceptual intake can be exhaustively described in terms that do not 
beg the question of the status,  as knowledge,  of what we ascribe to 
people when we say they understand utterances.138 
But what does this amount to? The idea is, it seems, that what we take in (the 
‘perceptual intake’) differs depending on what perceptual capacities we have. 
We  tend  to  assume  that  the  raw  materials  of  experience  are  the  same 
irrespective of such capacities. So, for example, that when both I and someone 
who understands German read a piece of German text we take in the same 
experiential data. He, as opposed to me, has an ability to work out the content 
of what is written. McDowell is claiming that this assumption is mistaken: the 
perceptual intake itself is shaped by what capacities a person has.
Let’s take a particular example. Consider again Wittgenstein’s ordering 
a pupil to write down the series ‘+2’. Given our normal assumptions – the 
kind  of  assumptions  McDowell  thinks  leads  to  a  ‘wooden’  conception  of 
linguistic behaviour – the pupils behaviour, his going ‘996, 998, 1000’, in itself 
will not be sufficient to regard him as genuinely obeying the order. This is 
because although his  behaviour has conformed to a certain  pattern to  this 
138 McDowell (1998b),  p.332.
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point we cannot rule out that his behaviour might diverge from that pattern: 
he might continue ‘1104, 1008, 1012…’ McDowell’s  claim is that a genuine 
perceptual capacity, something which a proper upbringing or inculcation in a 
way of life brings about, will allow us to simply see that the pupil is obeying 
the order ‘+2’ as opposed to ‘+2 up to 1000, +4 thereafter’. What then of the 
concern that the pupil’s behaviour could all of a sudden cease conforming to 
the pattern we expect? McDowell maintains that 
[…]  our right  to  the conviction that  it  will  not  happen is  anchored 
upward, so to speak, in our right to take another at face value; it is not 
something  we  have independently,  on  which  our  right  to  take  one 
another at face value can be founded.139 
The specific connection with rules is starting to come into focus. It is this: for 
McDowell, there can be no description of the requirements of a rule graspable 
independently of our understanding of what the rule requires.  Developing 
this thought will take us back to ‘sideways-on’ looks. 
[4.3.2] The View From ‘Sideways-On’
Dummett’s modified interpretation of Wittgenstein was examined in Chapter 
Three [3.2].  That interpretation presented Wittgenstein as holding both the 
trivial  point that a rule and its requirements are internally related and the 
interesting appeal to shared agreements in judgement. This was achieved by 
recognising Wittgenstein’s hostility to a kind of external perspective. That is:
139 McDowell (1998b), p.337.
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To attempt to step outside the situation in which we are placed, and 
thus to pass beyond the limits of language and say what can only be 
shown.140
Wittgenstein, on Dummett’s modified interpretation, relegates recognition of 
the internal relationship into the appeal to shared judgements by abandoning 
the idea that we can talk intelligibly about things as they are in themselves. 
The  view that  comes  out  of  Dummett’s  interpretation  is  to  be  rejected  as 
hopeless:  it  saves the internal  relationship at  the cost  of  the very point  of 
insisting on it. McDowell reads the same move in Wittgenstein as Dummett, 
but appears to find a resulting position far more palatable. This section aims 
at  highlighting  what  is  common  between  Dummett  and  McDowell,  the 
differences in where one goes from there will emerge in the next section. 
McDowell  claims  that  the  imagery  of  the  Platonist  picture  –  our 
somehow  attaching  mental  wheels  to  rail  leading  out  to  infinity  –  is  an 
example  of  the faulty  desire  for  an external  perspective:  the idea that  the 
relationship  between  our  language  and  the  reality  it  represents  can  be 
considered  from ‘sideways  on’,  from a  standpoint  independent  of  human 
practice. From such a perspective it would be recognisable what the correct 
move in any given mathematical series is: “[T]hat, say, 1002 really does come 
after 1000 in the series determined by the instruction “Add 2””.141 McDowell 
takes Wittgenstein to be rejecting the intelligibility of such a perspective. We 
want to deny that  what it  is  for the square of 13 to  be 169 is  for it  to be 
possible to train people to find such a calculation compelling. “Rather, it is 
140 Dummett (1993c), p.451.
141 McDowell (1998f), p.208.
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because  the square of  13  really  is 169 that  we can be brought  to  find the 
calculations compelling.”142 McDowell argues that we suppose that when we 
say ‘the square of 13 really is 169’ in the context ‘It is because […] that we can 
be  brought  to  find  the  calculations  compelling’,  we  are  speaking  from  a 
perspective  independently  graspable  from  our  understanding  of  such 
calculations.  But,  continues McDowell,  we cannot occupy such an external 
position, all we can do is describe matters from within the midst of our own, 
human,  competence,  and it  is  only  a  mistake to  think the  position makes 
sense.
The fact is that it is only because of our own involvement in our “whirl 
of organism” that we can understand a form of words as conferring, on 
the judgement that some move is the correct one at a given point, the 
special compellingness possessed by the conclusion of a proof.143  
If we are just normally and simply engaged in our practices we do not feel the 
need  for  the  ‘sideways  on’  view.  We  could  protect  ourselves,  continues 
McDowell, if we stop supposing that the relation to reality of some area of our 
thought and language needs to be assessed from a standpoint independent of 
our ‘form of life’. He admits this will be incredibly difficult, drawing attention 
to Wittgenstein’s comment:
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing 
philosophy when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so 
that  it  is  no  longer  tormented  by  questions  which  bring  itself in 
question.144
142 McDowell (1998f), p.208.
143 McDowell (1998f), p.209.
144 PI I, §133.
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McDowell argues that finding a way of stopping the temptation to adopt the 
‘sideways on’ perspective would be the discovery that enables one to stop 
doing philosophy when one wants to. The quest for the external standpoint is 
characteristic, continues McDowell, of a kind of philosophical realism. Such 
realism “chafes at the fallibility and inconclusiveness”145 of our finding out the 
ways things really are. It confers a sense on ‘But is it really so?’ in which the 
question does not call for an extremely careful assessment by our own lights, 
but from a perspective that transcends our own limitations. 
This is the same position Dummett’s modified interpretation reached. 
Both  McDowell  and  Dummett  agree  that  Wittgenstein  is  resisting  the 
possibility of a view from ‘sideways on’ and that it is in recognising this that 
we can see Wittgenstein as offering a coherent account. The question ‘is there 
really an internal relationship between a rule and its requirements?’ cannot be 
asked because it requires the external perspective to even be considered. From 
within  our  community  it  will  of  course  look like  the  internal  relationship 
holds. It is the desire to ask questions of the form ‘but is it  really that way?’ 
that  is  to  be  abandoned  as  empty.  There  simply  can  be  no  way  of 
characterising the requirements of a rule independent of our understanding 
of the rule.
It might be worthwhile pausing to reflect on what this standpoint is 
and  why  it  is  thought  to  be  so  problematic  for  Wittgenstein.  We  might 
understand  the  position  as  suggesting  that  we  can  in  some  way  ‘detach’ 
145 McDowell (1998f), p.212.
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ourselves from ourselves.  We could submit our own beliefs or attitudes to 
reflection  and  criticism  from  a  position  independent  of  those  beliefs  or 
attitudes. Such self reflection and criticism seems possible in particular cases. I 
might have the belief that Tony Blair was an honest and trust-worthy Prime 
Minister.  I  can reflect  on the  status  of  that  belief  whilst  at  the same time 
withholding judgement about the belief. I can bring evidence to bear on the 
belief – that he misled parliament regarding the threat posed by Iraq, that he 
created  a  financial  mess  for  future  generations  with  Private  Finance 
Initiatives,  that  he  exaggerated  the  threat  of  terrorism  to  push  through 
legislation  infringing  our  civil  liberties,  and  so  on  –  without  the  belief 
influencing my critical reflection.
If that is what a view from ‘sideways on’ amounted to it is hard to see 
why it  might be threatening or undesirable.  In the case of Tony Blair it  is 
simply an attempt to be objective as possible on my beliefs about him as a 
Prime  Minister.  It  is  the  kind of  standpoint  we adopt  (or  at  least  seek  to 
adopt)  all  the  time.  When  marking  an  essay  a  teacher  ought  to  aim  at 
impartiality: remove whatever opinions she has of the pupil and grade the 
work  on its  merits  alone.  We are  ‘sideways  on’  when we seek  to  learn  a 
second language. We know and understand our native tongue and what we 
do is map across the foreign terms.  It  is  only by doing this that we work 
ourselves into an understanding of the foreign language. On the face of it, 
then, we attempt to adopt ‘sideways on’ perspectives frequently and should 
feel no shame in doing so. 
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So what is the problematic ‘sideways on’ stance? Nagel claims that any 
attempt to completely adopt a ‘sideways on’ view – to totally divorce ourselves 
from ourselves  –  is  doomed to  failure.  Nagel  offers  Descartes’  attempt  to 
“demolish  everything  completely  and  start  again  right  from  the 
foundations”146 as an example of such a failure.
The true philosophical point consists not in Descartes’ conclusion that 
he  exists  […],  nor  even  in  the  discovery  of  something  absolutely 
certain. Rather, the point is that Descartes reveals that there are some 
thoughts which we cannot get outside of.147
Descartes  does  not  bring  everything  into  doubt  in  Meditation  One,  in 
particular his ability to reason, because he cannot: the whole project would 
then collapse. Nagel’s point is that there are some thoughts we cannot help 
but have, which are impossible to consider ‘from outside’, because they are 
necessarily and directly linked to any process of considering ourselves from 
the outside. This, for Nagel, highlights why full-blown relativism and related 
views regarding  ethics  are  incoherent.  They purport  to  tell  us  how things 
really are – that ethics is nothing more than, say, sociology and biology – yet 
deny that we are capable of having thoughts about how things really are. 
We  have  a  contrast  between  harmless,  natural,  attempts  to  adopt 
‘sideways  on’  perspectives  and  attempts  to  adopt  a  completely  external 
perspective on all our beliefs that is doomed to fail. The thought that has been 
developed out of McDowell’s remarks is this: for Wittgenstein, there can be 
146 Descartes (1996), p.12.
147 Nagel (1997), p.19. 
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no description of the requirements of a rule graspable independently of our 
understanding  of  what  the  rule  requires.  That  suggests  that  the  kind  of 
‘sideways on’ looks that bothers Wittgenstein (on the current interpretation) 
falls  somewhere  in  between:  it  is  harmful  and  yet  not  an  attempt  to 
completely detach ourselves from ourselves.  For any given concept, or any 
given rule, the claim is that we cannot occupy a ‘sideways on’ perspective on 
it. What we must recognise is that for any specific concept, our grasp of that 
concept cannot be described in terms that do not employ our understanding 
of  that  concept.  Put  like that,  Wittgenstein’s  supposed position looks very 
unappealing. We will return to the issue of ‘sideways on’ in Part Three
[4.4] Levels of Discourse
We have spent some time trying to understand what McDowell’s interpretive 
position  amounts  to.  Some  progress  has  been  made:  The  imagery  of  a 
‘meeting  of  minds’  has  been  made  somewhat  clearer  and  we  have 
investigated the crucial claim that Wittgenstein rejected the possibility of the 
view  from  ‘sideways  on’.  McDowell  is  agreeing  with  Dummett’s 
interpretation  insofar  as  Wittgenstein  is  to  been  seen  as  reconciling  the 
internal relationship between a rule and its requirements with the appeal to 
shared agreement in judgement by giving up any attempt to talk about the 
world as it  is  in itself.  But whereas Dummett  found nothing to be said in 
favour of this position, and that it ought to be abandoned, McDowell thinks 
that there is a genuinely interesting and persuasive account to be found in 
119
Wittgenstein’s  remarks.  This  section  aims  at  establishing  how McDowell’s 
interpretation is supposed to differ to that offered by Dummett. It turns on 
Wittgenstein’s engagement with transcendental philosophy. We saw a hint of 
this in the discussion of ‘levels’ of discourse in [4.2]. I think this is crucial to 
understanding quite how McDowell’s  interpretation is supposed to offer a 
unique way of reading Wittgenstein.
Perhaps the best way to approach this topic again is in the form of a 
possible  objection  to  McDowell’s  account.  When  introducing  McDowell’s 
interpretation I briefly raised concern whether the appeal to the ‘framework’ 
of shared agreements  would risk leaving McDowell’s  interpretation falling 
into the banality I  read in some of Baker and Hacker’s  views.  That worry 
might  still  be  pressing.  Indeed,  McDowell  himself  seems  to  anticipate  an 
objection along these lines:
Crispin Wright might distinguish my position from the target of anti-
realist attacks by saying that the acceptability of my position is a mere 
reflection of  “grammar”,  in  one of  Wittgenstein’s  senses.  There  is  a 
truth here, but it needs to be handled carefully.148
Part of McDowell’s defence against such a possible objection is that there is 
nothing wrong with a conception of the world that reflects grammar. So if we 
have a conception of the world that maintains that  elements  of  reality are 
beyond our  ability  to  discover  them,  if  our  grammar reveals  this  then  so 
“much  better  for  the  conception.”149 What  is wrong,  for  McDowell,  is  the 
148 McDowell (1998b), p.341.
149 McDowell (1998b), p.341.
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emphasis of the conception being a ‘mere’ reflection of grammar. That could 
only be a genuine complaint if a more critical perspective – the view from 
‘sideways on’ – was possible. 
But there is another element to McDowell’s response. If we are to reject 
the view from ‘sideways  on’  we are accepting  that,  in a  general  way,  the 
relationship between language and the world cannot be thought about except 
from within language. So an anti-realist will feel the force of the following 
idea:  the  relationship  between  language  and  the  world  which  realism 
proposes has to be infected with (‘a reflection of’) our ways of conceiving that 
relationship. McDowell’s point is that this does point to anti-realism, but only 
at  the  transcendental level:  “if  the “reflection” thesis  is  a  truth,  then it  is  a 
transcendental truth, the sort of thing which shows but cannot be said.”150 The 
anti-realist  interpretation saddles Wittgenstein with empirical  idealism. For 
McDowell,  it  seems, the right answer is  that  Wittgenstein,  by rejecting the 
view  from  ‘sideways  on’,  endorsed  empirical  realism  and  transcendental 
idealism.
So we are left saying this: if McDowell’s interpretation is to fill the gap 
between banal  but  true and interesting but false whilst keeping faith with 
Wittgenstein’s remarks, then we need, the claim appears to be, to accept that 
the author of the Investigations was a transcendental idealist. We would then 
read Wittgenstein  as  assembling truths  that  nobody would dispute  on the 
empirical, human, level, but holding that we simply cannot talk about things 
are they are in themselves on the transcendental level. This, to coin a phrase, 
150 McDowell (1998b), p.342.
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is  just a ‘programme for a solution to Wittgenstein’s problem’.  But it  does 
offer us a way of reconciling the trivial reminders Wittgenstein makes with 
the apparently fantastical claims about the depth to which contingency runs. 
In making the transcendental  turn McDowell  at  least  opens the possibility 
that  Wittgenstein’s  view  is  not  as  immediately  unpalatable  as  Dummett’s 
modified interpretation suggested.
[4.5] Wittgenstein and Idealism
The suggestion in play is that if we want to read the later Wittgenstein as 
offering an interesting and consistent account that does not look immediately 
unpalatable,  then  we  are  going  to  have  to  read  him  as  a  transcendental 
idealist. In this section I want to flesh out in greater detail precisely what this 
suggestion  would  amount  to;  what  it  would  mean  to  say  that  the  later 
Wittgenstein was a transcendental idealist.
One cannot introduce the notion of  transcendental  idealism without 
some discussion of Kant. The empirical / transcendental distinction is Kant’s 
distinction. He understood it as describing different standpoints from which 
one  could  conduct  philosophical  investigation.  An  object  could,  then,  be 
considered from both the empirical and transcendental standpoint. From the 
empirical or “human standpoint”151 one considers objects as they appear to us 
to  be.  Empirical  realism  holds  that  spatio-temporal  objects  are  real  when 
considered from the human standpoint. Empirical idealism holds that such 
objects  are  mental  images,  hallucinations  and  the  like.  From  the 
151 Kant (1929), A26/B42. 
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transcendental standpoint one considers the conditions under which objects 
are possible for us. That is, one does not consider how objects appear to us 
through our mode of cognition, but how objects stand in relation to our mode 
of cognition. Transcendental realism holds that objects have their constitution 
independently  of  human  sensibility  –  objects  are  things  in  themselves. 
Transcendental idealism holds that an objects constitution depends on human 
sensibility  –  objects  are  appearances.  Kant  maintains  that,  from  the 
transcendental standpoint, we cannot know about things in themselves.
What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity 
of  our  sensibility,  remains  completely  unknown  to  us.  We  know 
nothing but our mode of perceiving them – a mode which is peculiar to 
us […] Even if we could bring our intuition to the highest degree of 
clearness, we should not thereby come any nearer to the constitution of 
objects in themselves.152
Kant is thus a transcendental idealist. This is meant to go hand in hand with 
empirical realism. So whilst, for Kant, spatio-temporal objects are not features 
of the world as it is in itself, such objects are real from the human standpoint. 
These two ideas are intimately related in Kant’s thinking. Why transcendental 
idealism is correct – because the objects of experience cannot be considered as 
things in themselves but rather part of the structure of experience – provides 
the  basis  for  empirical  realism  because  the  objects  are  constituted  by  the 
structure  of  experience.  “Transcendental  ideality  and  empirical  reality  are 
correlates.”153 As Gardner summarises:
152 Kant (1929), A42-43/B59-60.
153 Gardner (1999), p.92.
123
transcendental idealism may be defined as the thesis that the objects of 
our  cognition  are  mere  appearances:  they  are  empirically  real  but 
transcendentally ideal. To say that they are transcendentally ideal is to 
say  that  they  do  not  have  in  themselves,  i.e.  independently  of  our 
mode  of  cognition,  the  constitution  which  we  represent  them  as 
having;  rather  our  mode  of  cognition  determines  this  constitution. 
Transcendental idealism entails that things cannot be known as they 
are in themselves.154
 
There is  no doubt that Wittgenstein was influenced (at least indirectly)  by 
Kant. Wittgenstein was troubled by questions of the ‘how possible’ kind. And 
so, for example:
The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe the 
fact which corresponds to […] a sentence, without simply repeating the 
sentence. (This has to do with the Kantian solution of the problem of 
philosophy.)155
But nothing in our discussion has shown Wittgenstein to be interested in the 
question  of  how  objects  are  possible  for  us  or,  indeed,  taking  sides  over 
whether  the  objects  of  our  experience  are  things  in  themselves  or  mere 
appearances.  But  then  why  call  the  suggested  view  ‘transcendental’  or 
‘idealism’ at all? For this I turn first to the paper by Williams “Wittgenstein 
and Idealism”. There Williams comments on the relationship between early 
and later Wittgenstein:
[If] the idea that the limits of my language mean the limits of my world 
can point to transcendental solipsism, then perhaps there is a form of 
154 Gardner (1999), p.95.
155 CV, p.10.
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transcendental  idealism which is suggested […] by the idea that the 
limits of our language mean the limits of our world.156 
Now in what way is this ‘transcendental’ and in what way is it a species of 
‘idealism’?  To  achieve  the  former  we  need  show  that  ‘the  limits  of  our 
language are the limits of our world’ is not an empirical claim. It does run the 
risk  of  looking  banal.  It  could  just  mean  whatever  we  understand  we 
understand, whatever we can speak of we can speak of, and so on. Williams 
warns  against  reading  ‘language’  narrowly  and  ‘the  world’  broadly.  So  a 
‘language’  would  be  a  system  of  communication,  with  various  different 
linguistic groups having different ‘languages’.  The way the world looks to 
different groups would depend on what their ‘languages’ were like. On the 
interpretation being attributed to Wittgenstein this simply will  not do. For 
Williams the idea is not that the ‘we’ of our language is, as it were, placed in 
the world and then examined from outside. 
Under the idealist interpretation, it is not a question of our recognising 
that we are one lot in the world among others,  and (in principle at 
least) coming to understand and explain how our language conditions 
our view  of  the  world,  while  that  of  others  conditions  theirs 
differently.157
The idea is rather that what the world is for us reveals itself in the fact that 
some things make sense and other things do not. Empirical investigation into 
‘our’ view of the world would, on this view, have to be coloured by the very 
thing we were investigating. It  would make no sense to talk of something 
156 Williams (1974), p.82.
157 Williams (1974), p.84.
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beyond the boundary of our language because we could not grasp our non-
understanding of it. There are, then, no comprehensible alternatives to ‘our 
language’;  the ‘we’  is  not  part  of  the world  but  rather  the framework  for 
conceiving  the  world.  In  this  way  ‘our  language’  admits  of  no  empirical 
explanation,  but  reveals  itself  in  our  shared  interests  and  activities.  Any 
attempt to actually say that these shared outlooks actually determine what the 
world is for us will turn out to be false – it is something that can only be 
shown and not said. Moreover, according to Williams, the fact that things can 
only  be  described  through  the  lens  of  our  shared  interests  and  concerns 
provides  the  ground  for  calling  “such  a  view  a  kind  of  idealism”158.  The 
thought is something like: the way we are minded determines the way we see 
the world,  but we cannot make any sense of the idea of  being other than 
minded in the way we are.
I take Moore to be working with a similar conception in his  Points of  
View. There he defines idealism as “the view that some aspect of the form of 
that  to  which  our  representations  answer  depends  on  some aspect  of  the 
representations.”159 Appealing to the ‘form’ is meant to show that we are not 
just interested in how that to which our representations answer stands, but 
interested in the essential features of reality however it may be. What makes 
idealism transcendental is the rider that the dependence is transcendent.
Moore  outlines  how  such  transcendental  idealism  can  be  seen  as 
appealing  (although  he  wants  to  go  on  and  argue  that  it  is,  in  fact, 
158 Williams (1974), p.85.
159 Moore (1997), p.116.
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incoherent).  It  appears,  for  example,  to  offer  reconciliation  between 
arguments  for  and  against  the  possibility  of  absolute  representations.  An 
absolute representation is a representation from no point of view; from no 
location whatsoever. Transcendental idealism points to the following: at the 
immanent level  the ‘Basic  Assumption’  holds (and can be justified);  at  the 
transcendental level the ‘Basic Assumption’ is false. (The ‘Basic Assumption’ 
is the assumption that representations are representations of ‘what is there 
anyway’.) More generally, transcendental idealism has appeal in meeting a 
general  philosophical  problem  of  attempting  to  acknowledge  an  apparent 
philosophical truth which we seem unable to acknowledge without saying 
something false. The shape of the response is to argue that there is a genuine 
philosophical  truth,  but  this  is  at  the transcendental  level.  Any attempt to 
express it at the human level will result in falsehood. 
Let’s take the idea that how things can be truly represented as being is 
how they really are; the content of a true representation is the fact that things 
are a certain way. The content of the thought that grass is green and the fact 
that grass is green are one and the same. “The content of my thought is that 
grass is green. The fact is that grass is green.”160 This is an identity, not mere 
correspondence. It also seems to be a Wittgensteinian thought: “When we say, 
and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we – and our meaning – do not stop 
anywhere short of the fact; but we mean:  this-is-so.”161 But what gives us the 
right to think that reality is made up of the kind of things that we can grasp in 
160 Moore (1997), p.118.
161 PI I §95.
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thought?  Transcendental  idealism  offers  an  answer;  by  saying  that  at  the 
transcendental level the form of reality is determined by the form of thought. 
But any attempt to get beyond mere platitudes at the human level will result 
in falsehood: “we are liable to produce absurdities  about,  for example,  the 
mental make-up of physical reality.”162
  This  Williams  (endorsed  by  Moore)  conception  of  ‘transcendental 
idealism’  chimes  with  the  kind  of  view  I  have  suggested  arises  from 
McDowell’s  comments on Wittgenstein.   As McDowell puts it:  “What is at 
issue here is the status of a position that is analogous to a kind of idealism, 
but with linguistic practice in place of “ideas”.”163 . There is something right, 
continues McDowell, about what the anti-realist wants to say but he simply 
misperceives  how it  ought  to  be  expressed.  The  anti-realist  interpretation 
“stands to the misperceived deep doctrine as a shallow empirical  idealism 
would stand to  an analogous transcendental  idealism.”164 It  is,  then,  not a 
Kantian form of transcendental idealism but a Wittgensteinian one; worthy of 
the title nonetheless. 
[4.6] Philosophical Therapy
The crucial question is whether McDowell takes this species of transcendental 
idealism to be the terminus of Wittgenstein’s thought or simply a halt along 
the  line.  In  this  section I  want  to  sketch  the  latter  idea:  that  Wittgenstein 
ultimately rejects transcendental idealism. (This chapter, as indicated in the 
162 Moore (1997), p.119.
163 McDowell (1998b), p.342.
164 McDowell (1998b), p.342/3.
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introduction [4.1], aims at merely sketching the alternatives. I will not attempt 
to  settle  the  matter  until  Part  Three.)  This  suggestion  has  Wittgenstein 
claiming that we need to recognise that the questions to which transcendental 
idealism would be the correct answer are themselves mistaken. Wittgenstein’s 
point, this train of thought would argue, is a therapeutic one. It is, therefore, of 
the same general motivation as Wright’s modified interpretation [3.3]. 
The  authors  I  have  pointing  Wittgenstein  in  the  direction  of 
transcendental idealism are, to say the least, cagey in actually attributing the 
view  to  him.  In  two  crucial  passages  McDowell  gestures  at,  but  comes 
conspicuously  short  of  asserting,  the  view  that  Wittgenstein  was  a 
transcendental idealist.
In  Wittgenstein’s  eyes,  as  I  read  him,  Wright’s  claim  that  “for  the 
community itself there is no authority, so no standard to meet” can be, 
at very best, an attempt to say something that cannot be said but only 
shown. It may have some merit, conceived in that light; but attributing 
it to Wittgenstein as a doctrine can only yield distortion.165
The impression one gets from this remark is that  maybe what the anti-realist 
(here figuring as the original position offered by Wright) is saying has some 
value, maybe it is even true. But if it is true it is the kind of thing that would 
reveal itself in the way we carry on rather than actually being capable of being 
expressed.  In  “Anti–Realism  and  the  Epistemology  of  Understanding” 
McDowell  comes  even  closer  to  the  transcendental  idealist  interpretation. 
There he accepts that the motivation for anti-realism, the kind of thing Wright 
165 McDowell (1998g), p.256.
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argues, has something going for it: “There is a truth here, but it needs to be 
handled carefully.”166 But in the space of a page McDowell seemingly wavers 
on  this.  He  tells  us  “if  the  “reflection”  thesis  is  a  truth,  then  it  is  a 
transcendental truth”167. But to waver over whether the “reflection” thesis – 
the thought that the world realism gestures at is, in some sense, a reflection of 
our  way  of  talking  about  that  world  –  is  true  is to  waver  over  whether 
Wittgenstein was an idealist or not. Williams is more forthright in pinning the 
view on Wittgenstein. But even he qualifies it:
In fact, I am not going to claim anything as strong as that he held it; it 
seems to me that both the nature of the view, and the nature of the later 
Wittgenstein  material,  make  it  hard  to  substantiate  any  unqualified 
claim of that kind.168
No doubt some of this caginess comes from the complexity of Wittgenstein’s 
remarks  and  the  way  different  themes  are  overlapped,  run  together,  re-
introduced  from different  directions  and so  on.  Another  concern,  perhaps 
more  substantial,  is  what  we  are  to  make  of  Wittgenstein’s  avowed anti-
theoretical  stance.  The  interpretation  we  have  been  considering  attributes 
transcendental idealism to Wittgenstein. But, one might legitimately ask, isn’t 
the  very  point  of  the  latter  Wittgenstein  project  to  reject  such  ‘isms’ 
altogether? 
There can be no doubt that there is an anti-theoretical thread in the 
Investigations. We came across it in [1.3.3]. Here are just a couple of examples:
166 McDowell (1998b), p.341.
167 McDowell (1998b), p.342.
168 Williams (1974), p.85.
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Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view there is nothing 
to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. […] 
The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a 
particular  purpose.  If  one  tried  to  advance  theses in  philosophy,  it 
would  never  be  possible  to  debate  them,  because  everyone  would 
agree to them.169
In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. “But it must be like this!” is 
not a philosophical proposition. Philosophy only states what everyone 
admits.170
As such, any account of what is going on in the rule-following passages is 
going to have to been sensitive to this particular theme. The question is not 
whether  Wittgenstein opposed philosophical  theory building but how that 
opposition is at work in the rule-following considerations; not whether the 
theme is there but what we are to do with it.
In  a  further  paper  McDowell  argues  that  the  anti-theoretical  strand 
deserves a central place in understanding Wittgenstein’s remarks. He warns 
against  the  following  kind  of  reading:  When  Wittgenstein  mentions  our 
shared  agreement  in  judgements,  this  is  meant  to  figure  as  an  answer  to 
genuine,  pressing,  philosophical  questions  such  as  ‘How  is  meaning 
possible?’
A  response  that,  according  to  some  readings,  Wittgenstein  actually 
gives,  and that,  according  to  other  readings,  he  points  towards  but 
does  not  deliver,  out  of  a  quietism  that  must  stand  exposed  as 
inappropriate by the sheer fact that the questions are supposed to be 
good ones.171
169 PI I §§126-128.
170 PI I §599.
171 McDowell (1998e), p.275.
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The targets here are Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ on the one hand, Wright’s 
original complaint that nothing positive can be rescued from Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on the other. Interestingly, McDowell admits (in a footnote) that his 
discussion in “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule” is too ‘hospitable’ to the 
kind  of  reading  offered  by  Wright.  Wright’s  initial  interpretation  of 
Wittgenstein had him unearthing interesting and fundamental questions for 
philosophers to  deal  with.  But given that these questions are genuine and 
pressing  concerns,  Wright  continues,  it  seems  unduly  defeatist  to  adopt 
hostility  to  ‘constructive’  philosophy  just  because  the  task  looks  hard.  If 
“Wittgenstein reveals  tasks for philosophy, he cannot appeal  to  what now 
looks like an adventitiously negative view of philosophy’s scope to justify not 
engaging with those tasks.”172 What is wrong with this, for McDowell, is that 
it  displays  awareness  of  Wittgenstein’s  resistance  to  ‘constructive’ 
philosophical ambitions, yet takes this resistance as something to be criticised. 
Wittgenstein’s real achievement,  on such an interpretation, was uncovering 
the issues he refuses to address. Wittgenstein’s point is rather, according to 
McDowell,  that  the  mention  of  ‘form  of  life’  is  not  part  of  an  attempt  to 
construct a philosophical response to supposedly good questions about the 
possibility of meaning etc., but: “to remind us of something we can take in the 
proper way only after we are equipped to see that such questions are based 
on a mistake.”173 
172 McDowell (1998e), p.277.
173 McDowell (1998e), p.277.
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There is a similar thought in Moore:
For Wittgenstein philosophy was a kind of therapy. Its purpose was to 
cure  us  whenever,  through  the  misuse  of  our  own  language,  we 
became troubled by unanswerable  pseudo-questions  posing as deep 
problems.174
Wittgenstein  avoids  transcendental  idealism,  for  Moore,  not  by  openly 
rejecting it, or showing it to be incoherent or false, but rather by denying to 
questions  that  would  lead  one  to  think  that  it  was  a  good  answer. 
Wittgenstein does not put another ‘ism’ in its place but rather treats the illness 
that made certain pseudo-questions look like pressing concerns.   
So  we  have,  then,  the  shape  of  an  alternative  interpretation  of 
Wittgenstein’s project: transcendental idealism would be the right answer if 
the question could intelligibly be asked. But how would this ‘therapy’ run in a 
specific case? For this I want to use one of Moore’s examples. Say we ask the 
following: ‘what does something’s being green consist in?’ No doubt there is a 
good scientific answer to this question. But from a philosophical perspective 
we are tempted to think that there must be a different, deeper, explanation. So 
we might try and offer one: ‘it consists in the thing embodying the universal 
‘greenness’.’ But that just amounts to saying it is green. What we wanted, or 
at least thought we wanted, was an explanation of what something’s being 
green consisted in. And here we are at one with Wittgenstein’s interlocutor:
174 Moore (1997), p.126.
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Isn’t there a deeper explanation; or mustn’t at least the understanding of 
the  explanation  be  deeper?  –  Well,  have  I  myself  a  deeper 
understanding? Have I  got more than I give in the explanation? – But 
then, whence the feeling that I have got more?175
Wittgenstein’s  point  is  that  no  deeper  explanation  is  possible  or,  indeed, 
desirable. If we keep pushing, if we keep trying to ‘dig below bedrock’ and 
such for even deeper explanations or justifications we reach the choices that 
have  been  figuring  in  our  discussion.  We  might  try  and  argue  that 
something’s  being  green  consists  in  it  reflecting  the  Platonic  object 
‘greenness’. Wittgenstein’s hostility to a certain kind of Platonism has already 
been  discussed.  A  better  answer  would  be  to  recognise  just  how  deep 
contingency runs in our lives. Ultimately there is nothing more to something’s 
being green than we call it such. Something’s being green depends on shared 
agreement in judgement. Of course when I put that claim into words it comes 
out  as  a  simple  falsehood;  it  is  better  to  think  of  the  claim as  expressing 
(pointing  at)  a  transcendental,  rather  than  empirical,  truth.  Wittgenstein’s 
remarks show that he thought this was the answer to the question. But the 
question  itself  was  misguided;  there  is  no  deeper  explanation  here 
whatsoever.  Whether  this  is  a  plausible  interpretation  of  Wittgenstein’s 
intentions will be asked in Part Three.
[4.7] Conclusion
This chapter has argued that McDowell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein is the 
most  promising  we  have  considered.  McDowell  neatly  identifies  in 
175 PI I §209.
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Wittgenstein’s  discussion  the  four  themes  that  were  identified  in  Chapter 
One. The crucial question for us is also the crucial question for McDowell: 
how  is  Wittgenstein’s  appeal  to  shared  agreement  supposed  to  be 
understood?  McDowell  agrees  with  (the more  recent)  Dummett  insofar  as 
Wittgenstein is to be seen as rejecting the possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ 
perspective. Whereas Dummett rejects the resulting Wittgensteinian position, 
McDowell finds something of value in it. McDowell argues that we ought to 
recognise different levels of discourse and recast what being a member of a 
linguistic community amounts to. The position we reached was this: that if we 
are to find anything of value in Wittgenstein’s view it seems to commit us to 
reading  Wittgenstein  as  embracing  a  linguistic  kind  of  transcendental 
idealism. There is a serious problem, however, in understanding quite what 
McDowell is arguing for. I presented two options. First, that McDowell reads 
Wittgenstein as embracing transcendental  idealism. Second, that McDowell 
sees  Wittgenstein  as  ultimately,  through  a  kind  of  philosophical  therapy, 
dissolving the appeal of such idealism.  
As indicated, I will not seek here to resolve which of these is the official 
McDowellian  view  or  whether  either  accurately  represents  Wittgenstein. 
Some work towards answering those questions will  be carried out in Part 
Three. We have enough in play to turn to the work of the early Wittgenstein. 
Crucially, we now have questions to drive that discussion: Does the Tractatus 
point  towards  either  (or  indeed  both)  of  the  options  here  presented  as 
interpretations  of  the  later  Wittgenstein?  Does  the  showing  /  saying 
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distinction  of  the  Tractatus provide  the  resources  for  the  transcendental 
idealist  interpretation?  Does  the  Tractatus aim  at  a  kind  ‘philosophical 
therapy’ like that suggested by the therapeutic interpretation? Part Two aims 
at answering those questions. Part Three will draw connections and discuss 
continuity.
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Part Two:
The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
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Chapter Five
The Primary Text: The Tractatus on Saying and Showing
[5.1] Introduction
The topic for discussion in Part Two, of which this chapter marks the start, is 
the philosophical outlook of the early Wittgenstein: in particular that offered 
in his  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Chapter Four argued that, even though 
we  have  not  settled  the  question  as  to  what  position  Wittgenstein  finally 
adopts,  there  is  enough  in  play,  enough  of  the  shape  and  content  of 
Wittgenstein’s  concerns  with  rules,  to  begin  a  comparison  with  his  early 
work. I concluded that the only way of making Wittgenstein’s  remarks on 
rules appear both interesting and coherent is, as urged by both Dummett and 
McDowell, to see him as resisting the possibility of an external, ‘sideways-on’, 
perspective.  Dummett  argues  that  the  resulting  position  must  be  rejected. 
McDowell,  in  contrast,  clearly  thinks  there  is  something  right  in 
Wittgenstein’s  position.  The  problem  was  working  out  precisely  what 
McDowell  takes  that  position  to  be:  whether  it  is  a  position  structurally 
analogous  with  Kant’s  distinction  between  empirical  realism  and 
transcendental idealism or, in contrast, a position where the appeal of such 
idealism is registered on the way to ultimately rejecting it.
The task for Part Two is to examine whether similar lines of thought 
present themselves in the Tractatus: whether Wittgenstein is there questioning 
the possibility of an external perspective and whether this is to be linked with 
a threat of idealism. But how are we to go about that task? In [1.2] I argued 
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that  an issue had to be chosen to focus discussion on the later Wittgenstein. 
Otherwise,  the  worry  was,  we  might  just  end  up  with  a  broad, 
impressionistic, sweep of the  Investigations. Moreover, it had to be a central 
issue: one that took us to the heart of the philosophical approach of the book. I 
chose the rule-following considerations but it was open to me to have picked 
another issue. Matters are somewhat different when it comes to approaching 
the  Tractatus.  It  remains  the  case  that  an  issue  needs  to  be  chosen  for 
discussion and that it should be a central one. But, given the kind of issues 
raised in Part One, we need to be more careful in picking an issue. What we 
need  is  to  examine  the  issue  most  likely  to  generate  similar  interpretive 
debates. That is,  if there are similar lines of thought in the Tractatus as there 
are in the  Investigations on the question of ‘sideways-on’ looks and idealism 
then they will be found by considering this issue.
I propose that Wittgenstein’s distinction between what can be said as 
opposed to merely shown should be the issue that drives the examination of 
the Tractatus. The saying / showing distinction is crucial to an understanding 
of the book. But there are two considerations pushing us towards tackling this 
issue as opposed to any other. First, both Dummett and McDowell introduce 
Wittgenstein’s  opposition  to  a  ‘sideways-on’  perspective  in  terms  of  the 
saying / showing distinction:
[Our problem comes from adopting] the externalist standpoint that it 
was the whole point of Wittgenstein’s account to repudiate: to attempt 
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to step outside of the situation in which we are placed, and thus to pass 
beyond the limits of language and say what can only be shown.176
But  if  it  is  true  that  we  cannot  think  about  the  relation  between 
language and reality  except  from the  midst  of  language as  a  going 
concern, then we must insist on this: if the “reflection” thesis is a truth, 
then it is a transcendental truth, the sort of thing that shows but cannot 
be said.177 
Second, the so-called ‘new’ interpretation of the Tractatus, offered most 
prominently  by  Diamond  and  Conant, is  developed  out  of  a  way  of 
understanding Wittgenstein’s distinction between what can be said and what 
shows itself.  Crucially for our purposes,  Diamond claims to be offering an 
interpretation in sympathy with certain McDowellian themes.  Wittgenstein, 
Diamond tells us, is in the business of clearing away metaphysical confusion, 
revealing to us how we are trapped in certain philosophical misconceptions. 
Diamond  explicitly  draws  parallels  in  this  regard  with  McDowell’s 
interpretation  of  Wittgenstein’s  later  work.  Both share  the conception,  she 
says, that Wittgenstein is attempting to free us from the illusory comfort of 
view from ‘sideways on’. 
In the Tractatus, the idea of the illusory view from sideways on has a 
very  particular  form.  When  we  philosophize  we  try  as  it  were  to 
occupy a position in which we are stationed outside logic, where logic 
is that through which we say all the things we ordinarily say, all the 
things that can be said.178
These  two  considerations  suggest  not  only  that  reflecting  on  the  issue  of 
saying  and  showing  will  bring  us  quickly  to  questions  of  ‘sideways-on’ 
176 Dummett (1993), p.451.
177 McDowell (1998b), p.342.
178  Diamond (1991b), p.185.
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perspectives, but also that an analogous reading of the Tractatus to the one I 
claimed most persuasive for the Investigations will result through examination 
of the saying / showing distinction and how it informs the so-called ‘new’ 
interpretation.  It  is  within  this  framework  that  the  examination  of  the 
Tractatus will proceed.
Chapter  Five  aims  at  providing  exegesis  of  the  primary  text:  the 
saying / showing distinction as it appears in Wittgenstein’s remarks on the 
inexpressibility of form. The aim of this, like the initial engagement with the 
rule-following passages  of  the  Investigations in  Chapter  One,  is  to  provide 
markers for future discussion. In Chapter One these took the form of four 
themes in Wittgenstein’s discussion that any satisfactory interpretation would 
have  to  respect.  Chapter  Five  aims  at  introducing  an  issue  that  will  run 
through  the  entire  discussion  of  the  Tractatus:  Wittgenstein’s  context 
principle. Wittgenstein tells us: “Only the proposition has sense; only in the 
context  of  a  proposition  has  a  name  meaning.”179 I  will  argue  that  an 
understanding  of  the  context  principle  is  crucial  in  coming to  understand 
different  interpretations  of  the  saying  /  showing  distinction.  A  certain 
understanding of the context principle will be shown, in Chapter Six, to be 
informing  Diamond’s  interpretation  of  Wittgenstein.  Chapter  Seven  will 
argue  that  the  question  of  ‘realism’  and  the  Tractatus turns  on  how  one 
understands the context principle.   
In Part One the engagement with the primary text was immediately 
followed by the setting out of extremes of the interpretative debate. One wing 
179 TLP 3.3
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read Wittgenstein as offering merely banal reminders about rules; the other 
wing read Wittgenstein as offering an interesting albeit incoherent account. 
We  then  searched  for  a  ‘middle-way’  between  those  two  extremes, 
concluding,  roughly,  that  something  along  the  lines  offered  by  McDowell 
must be right. Given the claims of affinity between McDowell’s interpretation 
of the Investigations and her interpretation of the Tractatus, it makes sense to 
adopt a shortcut approach and discuss the ‘middle-way’ in absence of two 
interpretative  extremes.  Chapter  Six  will,  therefore,  head  straight  into 
Diamond’s interpretation.  I  will  argue in Chapter Six that,  whilst much of 
what Diamond says is both interesting and persuasive, it does not provide us 
with  a  parallel  set  of  issues  arising  from  the  Tractatus  as  those  from  the 
Investigations.  Chapter  Six  is  therefore  to  be  seen  as  something  of  a 
disappointment: we were promised parallels between certain interpretations 
that do not seem to be there. Building out, however, of Diamond’s remarks on 
‘realism’  and  the  Tractatus,  Chapter  Seven  investigates  a  much  more 
promising comparison between early and late Wittgenstein. This will involve 
actually setting out extremes to which a ‘middle-way’ will be preferred.       
The  structure  of  Chapter  Five  is  as  follows.  [5.2]  sets  out  the  most 
fundamental distinction between what can be said and what is merely shown 
in  Wittgenstein’s  remarks:  the  inexpressibility  of  form.  I  show  that 
understanding Wittgenstein’s remarks requires a substantial investigation of 
the  metaphysical  commitments  of  the  early  sections  of  the  book.  [5.3] 
introduces the relevance of Wittgenstein’s context principle to understanding 
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the saying / showing distinction. This principle, as indicated, will provide the 
common  thread  for  the  chapters  on  the  Tractatus.  [5.4]  sketches  different 
approaches to understanding the saying / showing distinction. There will not 
be enough in these sketches to convince that any one approach is correct. But I 
will  argue  that  the  kind  of  interpretation  offered  by  Long  looks  at  least 
promising. 
[5.2] The Inexpressibility of Form
The  task  for  this  section  is  to  present  Wittgenstein’s  remarks  on  the 
inexpressibility of form. Perhaps the easiest and simplest way to introduce 
matters is through quotation:
4.12 Propositions  can represent  the whole reality,  but  they cannot 
represent what they must have in common with reality in order 
to be able to represent it – the logical form.
To be able to represent the logical form, we should have to be 
able to put ourselves outside logic, that is outside the world.
4.121 Propositions  cannot  represent  the  logical  form:  that  mirrors 
itself in the propositions.
That  which  mirrors  itself  in  language,  language  cannot 
represent.
That which expresses  itself in language,  we cannot express  by 
language.
The propositions show the logical form of reality.
They exhibit it.
We need to unpack some of this. For Wittgenstein, propositions can represent 
or picture reality in its entirety. Propositions cannot, however, picture ‘logical 
form’ where this is defined as that which a proposition has in common with 
what it pictures so as to be a picture of it. In order to picture logical form a 
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proposition would have to be stationed outside of logic. But that is clearly 
impossible  for Wittgenstein.  That is  not to  say that  there is  no connection 
between  logical  form  and  propositions.  On  the  contrary;  logical  form, 
Wittgenstein  tells  us,  is  reflected or mirrored in propositions.  Propositions 
display or show their logical form, even though they cannot express it. So, for 
example,  consider  a  proposition ascribing  a  property  to  an object  such as 
‘Andy is fat’. What shows forth, according to Wittgenstein, is the logical form 
of this proposition.  We would characterise  it  as:  φ (ξ).  What we have is a 
distinction between what can be said or expressed by means of language and 
what  can  merely  be  shown  or  reflected  in  language.  And:  “What  can be 
shown cannot be said.”180
Why  not?  That  is:  why is it  impossible  for  a  proposition  to  say  or 
express its own logical form? What kind of impossibility is this? Answering 
these questions involves first answering others. What does Wittgenstein mean 
by ‘logical’  or  ‘formal’  properties,  relations and concepts?  What  is  ‘logical 
form’  (that  which  a  proposition  must  have  in  common  with  what  it  is 
picturing in order to be a picture of it)? For these answers we must look to 
discussions featuring earlier in the  Tractatus:  in particular to Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of pictorial form.
Some basics of the picture theory will ease our way: 
2.12 The picture is a model of reality.
2.13 To  the  objects  correspond  in  the  picture  the  elements  of  the 
picture.
180  TLP 4.1212
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2.131 The elements of the picture stand, in the picture, for the objects.
2.14 The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined 
with one another in a definite way.
Propositions picture or represent reality. A collision between a car and a pram 
might be represented by means of a toy pram and a toy car in a courtroom. 
The toys could then be used to provide a three-dimensional  model  of  the 
accident. The model could serve to demonstrate the distances involved, the 
angle of impact, and so on. Propositions, for the  Tractatus, picture reality in 
much the same way; they provide a model of reality. 
In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. 
(As when in the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented 
by means of dolls, etc)181
The objects in reality correspond to the elements of the picture. The natural 
way to read this would be that the model car corresponds to the actual car, 
and the model pram corresponds to the actual pram, and so on. We need to be 
careful, however, when discussing the ‘objects’ of the Tractatus. Here objects 
are  simple  –  they  “form  the  substance  of  the  world”182 as  opposed  being 
contingent items in the world. Possible worlds are distinguished not by which 
objects are in them – for the objects are constant across worlds – but by the 
configuration of those objects. Just what makes the picture the picture it is, is 
not what elements there are,  but how those elements are combined.  I  will 
return to the status of objects for the Tractatus in Chapter Seven and again in 
Part Three. Our task here is to establish what this might have to do with form. 
181 NB 29.09.14.
182 TLP 2.021
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I  should note that there are interpretive issues with the very phrase 
‘pictorial form’ (‘Form der Abbildung’).  Pears and McGuinness use the term, 
presumably  to  distinguish  it  from  ‘representational  form’  (‘Form  der  
Darstellung’). Ogden makes no such distinction – with ‘form of representation’ 
standing for both German phrases. Commentators disagree over this. Kenny, 
for example, distinguishes between the two kinds of form: ‘Pictorial form’ is 
what makes A like B, what A has in common with B. ‘Representational form’ 
is  what  makes  A  unlike  B,  what  makes  A  merely  a  picture  and  not  a 
“reduplicated reality” of B. Although even Kenny ‘hedges his bets’ somewhat:
This appears to be what Wittgenstein meant by ‘Form der Darstellung’, 
if he did not mean this expression to be synonymous with ‘Form der  
Abbildung’.183
Sullivan  argues  for  the  opposite:  that  ‘Form  der  Darstellung’  is  “merely  a 
stylistic variant”184 of ‘Form der Abbildung’ – citing evidence that Wittgenstein 
was  happy  to  suppress  any  distinction  when  commenting  on  the  first 
translation  into  English.  Whatever  the  truth  here,  I  am  anxious  to  avoid 
getting  bogged  down.  I  hope  the  reader  can  grant  me  ‘pictorial  form’  as 
standing for  ‘Form der  Abbildung’  and that  we can  suspend judgement  on 
‘Form der Darstellung’. Nothing, I hope, turns on this.
Even if  those messy interpretive  concerns  can be avoided problems 
remain. For, as Ramsey185 pointed out, ‘pictorial form’ is given, in the space of 
just under a page of text, what appear to be three different meanings. First: 
183  Kenny (1973), p.57.
184  Sullivan (2001), p.107. 
185 Ramsey (1923)
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2.15 That the elements of the picture are combined with one another 
in a definite  way,  represents  that  the things are so combined 
with one another.
This  connexion  of  the  elements  of  the  picture  is  called  its 
structure,  and  the  possibility  of  this  structure  is  called  the 
pictorial form of the picture.
Pictorial form is the possibility that the elements of the picture are combined 
so as to be that very picture. 
2.151 The pictorial form is the possibility that the things are combined 
with one another as are the elements of the picture.
Pictorial form here is the possibility that the things or objects in reality are 
combined with one another in the same way as the elements of the picture are 
combined.
2.17 What the picture must have in common with reality in order to 
be able to represent it after its manner – rightly or falsely – is its 
pictorial form.
Finally,  pictorial  form is  that  which a picture  must have in common with 
reality  to  represent  it  at  all.  It  is  indeed far from obvious that  these three 
definitions can be subsumed under one term ‘pictorial form’. Sullivan appears 
to think that they can. We should conceive of a proposition, he argues, as a 
combination of expressions – a combination of words and/or phrases. These 
expressions have a certain range of possibilities built into them. That is: ways 
in which they can fit  with other  expressions  in propositions,  and in other 
propositional  contexts.  Such  possibilities  are  ‘internal’  in  that  they  are 
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essential  to  that  expression  being  the  expression  it  is.  The  following 
discussion of internal properties might be instructive:
4.123 A property is internal if it is unthinkable that this object does not 
possess it.
(This  blue  colour  and  that  stand  in  the  internal  relation  of 
brighter  and  darker  eo  ipso.  It  is  unthinkable  that  these two 
objects should not stand in this relation.)
So, it is unthinkable that this expression does not have these possibilities. Or, 
to  use  an  example  considered  in  Chapter  One  [1.3.1],  a  rule  and  its 
requirements are internally related: the rule would simply not be the rule it is 
if  it  did  not  have  these  requirements.  Wittgenstein  is  here  calling  an 
expression’s potential for combination with other expressions the form. And 
so, Sullivan concludes:
[To] talk of the pictorial form of a proposition is to draw attention to the 
fact  that any particular  propositional structure is  an actualization of 
possibilities of use built into the forms of the constituent expressions.186
This does make some sense of 2.15 – in that pictorial form is the very 
possibility of a proposition’s structure. But how are we now to account for the 
apparent  ‘jump’  between  2.15  and  2.151?  A  jump  that  is,  from  talk  of 
propositions  and  their structure  to  reality  and  its structure?   If  our 
propositions and reality really do line-up perfectly  with one another,  then 
2.151 would seem to make sense. For, the internal possibilities of expressions 
would  correlate  with  internal  possibilities  of  objects  in  reality.  But  why 
should we think that propositions and reality line-up so neatly? 
186  Sullivan (2001), p.103.
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2.1511 Thus the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it.
One way propositions and reality, names and objects, could be made to line 
up is by holding that it is the job of language to reflect the way the world is: 
objects set a standard for our propositions to meet. That kind of idea is at least 
suggested in certain passages. For example:
4.0312 The possibility of propositions is based upon the principle of the 
representation of objects by signs.
 
But we should question whether a crude object-name relationship is really the 
view  of  the  Tractatus.  Wittgenstein  holds  that  a  proposition  and  what  it 
pictures  must  have  something  in  common:  the  way  the  names  of  the 
proposition combine so as to make the proposition the one it is must mirror 
the way the objects might combine in reality. Wittgenstein’s thought appears 
to be that what it is to genuinely be a name is to share the possibilities of 
combination  in  propositions  as  the  corresponding  object  has  in  states  of 
affairs. It is bound up with being a name that it lines-up with reality in this 
way; otherwise it would not be a name at all. Wittgenstein is to be seen as 
saying that  there is  no issue over  how names line up neatly  with objects: 
‘that’s just what being a name is’. We will return to these issues in Chapter 
Seven.
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Wittgenstein clearly maintains that the possibilities of combination of 
names correlate with the possibilities of combination of objects. Otherwise, it 
just wouldn’t be a picture at all:
2.16 In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common 
with what it pictures.
2.161 In  the  picture  and  the  pictured  there  must  be  something 
identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.
This links into 2.17. For, unless there was a correlation between possibilities so 
described, there couldn’t be a picture. Crucially, there would be nothing in 
common between a picture and what it pictures and therefore no picturing 
relation.  It  would  be  of  interest  to  pursue  this  point  further  through 
discussion  of  the  motivation  for  thinking  that  there  must  be  something 
common  between  a  picture  and  what  it  pictures;  what  generates  such 
motivation. I will touch on this issue again in Part Three.  For now we are 
interested not so much in the why but the what: what is it that is common 
between a picture and what it pictures on Wittgenstein’s view? We are getting 
closer to answer, but other pieces of the jigsaw are required.
At 2.172 Wittgenstein tells us: “The picture, however, cannot represent 
its form of representation; it shows forth.” The argument for this appears to 
be given in the following two sections:
2.173 The picture represents its object from without (its standpoint is 
its form of representation),  therefore the picture represents its 
object rightly or falsely.
2.174 But  the  picture  cannot  place  itself  outside  of  its  form  of 
representation. 
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A picture’s ‘object’ is to be understood as a situation in reality. Wittgenstein is 
assuming that a picture can only be said to represent its object if it can get it 
right or wrong. 2.173 claims that a picture can only represent its object rightly 
or wrongly from a position outside of what it represents. 2.174 claims that a 
picture cannot occupy a position outside of its  own form. The conclusion, 
therefore, is that a picture cannot represent its own form. As Morris puts it:
The claim of 2.172 is, then, that a picture which represents  that things 
are  a  certain  way  cannot  represent  that  it’s  possible  for  its  own 
elements to be the same way. The reason is, apparently, that a picture 
cannot ‘place itself outside’ its own form of representation.187
How are we to understand ‘outside’ in this context? At 2.22 Wittgenstein says: 
“The  picture  represents  what  it  represents,  independently  of  its  truth  or 
falsehood,  through  the  form  of  representation.”  A  picture’s  genuinely 
representing  requires  it  being independent  of  whether  it  represents  things 
rightly or wrongly.
What is the relationship between pictorial form and logical form? 
2.18 What every picture,  of whatever form, must have in common 
with reality in order to be able to represent it at all – rightly or 
falsely – is the logical form, that is, the form of reality.
2.181 If the pictorial form is the logical form, then the picture is called 
a logical picture.
2.182 Every picture is  also a logical picture.  (On the other hand, for 
example, not every picture is spatial.)
2.19 The logical picture can depict the world. 
187 Morris (forthcoming), p.85.
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The idea here appears to be that logical form is simply the broadest or most 
basic kind of form: what every picture, of every possible form, must have is 
logical form. Different pictures could have different pictorial forms but must 
still share logical form – the form of reality. For example: I could describe my 
new bathroom design to a friend, show her my childlike sketch on paper or 
show her the 3D computer simulation the people at MFI did for me. These 
representations have different pictorial form: the second and third are spatial 
whereas the first is not, the third is coloured whereas the first two are not, and 
so on. But each of them share logical form.
So what is it, then, that a picture must share with the reality it pictures 
to  be  a  picture  of  it?  Let  us  return  to  the  model  car  and  pram  in  the 
courtroom. There are, of course, going to be a number of differences between 
a picture and what it pictures: between the courtroom model of the collision 
and the actual collision. What we need to do is separate what is essential to 
the picture being the picture it is from what is inessential; find that which is 
required for the proxies to be in a relation representing how the actual objects 
were related. The colour of the pieces used to represent the car and pram is 
clearly inessential. That the car was red (even if that were essential to the case) 
could be symbolised in many different ways; painting it red would be the 
most obvious but one could draw an ‘R’ on the side of the relevant piece and 
so on. That the pieces are shaped like a pram and a car is also inessential, it 
could still be a representation if wooden blocks were used as a replacement 
for the models. Are the spatial relations between the proxies (wooden blocks, 
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models, whatever) required? We might initially think so – how else could the 
proxies  be  in  a  relation representing  how the  actual  objects  were  related? 
Sullivan argues that this too is inessential: “we can suppose that the spatial 
order of the vehicles is represented by a temporal order in which their proxies 
are placed.”188 How might that work? Presumably, that the proxies are placed 
in a temporal order, at staggered points, representing the relation between the 
actual objects.  But even the physical objects we might use in this temporal 
story seem inessential. A verbal description of the collision would also serve 
to represent it. 
All material identity – colour for colour, space for space – having been 
abstracted  away,  what  remains  is  identity  of  form:  that  the 
combination  exemplified  by  the  proxies  in  the  picture  is  an 
exemplification  of  the  combinatory  possibilities  of  the  coordinated 
things. For only in that way can those proxies be indeed proxies for 
those things.189
The  notion  of  replacement  is  crucial  here:  all  material  aspects  could  be 
replaced by or assigned to something else. Sullivan’s contention is that once 
we have abstracted away all that is inessential to a picture we end up with 
that which cannot be abstracted away – identity of form. A picture’s ability to 
picture  is  no  longer  a  physical  consideration,  but  rather  a  matter  of  mere 
intelligibility. What is essential cannot be replaced. 
It  is  worth noting that  an understanding of  the context  principle  is 
operating in the background of this discussion. A common form is what is 
required for representation.  The final sentence of the passage quoted from 
188  Sullivan (2001), p.109.
189  Sullivan (2001) p.109.
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Sullivan is meant to be an echo of the context principle: Proxies can only be 
proxies for things insofar as they share a common form. Or, in other words, 
only in the context provided by the form can a name be a name. 
But what, exactly, does that leave us with? We want to represent the 
car  standing in  a  certain  relation to  the pram.  We have cleared away the 
inessential  elements of the representation. What we have left  is simply the 
logical or formal relation: ζ φ ξ.  There are two items standing in a certain 
relation.  And  it  is  that that  is  common,  or  identical,  between  the 
representation of the collision and the actual collision. Wittgenstein’s claim, at 
4.12, that propositions cannot represent what they must have in common with 
reality in order to be able to represent it – the logical form – is therefore to be 
understood as the claim that, for any given proposition it cannot represent, it 
cannot say, that it is of a certain logical form.
We have cleared up some confusion to leave ourselves with a question 
to answer: ‘Why is it impossible for a proposition to represent logical form?’ 
That is: why is it impossible for a proposition of the form, for example, ζ φ ξ 
to say that it is of that form? Unfortunately, Wittgenstein then immediately 
appears to raise a different question. 
4.124 The existence of an internal property of a possible state of affairs 
is  not  expressed  by  a  proposition,  but  expresses  itself  in  a 
proposition which presents that state of affairs, by an internal 
property of this proposition.
It  would  be  as  senseless  to  ascribe  a  formal  property  to  a 
proposition as to deny it the formal property
4.1241 One cannot distinguish forms from one another by saying that 
one has this property, the other that: for this assumes that there 
is a sense in asserting either property of either form.
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What’s going on here? The initial part of 4.124 appears to be repeating issues 
of  inexpressibility.  In  that  an  internal  property  of  a  situation  cannot  be 
expressed by means of a proposition, but reveals itself by means of an internal 
property  of  a  proposition.  Wittgenstein  then  moves  onto  to  argue  that  is 
senseless  to  assert  that  a  proposition  has  or  lacks  a  logical  property.  We 
cannot say that a proposition is of a certain logical form as opposed to another 
one. That is: we couldn’t say that proposition is of the form ζ φ ξ as opposed 
to any other form, it has this formal property as opposed to that one. For that 
would suppose that  it  made sense  to  ascribe  either  of  those  properties  to 
either of those forms. This prompts a different question from that discussed 
above: ‘why is it impossible to say of a proposition that it is of a certain logical 
form?’ That is: why is it impossible to say of a proposition of the form, for 
example, ζ φ ξ, that it is of that form?  
4.126 That  anything  falls  under  a  formal  concept  as  an  object 
belonging to it, cannot be expressed by a proposition. But it is 
shown in the symbol for that object itself. (The name shows that 
it  signifies  an  object,  the  numerical  sign  that  it  signifies  a 
number, etc.)
Formal concepts cannot, like proper concepts, be presented by a 
function.
We  now  appear  to  be  in  some  trouble.  We  started  with  an  initial 
characterisation  of  the  inexpressibility  of  form:  that  it  is  in  some  way  or 
another impossible. I argued that we needed to sharpen our understanding of 
the claim Wittgenstein is making in order to properly form a question to the 
effect:  ‘but  why?’  This  led  us  into  close  evaluation  of  the  picture  theory. 
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Unfortunately  close analysis  of the text  reveals  that  Wittgenstein makes at 
least two claims. The first is that it is impossible for a proposition to represent 
logical form. The second is that it is impossible to say of a proposition that is 
of a certain logical form. These look like different claims. So when we ask ‘but 
why?’ we appear to be asking different questions.      
[5.3] The Context Principle 
Wittgenstein’s  context  principle  was  introduced  in  [5.1]:  “Only  the 
proposition  has  sense;  only  in  the  context  of  a  proposition  has  a  name 
meaning.”190 Wittgenstein was clearly influenced in this regard by “the great 
works of Frege”191. Frege maintained, in the Introduction to  Grundlagen, that 
we are “never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the 
context  of a proposition.”192 Later in the book he asserts:  “it  is  only in the 
context of a proposition that words have any meaning.”193 
Settling what the context principle means, whether that be for Frege or 
for Wittgenstein, is no easy matter. Our initial task is to settle the very least 
any such principle could mean. 
The context principle does not say that a word may have one meaning 
in one context and a different meaning in another; it says that it may be 
said to have a meaning at all only as occurring in some context. […] it is 
plain that it  is  a principle concerning what it  is  for a word to have 
meaning, and does not imply that its meaning may legitimately vary 
from one occurrence to the other.194
190 TLP 3.3
191 TLP Preface
192 Frege (1968), p.x.
193 Frege (1968), §62
194 Dummett (1981), p.364.
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Here  Dummett  is  remarking  on  what  Frege  understood  by  the  context 
principle. Dummett neatly assesses the kind of question to which the context 
principle  is  supposed to  provide  an answer.  It  is  a  very general  question: 
‘what  is  it  for  a  word to  have  meaning?’  The  principle  maintains  that  to 
explain the meaning of a word is to explain the meaning it has in a given 
proposition. We cannot hope to abstract the word away from the proposition: 
for the meaning of a word just is the way it contributes to the meaning of the 
proposition in which it occurs. The context principle is, however, to be seen as 
compatible with asking particular questions, such as: ‘what does this word 
mean?’ The compositionality of language is to be respected: by grasping the 
meaning of a word we can go on to understand other,  novel,  sentences in 
which that word occurs. 
We  have  already  seen  an  understanding  of  the  context  principle 
coming to the surface of our discussion. The first was when we worried about 
an apparent jump in Wittgenstein’s remarks from talk about propositions and 
their structure to talk of reality and its structure. Wittgenstein seemed to be 
assuming that propositions and the reality they represent line up neatly. It 
looked wishful thinking, at best,  to maintain that this correlation could be 
maintained  through  a  crude  object-name  relationship.  Reflecting  on  the 
context principle resulted in this thought: that the lining up of propositions 
and reality, names and objects, has to be the case for there to be something 
common between a picture and what it pictures. Being a name just is having 
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the combinatory possibilities in propositions that the object it stands for has in 
states of affairs. If not, it is not a genuine name at all. This replaces a crude 
‘naming-game’ with the recognition that only within a given context does a 
name stand for an object. The second place the principle emerged was in the 
process of abstracting away what is inessential to a pictures being the picture 
it  is.  The thought there was that what cannot be extracted away is logical 
form. A proxy is a proxy only insofar as it  shares the logical combinatory 
possibilities of what it stands for. Any attempt to replace this combination 
with further proxies is hopeless: that something can be a proxy for something 
else depends on sharing such a combination. Put more simply: only in the 
context provided by the shared form can a name genuinely be a name.
Reflecting on the results of the two appearances of the context principle 
in  our  discussion  already  prompts  us  to  think  that  Wittgenstein  meant 
something  more  by  his  context  principle  than  our  initial  description.  The 
initial suggestion was that we could abstract the meaning of a word from the 
propositions in which it occurs. Wittgenstein’s further claim, it seems, is that a 
word has no meaning outside of its occurrence in a proposition. A name is 
only a name in a given context. 
3.328 If  a  sign  is  not necessary then  it  is  meaningless.  That  is  the 
meaning of Occam’s razor.
(If  everything  in  the  symbolism works  as  though a  sign had 
meaning, then it has meaning.)
Here Wittgenstein looks to be not only endorsing the claim that attending to 
the propositional context of use is necessary in coming to understand what a 
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word means but also that it is sufficient, nothing else is required. If the name 
functions as if it does stand for an object then it does actually stand for that 
object. This reading of the principle, as Sullivan points out, directs us towards 
a  kind of  ‘internalism’  about  language:  “this  is  the  claim that  there  is  no 
perspective external  to  language from which we may certify as correct,  or 
reject as misconceived, its ontological commitments.”195 Wittgenstein clearly 
moves from the initial characterisation of the principle. Quite how far will be 
a recurring theme in subsequent chapters.
At  the end of  [5.2]  it  appeared we had run into a serious  problem. 
Wittgenstein  appeared  to  be  offering  two  distinct  claims  about  the 
inexpressibility  of  form. The general  drift  was towards the claim that  it  is 
impossible  for  a  proposition  to  represent  logical  form.  But  another  claim 
seemed to develop, namely: it is impossible to say of a proposition that it is of 
a certain form. These two questions appear to differ over how to understand 
the term ‘represent’. Does this mean ‘name’ (stand for), or, in contrast, ‘say’? 
The first claim amounts to saying that, unlike the objects themselves, the way 
objects are combined cannot be proxied. The second claim amounts to saying 
that we cannot say of a proposition that is of this or that logical form. [5.4] 
will  show that  these are not,  for Wittgenstein,  separate  questions at all.  In 
doing so the importance of the context principle will be further demonstrated. 
[5.4] Attempts to Characterise the Saying / Showing Distinction
195 Sullivan (2001)
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I start with answers aimed at the second question: ‘why is it impossible to say 
of a proposition that it is of a certain logical form?’ The suggested answer is 
this: It just doesn’t make sense to attempt to express such things in words. A 
proposition wouldn’t be the very proposition it is without having such-and-
such formal properties, or falling under a certain logical category. Attempting 
to assert that a proposition is, for example, a two-placed relation ‘opens the 
door’ to the possibility that it  might not fall  under that logical category, it 
could  have  been  otherwise.  But  that  is  simply  inconceivable.  Such  a 
possibility would rule out the proposition being the very proposition it is. For 
example, let’s say we attempt to distinguish ζ φ ξ from φ (ξ) by saying the 
former  falls  under  a  certain  logical  category,  the  latter  a  distinct  logical 
category. But that just doesn’t make any sense. There is no common ground 
for logical categories,  no level  at which one may possibly be mistaken for 
another  category.  This  appears  to  fit  with  Wittgenstein’s  remarks  at,  in 
particular, 4.2141. There is no sense in asserting a property of a certain form. 
Kenny offers a similar interpretation of the distinction between saying 
and showing in regard to the 4.12’s:
 
As  a  first  attempt  to  explain  the  distinction,  one  might  say  that 
something can be said if it would be possible for a hearer to grasp the 
content of what was communicated to him without knowing its truth-
value; or, to put it another way, it can be said that p only if a questioner 
can formulate a question ‘Is it the case that p?’ without yet knowing the 
answer to it. For Wittgenstein, something can be said only if it could be 
passed on to somebody as a piece of new information.196
196  Kenny (1973),  p.46.
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Take the tautology: ‘If it is Sunday the shops are shut, and it is Sunday, then 
the  shops are  shut.’  This  shows something about  the  formal  properties  of 
language. Namely: that ‘The shops are shut’ follows from ‘If it is Sunday, the 
shops are shut’  and ‘It  is  Sunday.’  But  why is  it  impossible  to  express  of 
language that it has such and such formal properties? Kenny’s answer is this: 
To understand those propositions one must take them not as  meaningless 
marks but as English expressions. To do this, a person must already grasp 
English and know rules for the use of English expressions such as ‘If  it  is 
Sunday the shops are shut’. But, if a person already knows such rules then he 
is in the position of already knowing that ‘The shops are shut’ follows from ‘If 
it is Sunday the shops are shut’ and ‘It is Sunday.’ So no information has been 
conveyed by this attempt to say what really can only be shown. The common 
thread  of  my  initial  attempt  and  Kenny’s  could  be  summarised  thus: 
necessary truths are unsayable.
I want to raise two concerns with such an interpretation that, whilst 
not devastating, provide motivation for a more a suitable alternative.  First, 
there is a concern that we are using a rather blunt unwieldy instrument to 
crack  what  is  a  very  subtle  nut:  we  are  using  Wittgenstein’s  notion  of 
bipolarity to explain saying and showing. Bipolarity can be traced back to 
some of Wittgenstein pre-Tractatus remarks:
To have  meaning  means to  be  true  or  false:  the  being  true  or  false 
actually constitutes the relation of the proposition to reality, which we 
mean by saying that it has meaning.197
197  NB, p.113.
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So, for Wittgenstein, if a statement really is a genuine expression of thought, 
really does convey information, then it must have two poles: a truth pole and 
a  false  pole.  There  must  be  circumstances  that  make the  proposition  true 
along with circumstances that make the proposition false.  If this is not the 
case then the proposition in question lacks sense. The consequence of this is 
that, for Wittgenstein, tautologies and contradictions lack sense. The concern 
here  is  that  generating  the  saying  /  showing distinction  requires  that  we 
already have a large chunk of Wittgenstein’s theory in play. Or, better; what 
we want is an account of saying and showing that, whilst compatible with, 
does not depend on bipolarity. The second concern arises out of the first: this 
interpretation  just  looks  all  too  easy.  Wittgenstein  directs  a  substantial 
amount of his discussion toward the saying / showing distinction. It seems 
hard to reconcile that with the apparent ease of setting up the distinction on 
our  current  interpretation.  ‘Tautologies  and  contradictions  cannot  be  said 
because they do not convey any information, but rather reveal themselves in 
language’.  Wittgenstein  could  have  expounded  that view  in  a  couple  of 
paragraphs. We would seem be left with a rather uncomfortable choice. Either 
Wittgenstein was unable to express his own view in a short, succinct, manner 
or he was deliberately being obtuse in his exposition. Neither of these options 
presents Wittgenstein (nor his distinction) in a good light. Such worries are, as 
I said, flesh wounds at worst. But they do open up a requirement for a more 
suitable  interpretation  of  what  is  going  on  in  these  puzzling  passages  on 
saying and showing.
162
We have attempted to answer the ‘why not?’ from one direction. Let us 
now turn to the other:  ‘why is it  impossible for a proposition to represent 
logical form?’ Long’s paper “Formal Relations” is a good, if taxing, place to 
start. Take the relation of a city to the country of which it is the capital or the 
relation of a man to a child of whom he is the father. The first relation can be 
expressed in sentences such as: ‘London is the capital of the United Kingdom’, 
‘Paris is the capital of France’, ‘Berlin is the capital of Germany’ and so on. 
These sentences share the expression ‘capital of’. The second relation can be 
expressed in sentences such as ‘Prince Philip is the father of Prince Charles’, 
‘Prince Charles is  the father of Prince William’ and so on. These sentences 
share the expression ‘father of’. But how are we to express “the relation of an 
object to a function of which it is the argument?”198 Long’s contention is that 
we cannot put such a relation into words at all. Echoing 4.121, Long suggests 
that this relation is not one that can be expressed  by means of  language, but 
rather expresses itself in language.
Frege held that a concept is a particular case of a function. So, the sense 
in which we speak of the relation between an object and a concept it falls 
under is the same as the relation between an object and a function of which it 
is the argument. If we write ‘Gold falls under the concept malleable’ instead of 
‘Gold is malleable’ we are not expressing in words with the longer sentence a 
relation that is expressed without words in the shorter sentence. It would be 
like writing ‘the value of the function capital of for the argument Germany’ in 
place of ‘the capital of Germany’.
198  Long (1982), p.151.
163
Suppose someone now thought that the longer designation contained 
an expression – viz., ‘the value of the function ___ for the argument …’ 
– for the relation of an object to a function of which it is the argument. 
Would this not be manifestly absurd?199
Well, would it be manifestly absurd? Doesn’t ‘the value of the function ___ for 
the argument …’ capture the relation of an object to a function of which it is 
the argument? We could ‘plug in’ things to the gaps in the expression, just as 
we can for the expressions ‘___ is the father of …’ or ‘___ is the capital of …’ 
For example: ‘the value of the function fatness for the argument Andy’ or ‘the 
value of the function useless for the argument Steve McClaren’. 
Long holds that statements like: ‘There is no expression for the relation 
of one body to another that lies beneath it’ are obviously false. This statement 
expresses a relation in denying any such relation is expressible. Long argues 
that the same is not happening with statements like: ‘There is no expression 
for  the  relation of  an  object  to  a  concept  it  falls  under.’  This  statement  is 
supposedly concerning the grammar of ‘relation’. Equally:
In saying, “The relation of an object to a concept it falls under expresses 
itself in  language  and  is  not  one  that  we  express  by  means  of 
language”, we have not in the same breath expressed the very relation 
that we are saying cannot be expressed.200
There is a difference in kind then, for Long, between ‘lies beneath’ and ‘falls 
under’. Whereas the former is a relational expression, the latter is not. Since 
‘falls under’ is not a relational expression that means that phrases of the form 
199  Long (1982), p.152.
200  Long (1982), p.152.
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‘the  concept  F’  are  not  singular  terms.  So  whereas  ‘the  city  of  Stirling’ 
designates a certain city, ‘the concept  malleable’ does not designate a certain 
concept. So ‘falls under’ and ‘the concept F’, continues Long, are not signs in 
their own right, they are not expressions for anything. But why not think that 
the relation between gold and malleable in the sentence ‘Gold falls under the 
concept malleable’ is expressed by the ‘falls under’? Long’s answer appears to 
be  this:  The  expression  ‘the  concept  malleable’  is  not  an  expression  for  a 
concept. Therefore, it cannot stand for the second term of an object’s falling 
under a certain concept. That being the case, ‘falls under’ cannot  itself be an 
expression for that relation. There is a slight puzzle, then, as to which way 
round  the  argument  is  supposed  to  run.  On  the  one  hand  we  have  the 
suggestion that because ‘falls under’ is not a relational expression phrases like 
‘the concept  F’ are not singular terms. On the other we have the suggestion 
that  because,  for  example,  ‘the concept  malleable’  is  not  an expression for a 
concept, ‘falls under’ cannot be the expression of the relation in question. The 
latter, I think, is Long’s view. It would appear to fit with what Frege himself 
says, for example, about the concept horse:
Quite so; the three words ‘the concept “horse” ‘ do designate an object, 
but on that very account they do not designate a concept, as I am using 
the word.201
The concept-object relation is expressed, continues Long, in both ‘Gold falls 
under  the  concept  malleable’  and  ‘Gold  is  malleable’  because  they  both 
complete a sign for an object with a sign for a concept. The first completes ‘ξ 
201  Frege (1966).
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falls  under  the  concept  malleable’,  the  second ‘ξ  is  malleable’.  Crucially  for 
Long, these two amount to the same thing:
Hence it comes to the same thing whether we say that the relation of an 
object’s falling under a concept is expressed in a sentence or that the 
sentence  satisfies  this  formal  description.  In  other  words,  for  this 
relation to be expressed in a sentence is for the form Fa to be expressed 
in it.202
So we don’t get any closer to, because we are infinitely far away from, the 
pure expression of the relation. Now, continues Long, given that it is the same 
thing for the concept-object relation to be expressed in a sentence and for the 
form  Fa to  be  expressed  in  it,  we  ought  to  call  such  a  relation  a  ‘formal 
relation’. We can represent it as: φ (ξ). Therefore:
the grammatical statement ‘There is no expression for the relation of an 
object to a concept it falls under’ will then give way to the statement 
‘There is  no expression for  the relation φ (ξ)’,  the truth of  which is 
manifest.203
Sullivan’s  answer  is  comparable  to  Long’s.  Sullivan  argues  that  it  is  a 
straightforward step from the abstraction process  (described above)  to  the 
inexpressibility of form. The latter, argues Sullivan, is just the impossibility of 
a stage of abstraction beyond what has been labelled ‘the final stage’. To get 
beyond this final stage would involve representing the logical combination of 
the elements of reality not with the logical combination of the proxies in the 
proposition,  but  rather  with  proxies  for  those  proxies.  But  that  is  simply 
inconceivable. A proxy can only be such, as we have discovered, in virtue of 
202  Long (1982), p.153.
203  Long (1982), p.153.
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its logical combination. “The elements of a proposition can represent things in 
the world  only because their manner of combination represents  nothing but 
itself.”204 
The common ground between Long and Sullivan is the incoherence of 
another step beyond, as it were, the final step.  This kind of answer appears to 
have  more  going  for  it.  We  have  a  story  that  is  both  compatible  with 
bipolarity without appealing to it, and also is subtle and complicated enough 
to warrant a sustained exposition of the view. Moreover, it neatly explains the 
impossibility  for  Wittgenstein  of  expressing  logical  form  by  means  of  a 
proposition.  In  doing so  it  brings  together  what  looked like two different 
questions. 
[5.5] Conclusion
At  the  narrow  level  of  exegesis  we  have  been  examining  Wittgenstein’s 
motivation for maintaining the inexpressibility of form: quite what the claim 
amounts to and what considerations Wittgenstein offers in favour of it. Some 
progress has been made. The kind of answer suggested by both Long and 
Sullivan seems plausible. The impossibility of expressing logical form is to be 
seen as the incoherence of another step beyond the final possible step. The 
abstraction process, as Sullivan puts it, can go no further. A proxy can only be 
a proxy in virtue of its logical combination. But I  do not pretend that this 
chapter  has finally settled the interpretative debate surrounding this issue. 
There is much more to be said about the saying / showing distinction. 
204  Sullivan (2001) p.110.
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At the strategic level (what this chapter contributes to the aim of Part 
Two) matters are much more satisfactory. [5.1] set out the shape of Part Two. 
We now have enough in play to work towards an understanding of the ‘new’ 
interpretation  offered  by  Diamond.  Diamond  uses  an  understanding  of 
Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing both as an inspiration 
and ‘stalking horse’ for her interpretation. Chapter Six will investigate this 
reading of the Tractatus.
Chapter Six
Diamond: A New Interpretation?
[6.1] Introduction
This  chapter  will  outline  and  evaluate  Cora  Diamond’s  so-called  ‘new’ 
interpretation  of  the  Tractatus.  Chapter  Five  concluded  that  Wittgenstein’s 
distinction between saying and showing, whilst still undoubtedly puzzling, 
was  clear  enough to  begin analysis  of  different  interpretative  stances.  The 
rationale  for  assessing  the  work  of  Diamond  was  set  out  in  [5.1].  Our 
examination  of  the  Investigations involved  setting  out  two  extremes  of 
interpretation: the task was then to find a satisfactory ‘middle-way’ between 
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them. Here it is hoped that we can avoid having to set out extremes. Diamond 
argues  that  she  is  offering  an  analogous  reading  of  the  Tractatus  to 
McDowell’s reading of the Investigations. Part One concluded that McDowell 
comes  the  closest  to  reading  Wittgenstein  as  offering  a  coherent  and 
interesting position. So let us take a shortcut and start with Diamond.    
This chapter will argue that, unfortunately, the proposed shortcut will 
not get us to a position of genuine comparison between the Tractatus and the 
Investigations.  I  will  argue  that  Diamond  grounds  her  interpretation  by 
picking a fight where no fight is wanted or indeed required. There appears to 
be no single or simple difference between her interpretation and the so-called 
‘traditional’  readings  she  sets  out  to  oppose.  There  are  undoubtedly 
differences of emphasis or focus between Diamond and those she takes as her 
opponents. But these differences do not bring into play the kind of issues that 
were  raised  in  Part  One.  In  short,  there  is  no  deep-rooted  disagreement 
between ‘new’ and ‘standard’ readings of the book to parallel those outlined 
with  regard  to  the  Investigations.  We  will  find,  however,  that  Diamond’s 
remarks do point  to another question which  will help our project:  to what 
extent, if any, is the author of the  Tractatus a realist? That question will be 
pursued in Chapter Seven.
The  structure  of  this  chapter  is  as  follows.  [6.2]  uses  an  influential 
paper  by  Geach  as  a  way of  linking  the  discussion  of  Chapter  Five  with 
Diamond’s  so-called  ‘new’  interpretation.  [6.3]  outlines  Diamond’s 
interpretation  of  Wittgenstein.  [6.4]  offers  an  evaluation:  I  argue  that 
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Diamond’s view does not generate the kind of disagreement we hoped for. I 
contrast Diamond’s interpretation with an account that, whilst clearly wrong, 
would genuinely diverge from ‘traditional’ readings. 
[6.2] Geach on Saying and Showing
Geach’s paper is a useful way into Diamond’s interpretation because it deals 
with some of the puzzling issues so far discussed, whilst at the same time 
providing  the  dual  role  of  inspiration  and  ‘stalking  horse’  for  Diamond’s 
interpretation. 
Geach sets up his paper with a concern one might naturally have with 
Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing: should we not think 
that, if it follows from a certain doctrine that this doctrine cannot be stated, 
then this simply amounts to a refutation of the doctrine? As Geach puts it, 
does this not simply amount to a kind of ‘self-mate’? Geach’s suggestion – a 
suggestion we have already seen taken up in Long and Sullivan [5.3] – is that 
to  understand how Wittgenstein  avoids the pitfall  of  self-mating we must 
attend to ‘the great works of Frege’:
I  shall  here  argue  that  some  fundamental  aspects  of  the 
Wittgensteinian saying / showing contrast are already to be discerned 
in Frege’s writings … Wittgenstein extended the doctrine beyond the 
limits within which Frege employed it[.]205
According to Geach, Frege held that there are logical category-distinctions, 
which clearly show themselves in formalised language, but cannot themselves 
205
2
  Geach (1977), p.55.
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be asserted in language. The sentences we use to convey such distinctions are 
logically  improper;  they  cannot  be  translated  into  well-formed  symbolic 
notation. Nevertheless, these sentences have a use and we can  test whether 
they convey the intended distinctions – whether through them mastery of the 
formalised language is attainable.
Let  us  try  and  tease  some  of  this  out.  Frege  held  that  there  is  a 
fundamental difference between concepts and objects. Let’s take an instance 
of this:
a) There is a difference between what ‘Brutus’ stands for and what the 
predicate ‘___ killed Caesar’ stands for.
Geach claims that Frege held the view, and was required to on pain of ‘self-
mating’, that inserting an expression in the blanks of “what ‘___’ stands for” 
will result in something that stands for what the expression inserted stands 
for. For example, “that function of 2 which ‘the square of’ stands for” is just a 
long-winded way of saying ‘the square of  2’.  Equally,  “what ‘the Duke of 
Wellington’ stands for” is simply a long-winded replacement for the Duke’s 
name.  If we apply this principle to a) we get:
b) There is a difference between Brutus and killed Caesar.
This is manifestly nonsense. It appears that Frege has ‘self-mated’. But Geach 
thinks Frege has a way out of this bind. The position he would adopt is to 
assert that the reduction from a) to the manifest nonsense of b) highlights the 
fact that we cannot actually construct any significant proposition to say what 
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we  wanted  to  say  in  a).  But  why  not  think  that  if  it  follows  from  the 
philosophical  doctrine  that  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  between 
concepts and objects that that doctrine cannot be credibly stated that this is a 
good reason to reject the doctrine? Geach’s answer is this: sentences like a) 
may nevertheless be useful – they may lead someone to understand Frege’s 
concept-script. And the test of whether something useful has been conveyed 
by sentences like a) is that a person masters the use of symbolic language 
partly in virtue of it. And I think it’s this testability of things like a) which is 
crucial for Geach.
I am only touching on issues in what is a very deep and complex paper 
by Geach. Interestingly, Geach goes on to argue that Wittgenstein simply took 
over and extended Frege’s doctrine, recognising further category-distinctions 
which  Frege  had  missed.  But  we  have  enough  already  in  play  for  the 
purposes  of  our  discussion.  As  Geach  himself  puts  it,  with  some  of  the 
background  of  the  saying  /  showing  distinction  in  Frege  filled  in  “the 
doctrine  should  no  longer  appear  as  mystification,  even  if  it  remains 
mysterious.”206 Geach’s concern is that, whilst testability makes sense for those 
cases in Frege, it is difficult to see how in the disciplines Wittgenstein extends 
the doctrine to (such as ethics or religion) we could  test that insights have 
indeed been conveyed. 
[6.3] Diamond
206  Geach (1977), p.68.
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I said that Geach’s paper is both an inspiration and ‘stalking horse’ for ‘new’ 
interpreters. Here is Diamond:
Geach is right that we can best understand what the  Tractatus holds 
about saying and showing if we go back to Frege and think about what 
the saying / showing distinction in its origin looks like there.207
And later in the same paper Diamond talks of going “further down the road 
that Geach points out as a road.”208 The overarching aim of Diamond’s paper 
“Throwing  Away  the  Ladder”  is,  we  are  told,  to  pay  attention  to 
Wittgenstein’s  insistence  throughout  his  philosophical  work  that  he  is  not 
putting  forward  philosophical  doctrines  or  theses.  It  is  only  a  matter  of 
confusion which would lead one to think that one was offering philosophical 
doctrines  or  theses  in  first  place  at  all.  The  third  theme  identified  in 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of rules in the Investigations [1.3.3] touched on this. 
We ought not look for ever more complex explanations but, rather, stop and 
look  at  the  actual  practice  of  following  rules.  This  Quietist  thought  was 
developed by both Wright [3.3] and, on one way of reading him, McDowell 
[4.6]. 
I think that there is almost nothing in Wittgenstein which is of value 
and  which  can  be  grasped  if  it  is  pulled  away  from  that  view  of 
philosophy.209 
Diamond contends that in order to understand this conception of philosophy, 
and how it permeates Wittgenstein’s writings, we must first understand how 
207  Diamond (1991b). p.179.
208  Diamond (1991b), p.180.
209  Diamond (1991b), p.179.
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it figures in the Tractatus. There, Diamond argues, it is inseparable from the 
central  theme:  the  distinction between what  can be  said  and what  can be 
shown. And that brings her back to Geach.
I want to take a brief detour before following Diamond down Geach’s 
road. We need a general  grounding in Diamond’s strategy. In particular,  I 
want to consider  Diamond’s discussion on the nature of ‘nonsense’.  What, 
one might  ask,  has  this  got  to  do with our current  concerns  over  how to 
interpret the Tractatus?
6.54 My  propositions  serve  are  elucidatory  in  this  way:  he  who 
understands  me  finally  recognises  them  as  nonsensical 
[unsinnig],  when he has climbed out through them,  on them, 
over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he 
has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world 
rightly.
One of the many puzzles in reading this puzzling book is how we ought to 
take  Wittgenstein’s,  on  the  face  of  it  paradoxical,  claim  that  his  own 
propositions  are  nonsense.  An  answer  to  such  a  puzzle  will  depend,  of 
course, on what we take him to mean by ‘nonsense’. Diamond introduces us 
to her discussion of this question with the following examples of nonsense:
1) Caesar is a prime number
2) Scott kept a runcible at Abbotsford
In virtue of what are these sentences nonsense? One, very natural view, runs 
as  follows:  1)  is  nonsense in virtue of  the meaning of  the terms involved. 
‘Caesar’, we can assume, is a proper name. That something is a prime number 
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can only be truly or falsely said of numbers. We cannot say of a person that he 
is a prime number or not. Therefore, the two ‘bits’ – the logical parts – of the 
sentence do not fit together. In short we have some sort of category error. 2), 
in  contrast,  is  nonsense  in  virtue  of  one  of  the  terms  involved  lacking 
meaning. ‘Runcible’ has no meaning in our language. 
Diamond  offers  an  alternative  to  this  natural  view  of  nonsense, 
something she calls the ‘Frege-Wittgenstein’ view. She begins by reminding 
us of Frege’s three fundamental principles:
There must be a sharp separation of the psychological from the logical, 
the subjective from the objective;
The  meaning  of  a  word  must  be  asked  for  in  the  context  of  a 
proposition, not in isolation;
The distinction between concept and object must be kept in mind.210
Diamond argues that if we wish to focus on the work done by the ‘working 
parts’ of a sentence – those parts in virtue of which the sentence means what 
it does – then to keep faith with Frege a) we must not refer to psychology and 
b) we must look at the working parts in the context of the whole sentence 
rather than in isolation. Here, again, we see the context principle playing a 
crucial role in the discussion.
Let’s begin with 1). The word ‘Caesar’ appears in this sentence. If I say 
‘Caesar is a prime number’,  my state of mind may be exactly the same as 
when I use the word ‘Caesar’ in saying ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’. But this 
state of mind doesn’t prove that ‘Caesar’ as it occurs in ‘Caesar is a prime 
number’ has the role it does in ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’. 
210  Frege (1963), p.x.
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What  I  am driving  at  is  this:  that  if  we  accept  Frege’s  principle  of 
always separating the psychological from the logical, there must at the 
very least be a question for us whether “Caesar” in “Caesar is a prime 
number” is working as the proper name of a person[.]211
And, of course, a similar consideration applies to the last four words of 1). I 
may intend those words to mean what they do in ‘17 is a prime number’, but 
by  Frege’s  lights  my state  of  mind  cannot  settle  whether  those  words  do 
indeed mean the same. 
Returning to 2), Diamond asks us what would ‘cure’ such a sentence of 
being  nonsense?  The obvious  suggestion is  that  the  sentence  would make 
sense if a meaning were given to the term ‘runcible’. Both the natural view 
and  the  Frege-Wittgenstein  view  would  accept  that.  But  the  Frege-
Wittgenstein  view,  according  to  Diamond,  denies  what  the  natural  view 
accepts: that it would be possible to assign a meaning to ‘runcible’ that would 
clash with the remainder of the sentence. The idea is that ‘Scott kept a ___ at 
Abbotsford’  has a meaning which is constant in both ‘Scott  kept a cow at 
Abbotsford’ and ‘Scott kept a runcible at Abbotsford’. To give a meaning to 
the latter  sentence  one must  ascribe  a meaning to  ‘runcible’  that  fits  with 
‘Scott  kept  a  ___  at  Abbotsford’.  That  is:  that  fits  with  the  meaning  the 
sentence already has. But:
On the Frege-Wittgenstein view, if a sentence makes no sense, no part 
of it can be said to mean what it does in some other sentence which it 
does  make  sense  –  any  more  than  a  word  can  be  said  to  mean 
something in isolation.212
211  Diamond (1991c), p.99.
212  Diamond (1991c), p.100.
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Compare with the Investigations:
When a sentence is called senseless it is not as it were its sense that is 
senseless.  But  a  combination  of  words  is  being  excluded  from  the 
language, withdrawn from circulation.213
If, on this view, ‘Caesar is a prime number’ is nonsense, then ‘Caesar’ cannot 
be taken to mean what it does when used in, for example, ‘Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon’. Equally, ‘is a prime number’ cannot be taken to mean what it does 
when used in, for example, ‘17 is a prime number’. The same applies to 2). If 
‘Scott kept a runcible at Abbotsford’ is  nonsense, then ‘Scott kept a ___ at 
Abbotsford’ cannot be taken to mean what it does in, for example, ‘Scott kept 
a cow at Abbotsford.’ 
Diamond’s  point  is  that,  on  the  Frege-Wittgenstein  account  of 
nonsense, the strategy for curing 2) applies equally to curing 1). We could 
stipulate  that  the  logical  element  ‘runcible’  in  ‘Scott  kept  a  runcible  at 
Abbotsford’ stands for a keep-able kind of thing. 2) will then say that Scott 
kept such a thing at Abbotsford. Then 2) will be working as ‘Scott kept a cow 
at Abbotsford’ works – by combination of the logical element ‘Scott kept a ___ 
at Abbotsford’ and a logical element standing for a keep-able-kind-of-thing. 
In the case of 1) we can proceed in two ways. First, we could assign a meaning 
to ‘Caesar’ so that it is a number term. ‘Caesar is a prime number’ would then 
turn out to be a logical combination of a number term and the predicate ‘is a 
prime number’. Second, we could assign a meaning to ‘number’ such that it 
213 PI I §500
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could be attributable to a person, ‘minister’ for example. ‘Caesar is a prime 
number’ would now be read as a combination of a logical element ‘Caesar’ as 
it  is  understood  in  ‘Caesar  crossed  the  Rubicon’  and  something  it  makes 
perfect sense to say of a person – that of being a prime minister. So, on this 
view, it is precisely because certain determinations of meaning have not been 
made in 1) that it  turns out to be nonsense. 1) has  words in common with 
‘Caesar  crossed  the  Rubicon’  and  ‘17  is  a  prime  number’,  but  it  fails  to 
conform to either pattern because a meaning has not been given to ‘Caesar’ or 
a meaning has not been given to ‘is a prime number’. On this way of thinking, 
then, nonsense of type 1) turns out to share a fundamental aspect of nonsense 
of type 2).
The Frege-Wittgenstein  view is  to  be  seen as denying a ‘functional’ 
account of nonsense. The natural view holds that whether a sentence makes 
sense depends on its parts, on their logical category. Nonsense of the type 
expressed  by  1)  is  dependent  on  the  functionality  of  the  terms  involved: 
whether you get sense or nonsense when you replace the word ‘Caesar’ in 1) 
depends on the category of word you put in. Nonsense comes out if you put 
in terms of certain categories (names, objects), sense comes out if you put in 
terms of a certain other category (numbers). The Frege-Wittgenstein view, as 
Diamond presents it, denies this: A word does not have a category which, as 
it were, it carries around with it, which it brings to whatever context the word 
is used.
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Sentences are not made up of ingredients, words-assigned-to-certain-
categories,  but  are  constructed on patterns,  where the category of  a 
word  in  a  sentence  depends  upon  the  pattern  (or  patterns)  in 
accordance  with  which  the  whole  sentence  may  be  taken  to  be 
constructed[.]214
The idea is that nonsense cannot be ‘constructed’ by putting words of such-
and-such categories together in a sentence so that nonsense results. It would, 
suggests Diamond, be an example of an ‘illogical language’. Here we can see 
Diamond’s reliance on a reading of the context principle. Words only have 
meaning in the context in which they appear; they do not have a meaning 
prior to or independently of their occurrence in propositions. 
Other  than  wishing  to  remain  faithful  to  Frege’s  fundamental 
principles  we  are  yet  to  hear  why  the  Frege-Wittgenstein  view  is  to  be 
preferred, or, indeed, what is mistaken about the natural view. Diamond does 
highlight an objection for the natural view. The objection seems to be that the 
natural view is guilty of some sort of ‘double-think’. In the sentence ‘Caesar is 
a prime number’  we have been saying there is  no genuine thought,  just a 
string of words imitating an expression of a thought. Only a sentence which 
did genuinely express the thought that Caesar is a prime number would have 
the structure we think we can see, we pretend or imagine we can see, in the 
sentence ‘Caesar is a prime number’. That is: only a sentence that did say this 
individual,  Caesar,  was  a  prime  number  would  contain  illegitimately 
combined categories. The idea that the sentence is nonsense because of the 
categories  in  it  being  combined  illegitimately  implicitly  acknowledges  the 
214  Diamond (1991c), p.105.
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notion of those categories forming a sentence that does say something. But 
that is impossible; such a thing cannot be sayable, on the natural view, at all. 
Diamond frames her discussion by speaking of ‘positive’ nonsense. She 
argues that, for Wittgenstein, “there is no kind of nonsense which is nonsense 
on account of  what  the terms composing it  mean – there is  as  it  were no 
‘positive’ nonsense.”215 Any genuine nonsense is nonsense in virtue of a lack of 
determination  of  meaning,  rather  than  as  a  result  of  determinations  of 
meaning  that  have  been  made.  Diamond  contends  that  the  opposition  to 
‘positive’ nonsense – opposition to the view that a sentence is nonsense in 
virtue  of  what  it  would  mean  given  the  fixed  meanings  of  the  terms  it 
contains – is  one Wittgenstein held throughout his writings:  right through 
from the pre-Tractatus writings to the Investigations. 
It  is  somewhat confusing why such nonsense is  worthy of  the term 
‘positive’. Presumably ‘yellow orange red’ would be a putative example of 
positive  nonsense,  in  that  it  could  be  regarded  as  nonsense  in  virtue  of 
determinations of meaning that have been made. The thought must be that 
cases of positive nonsense would be more philosophically interesting, or of 
more value than, ‘mere’ nonsense. But where would that value lie? I think it 
must be something like this: with some ‘positive nonsense sentences’ – say 
‘Caesar is a prime number’ – we can, as it were, go along with the ‘charade’ 
for a while. We can understand, given the words involved, what the sentence 
is  trying to  say,  if  only it  could say it.  We can grasp that  the sentence  is 
attempting  to  ascribe  something to  a  person that  can only  legitimately  be 
215  Diamond (1991c), p.107.
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ascribed to a number. So something understandable is conveyed even though, 
strictly speaking, the sentence is nonsense. 
It might be worth noting why this debate surrounding nonsense might 
be thought important, beyond localised quibbling over how to interpret the 
Tractatus. This will help us see the beginnings of a connection with the kind of 
issues touched on in Part One. The suggestion would be that the debate over 
nonsense – whether there is such a thing as ‘positive’ nonsense – cuts right to 
the heart of an issue for philosophy in general.  Namely: the issue of what 
philosophy should be doing, what the task for philosophy is.  If  you think 
there is such a thing as positive nonsense then it looks like you can demarcate 
between that  which makes sense and that  which does not.  So we can say 
‘Caesar is a prime minister’ makes sense, but ‘Caesar is a prime number’ does 
not because, if allow the ‘charade’, you see what it is trying to say cannot be 
said. In that way we could ‘stake out’ a line between what makes sense and 
what does not,  what can be thought and what cannot,  what is  logical and 
what is illogical, what is possible and what is impossible. And we see both 
sides of this line or boundary: see how the land lies. And it is a line we can 
systematically get beyond to highlight where the line actually is. If,  on the 
other hand, we deny ‘positive’ nonsense, the suggestion is that philosophy 
becomes  a  very  different  discipline  all  together.  There  is  now no  way  of 
getting beyond the bounds of sense, any attempt to do so ends up with ‘mere’ 
nonsense,  mere strings of word on a page, where the words do not mean 
what they do in sentences that do make sense. If we cannot get beyond the 
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line we can no longer stake out that line from both sides. Instead we have a 
limit from which we can get no further. Philosophy built on this restriction is 
more therapeutic by nature. It is simply in the business of clearing up what 
can be meaningfully said, or thought, clearing up what is possible. And the 
task is to show that we cannot do more than that, we cannot break the bounds 
of sense. 
The notion that we could adopt an external, ‘sideways-on’, perspective 
on  our  practices  or  on  our  grasp  of  concepts  is  what  both  Dummett  and 
McDowell read the latter Wittgenstein as rejecting. In Part Three we will need 
to return to the issue of ‘sideways-on’ looks, the distinction between limits as 
genuine  limits  as  opposed  to  limitations,  and  what  relationship  there  is 
between  such  issues  and  idealism.  But  we  need  something  much  more 
specific in play before any general comparison can take place: we want an 
explicit connection between the Tractatus and a ‘sideways-on’ perspective.
Diamond  draws  a  contrast  between  two  ways  one  might  take  the 
suggestion that there are no philosophical doctrines. First, one could read the 
Tractatus as containing a number of doctrines that Wittgenstein argues cannot 
be put into words. Such doctrines lack sense. If we were to read the Tractatus 
that way, according to Diamond, we are suggesting that once the ladder has 
been  ‘thrown  away’  you  are  left  with  truths  about  reality,  although  you 
cannot say anything about reality. So, it appears, there are ineffable truths. 
This kind of reading Diamond labels as ‘chickening out’. Second, you could 
not ‘chicken out’ – and be ‘resolute’ instead - and maintain that the notion of 
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an unsayable truth is itself going to have to be thrown away. “One is not left 
with it at the end, after recognizing what the  Tractatus has aimed at getting 
one to recognise”216.
 This supposed contrast needs further analysis. Diamond clearly thinks 
that there is value or insight to be gleaned from the Tractatus, despite the fact 
that, strictly speaking, the book consists of propositions that lack sense. It is 
not as though being ‘resolute’ amounts to simply throwing away the book, 
dismissing the project out of hand. What would it be, then, to understand or 
gain some insight from a person who talks nonsense? Diamond considers this 
is a further paper. The Tractatus argues, she suggests, that when you ascribe to 
someone the  thought  that  p,  you give  what  the  person  thinks  by using  a 
sentence  you yourself  understand.  Understanding  what  a  person  says,  for 
example, is shown by putting what s/he says in a sentence of your language. 
Crucial to this story is that what is not happening is a description of the other 
person’s mind from the point of view of empirical psychology. But what are 
we  to  make,  then,  of  the  utterer  of  nonsense?  Diamond  accepts  that 
understanding a person who utters nonsense is often required in philosophy. 
I may say to someone that they are under an illusion of some sort, and when I 
try to specify the illusion I myself mean something that doesn’t make sense. 
The Tractatus asks us to understand Wittgenstein – understand the utterer of 
nonsense.
Diamond clarifies two ideas relating to nonsense-sentences and their 
role in the Tractatus. She argues, first, that no nonsense-sentences are closer to 
216  Diamond (1991b), p.182.
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being true than any other. This, she says, places her in direct opposition to 
Anscombe – who (apparently) argues that there are some nonsense-sentences 
which would say something true if what they are an attempt to say could be 
said. This, for Diamond, introduces a hierarchy within nonsense-sentences:
[Anscombe] works with the contrast between nonsense-sentences that 
have  something,  something  true  but  unsayable,  behind  them,  and 
those that have nothing but confusion behind them.217 
For example, if we were to say “There is a distinction between objects and 
facts”,  that  sentence aims at  something that  is  true,  although the sentence 
itself  is  nonsense.  Diamond wants to reject  such a picture.  This discussion 
fleshes out some of Diamond’s remarks on ‘nonsense’ and on the ‘chickening 
out’ reading of the  Tractatus.  A nonsense-sentence that had something true 
but unsayable ‘standing behind’ it would be an example of positive nonsense: 
what such a sentence gestures at is true, what it attempts to say (given the 
meaning of the terms in the sentence) is correct but it just cannot be said. “The 
philosophical  perspective  is  fine,  but  you  just  need  to  shut  up.”218 This 
amounts to ‘chickening out’, not taking on Wittgenstein’s remarks resolutely 
enough. Diamond accuses Anscombe of doing just that.
 Second, Diamond examines the role imagination plays in coming out 
with nonsense-sentences. Here she does want to draw a distinction between 
different  kinds  of  nonsense.  The  distinction  is  not,  she  suggests,  between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ nonsense – between nonsense gesturing at truth and mere 
217  Diamond (2000), p.158.
218  Diamond (1991b), p.196.
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nonsense.  Nonsense-sentences,  for Diamond, are all  ‘internally’  the same – 
they  are  simply  nonsense.  But  ‘externally’  they  may  actually  differ.  For 
example, in the case of a particular nonsense-sentence “its utterance may fail 
to reflect an understanding of oneself or of others; it may depend on this or 
that  type  of  use  of  imagination.”219 It  as  not  as  if  we  can  say a  nonsense-
sentence is elucidatory in virtue of the sentence it is, in virtue of the meaning 
of the terms and expressions involved, yet such a sentence may nevertheless 
elucidate in some way: “For a sentence that is nonsense to be an elucidatory 
sentence is entirely a matter of features external to it”220 The crucial question is 
what exactly Diamond intends ‘elucidate’ to mean. In a footnote she argues 
that a proposition being an elucidation concerns the context of use rather than 
the  content  itself.  Saying  philosophy  consists  of  elucidations  and  that 
philosophy is an activity amounts to saying the same thing. That is somewhat 
obscure. I think, again, it highlights how deep and fundamental Diamond’s 
reading  of  Wittgenstein’s  context  principle  goes.  Clearly  Diamond  is 
advocating a kind of nonsense that is simply nonsense, yet nevertheless can 
be used, in virtue of its ‘external’ features, to convey information. 
Diamond  examines  contexts  in  which  nonsense-sentences  are  put 
forward, investigating how imagination can play a role in the producing of 
nonsense: in particular in our imagining of a point of view for philosophical 
investigation. Such an illusory point of view is exactly, according to Diamond, 
what the Tractatus self-consciously gets itself into. The point of doing so is to 
219  Diamond (2000), p.159.
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reveal that the attractiveness of the point of view results from an incorrect or 
false imaginative stance. Take, for example, the opening sentences (TLP 1, 1.1) 
of the book: “The world is everything that is the case. The world is the totality 
of facts, not things.” Such sentences imagine being able to adopt a point of 
view from which the whole world can be surveyed. It is, we might say, a view 
from ‘sideways-on’. That idea is meant to characterise philosophy as it has 
been practiced. Wittgenstein, for Diamond, does not intend us to grasp what 
it would look like from such a viewpoint even though we cannot put what we 
grasp into words. Rather; his point is to get us to understand a person in the 
grip of the illusion. “It understands him through entering into that illusion in 
order to lead him out of it; and the upshot will not be any grasp of what can 
be seen from the philosophical point of view of the world.”221 So, for Diamond, 
the  Tractatus tells  us  that  its  own propositions  belong  to  an  activity  –  an 
activity  of  providing  comfort  to  those  attracted  by  philosophy.  The  self-
understanding reached by this activity would, then, make a person recognise 
that to be attracted in such a way is mistaken. It is in this area, I take it, where 
Diamond sees a close connection between her interpretation of the  Tractatus 
and  McDowell’s  interpretation  of  the  rule-following  passages  of  the 
Investigations.  Both  see  Wittgenstein  recognising  the  motivation  for  a 
particular  kind of  standpoint,  but  both  argue that  Wittgenstein  ultimately 
shows the reader what was mistaken in that motivation.
[6.4] Evaluation of Diamond’s View
221  Diamond (2000), p.160.
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I  think  that  is  enough  exposition:  what  of  possible  criticism?  I  set  out 
Diamond’s attempt to ‘pin’ the notion of ineffable truths on Anscombe and 
her interpretation of the  Tractatus.  But this is simply not supported by the 
text. Anscombe says the following about things that show themselves:
That is to say: it would be right to call them ‘true’ if,  per impossibile, 
they could be said; in fact they cannot be called true, since they cannot 
be  said,  but  ‘can  be  shewn’,  or  ‘are  exhibited’,  in  the  propositions 
saying various things that can be said.222
That quotation does not suggest that things shown are true but unsayable; 
rather they  would be true if we could do the impossible and say them. This 
means that they are actually not true. On the same page Anscombe raises the 
question of interest to Diamond. The things that would be true if they could 
be said are important. So can we, then, draw a distinction between the things 
that would be true if they could be said, and things that would be false if they 
could be said? Anscombe’s answer is immediate: “It is impossible to speak 
like  this”223.  A  clearer  rejection  of  Diamond’s  interpretation  of  Anscombe’s 
discussion is hardly possible. Only after this rejection does Anscombe move 
onto discussing a further distinction:
Nevertheless there are utterances which at least sound like attempts to 
say the opposite of the things that are ‘quite correct’ in this sense; and 
there will be more error, or more darkness, in such attempts than in 
trying  to  say  the  things  that  are  ‘shewn’,  even  if  they  are  really 
unsayable.224
222  Anscombe (1973), p.162.
223  Anscombe (1973), p.162.
224  Anscombe (1973), p.162.
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We  should  note,  first,  that  even  here  Anscombe  cannot  bring  herself  to 
endorse the distinction. It seems as though, or sounds like, there is a distinction 
between ‘helpful’ and ‘plain’ nonsense. Moreover, this is a different distinction 
to the one she sharply dismissed a few sentences before. Nonsense which is 
strictly  speaking  nonsense  can  nevertheless  be  helpful.  Indeed,  that  is 
precisely what Diamond commits herself to when she says that nonsense can 
elucidate.  It  would simply be a mistake to equate ‘positive’ nonsense with 
‘helpful’ nonsense. So to criticise Anscombe as ‘chickening out’ or not being 
‘resolute’ enough in her interpretation is actually for Diamond to criticise the 
very distinction she is so keen to emphasise. 
The theme that Diamond is attempting to pick a fight where no fight is 
wanted or even required is also taken up by White.  White suggests that it 
would indeed be a careless thinker who advocated ‘positive’ or ‘substantial’ 
nonsense,  or ascribed that view to the  Tractatus.  Moreover,  no interpreters 
have actually done so. White’s suggestion is that, if Diamond and other ‘new’ 
interpreters  really  do  want  to  instigate  a  challenge  to  ‘standard’ 
interpretations then they will have to alter their target somewhat:
The issue here is actually simple: what Diamond and Conant should be 
challenging is not the idea there is substantial nonsense, but the idea 
which they fail to distinguish from that – the idea that someone can 
maintain that a sentence is simply nonsense, but can simultaneously 
believe  that  one  can,  under  appropriate  circumstances  use  that 
sentence to communicate.225
225  White (2000), p.14.
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The idea being that if Diamond wants a distinctive view then this is the battle 
she  must  fight.  Two  points  become  immediately  obvious,  however.  First, 
nonsense sentences, simply nonsense at that, are used to communicate all the 
time. White has a lovely example of a comment made regarding a move in 
chess. Playing Black, we might want to gain control of the a1 – h8 diagonal. 
By moving our bishop to h8 we achieve this in such a way that the bishop 
itself  is  (relatively)  secure  from capture.  The  example  given  is  Bronstein’s 
comment: “Bh8. I like this move a lot: Bj10 would have been even stronger.”226 
This is,  of  course,  nonsense.  A chessboard only runs  a-h,  1-8.  So the term 
‘Bj10’  lacks  a  determination  of  meaning.  Even  if  the  remark  is  made 
somewhat  ‘tongue-in-cheek’,  we  can  understand  what  Bronstein  means, 
understand the underlying tactical point he is making. Secondly, Diamond is 
more than happy to accept that nonsense sentences are used to communicate. 
Indeed,  we have already seen that she accepts  they are an integral part of 
coming to understand Wittgenstein. Again, the criticism is that Diamond has 
failed to grasp that her view is just as committed to the distinction between 
‘helpful’  nonsense and ‘plain’ nonsense as other interpretations.  Moreover, 
that  that  distinction  is  different  to  the  one  between  ‘positive’  and  ‘mere’ 
nonsense. 
 A broader question could be raised here:  Is  the notion of  ineffable 
truths  (or  an  ineffable  truth)  plausible  at  all,  irrespective  of  whether  one 
wanted to attribute the idea to Wittgenstein? This question is taken up, and 
given a negative answer, by Moore in his paper “Ineffability and Nonsense”. 
226  White (2000), p.19.
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Moore suggests  that not much by way of  argument  is  needed to establish 
such a conclusion:
I am inclined to say that we do not understand the notion of truth, at 
least when it is taken in its strictest sense, independently of what can 
be expressed; or rather, more cautiously, that we do not understand 
the notion of a truth independently of that.227
That is: we simply cannot grasp what an ineffable truth would be like, it just 
does not make sense.  Moore claims that  what is  wrong with such a short 
answer is its shortness, not, as it were, its direction. The interesting question 
for  Moore,  and equally  for  us,  is  whether  if  we reject  ineffable  truths  we 
thereby reject  the idea of value in the ineffable.  His answer to this further 
question is no, and I think it  will  be instructive to examine his discussion 
further.
What  Moore  has  in  mind  is  ineffable  understanding as  opposed  to 
ineffable truth. Indeed, a lot of my comments in the previous few paragraphs 
have been concerned with the understanding that is conveyed by or manifest in 
sentences which are, strictly speaking, nonsense. 
Once  we  have  taken  account  of  the  possibility  of  ineffable 
understanding,  there  are  ways  of  construing  the  two  readings 
whereby,  to  borrow a wonderful  phrase of  David Wiggins’s  from a 
different context,  ‘Suddenly it seems that what makes the difference 
between [them] has the width of a knife-edge.’228
If  we recognise the possible value of  ineffable  understanding,  the thought 
runs, we can get beyond viewing (if indeed we were ever trapped in such a 
227  Moore (2003), p.175.
228  Moore (2000), p.180.
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position) the ‘new’ and ‘standard’ interpretations of the Tractatus as differing 
over  whether  Wittgenstein  held  that  there  are  ineffable  truths.  The  two 
supposed camps can therefore be viewed differently.  Those interpretations 
which claim that the Tractatus conveys ‘something’ that cannot be said can be 
seen as claiming ineffable understanding to be that ‘something’. Those who 
claim that the Tractatus conveys nothing ineffable can be seen as limiting that 
‘nothing’ to truths. Then, suggests Moore, we can see the supposed opponents 
“as being entirely consonant with each other.”229 This is, of course, dependant 
on offering a plausible account of ineffable understanding. Such an account, 
or a detailed discussion of Moore, is beyond me here. I would like to gesture 
at a possible link with Geach here, though. Ineffable understanding looks like 
that which Geach claims we can test. If a person masters the use of symbolic 
language partly in virtue of the statement ‘There is a difference between what 
‘Brutus’ stands for and what the predicate ‘___ killed Caesar’ stands for’, then 
the statement has conveyed some understanding to the person. Even though, 
what has been conveyed cannot be put into words or expressed.  There is, 
then,  a  repeat  of  Geach’s  worry for Moore:  whilst  ineffable  understanding 
makes  sense  for  cases  such  as  these,  we  do  not  know  how  to  test  that 
understanding has been conveyed in other cases such as ethics or religion.
It has only taken a brief period of critical reflection to establish that the 
supposed distinction between Diamond’s ‘new’ interpretation will not do for 
our purposes. There are gestures and hints of certain misguided ‘sideways-
on’  perspectives,  but  no  substantial  issues  or  connections  have  yet  been 
229  Moore (2000), p.181.
191
identified.  Indeed,  it  seems  as  though  the  opposition  between  ‘new’  and 
‘standard’ interpretations is a shallow one. It might be worthwhile making 
explicit what would amount to a distinctive (albeit mistaken) interpretation of 
the Tractatus. I have something like the following in mind:
Since the system itself implies that, in advancing it, one does not say 
what  is  so,  no  one  advancing  the  system  could  say  what  is  so. 
Presuming that the point of any system is to say what is so, this first 
development concludes that the system must be rejected.230
Earlier I discussed Geach’s conception of a ‘self-mate’. What we have here is a 
reading  that  follows  through  that  thought.   If  we  are  really  to  take 
Wittgenstein’s comments that his doctrines cannot be stated seriously, then 
we should simply reject his project out of hand. We really should just throw 
the  book  aside.  Indeed,  if  we  are  to  follow  Diamond  and  others  and  be 
‘resolute’ in our reading then such a position looks more principled. Sullivan 
labels  such  an  uncompromising  rejection  “more  honest”231 than  ‘new’ 
readings.  This view is mistaken, and seeks to obliterate all that is of value 
from the  Tractatus. But it does genuinely diverge from the ‘standard’ view, 
right at the beginning of debating what one is to do with this puzzling book. 
[6.5] Conclusion 
The conclusion we have reached is not that Diamond’s way reading of the 
saying / showing distinction, her conception of ‘nonsense’ as it appears in the 
Tractatus, and her interpretation of the book in general is just  wrong. On the 
230  Sullivan (2004), p.36. 
231  Sullivan (2004), p.37.
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contrary; a lot of what Diamond’s discussion is both sharp and informative. In 
particular,  she  is  right  that  we  ought  to  fully  engage  with  Wittgenstein’s 
remarks, not ‘chicken out’. 
There  is  an  undoubted  difference  in  tone  or  emphasis  between 
Diamond (and her followers such as Conant) and other interpreters  of the 
Tractatus. Diamond maintains that Wittgenstein’s work is to be seen as a work 
of ‘therapy’ as opposed to theory or doctrine based.  But  all sides can agree 
that the  Tractatus  has a therapeutic aim: Wittgenstein does attempt to clear 
away confusion, make us recognise the futility of certain ways of thinking, 
recognise  that  we  must  simply  and  clearly  state  what  can  be  said  but 
“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”232 He does indeed 
speak of drawing a limit rather than staking out a line which can be surveyed 
from both sides. The concern raised in [6.4] was that Diamond’s divergence 
from the ‘standard’  appears  at  best  to  be a shallow one.  Diamond simply 
places greater emphasis on parts of the Tractatus that all interpretations agree 
is there. She makes ‘therapy’ the central focus of the book, bringing to the fore 
remarks that display that theme - relegating other doctrines and aspects of the 
book.  That  is  not,  however,  enough of  a  divergence  to  create  the  kind of 
distinctiveness Diamond obviously intends by her interpretation. 
This  is  not  only  a  disappointing  result  for  the  so-called  ‘new’ 
interpretation of the Tractatus, but also for our project in Part Two. What we 
wanted, and what examination of Diamond looked the most promising way 
of delivering, was seeing the same questions and lines of thought developed 
232  TLP 7.
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in the  Tractatus as we found in the  Investigations. From there we could offer 
some comparison between the two. We have seen the start  of connections 
with  issues  discussed  in  Part  One:  through  the  discussion  of  ‘positive’ 
nonsense  and  Diamond’s  claim  that  Wittgenstein  is  opposing  a  certain 
‘sideways-on’  perspective.   Unfortunately,  what  this  perspective  is  for  the 
author of the  Tractatus and why it is mistaken remains unclear, as does any 
connection  between  the  perspective  and  a  threat  of  idealism.  Diamond’s 
remarks gesture at things that might serve as a good comparison between the 
approach of  the early  and latter  Wittgenstein,  but  as  yet  there  is  no deep 
substantive issue to latch onto and discuss accordingly. The shortcut has not 
been successful.    
But perhaps this is a little quick. What I am claiming to be a ‘surface’ 
disagreement, of emphasis or relevance, could still possibly be a reflection or 
instantiation of a much deeper and substantial divergence. Part of Diamond’s 
whole approach is to show that Wittgenstein seeks to undermine a certain 
kind of ‘realism’. Here are a couple examples:
I believe that an understanding of Frege can help us to see our way 
past  the false  alternatives  of  realism and anti-realism in philosophy 
[…] and to see the power of Wittgenstein’s criticisms, in the Tractatus 
and later, of the conception of logic as science.233
Frege, in the development of a concept-script as a tool for philosophical 
thought, allows us to get clear of the two alternatives, to leave them 
behind.  […]  Look  somewhere  else:  That  is  what  we  can  hear  in 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy; look where you do not think there can 
be any reason for looking. That is there to be heard in the Tractatus, and 
233  Diamond (1991b), p.203.
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it simply  makes  clearer  a  message  already  to  be  heard  in  Frege’s 
work.234
Indeed, Diamond argues that her paper on realism is the central one of the 
whole collection. I suggest, then, that we pursue the question of realism: ‘to 
what extent, if any, was the author of the  Tractatus  a realist?’ If we address 
that question perhaps we will find the kind of deep-rooted disagreement over 
how to interpret Wittgenstein that I have argued is conspicuous by its absence 
between Diamond’s ‘new’ and other, ‘traditional’, interpretations. This is the 
task for the Chapter Seven.
234  Diamond (1991d), p.142/3. 
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Chapter Seven
‘Realism’ and the Tractatus
[7.1] Introduction
Chapter Six concluded that the supposed conflict between so-called ‘new’ and 
‘traditional’  interpretations of the  Tractatus is neither a genuine nor a deep 
disagreement about how the book is to be understood. This is to been seen as 
a  disappointment  for  the  project  of  Part  Two.  Consideration  of  Diamond 
would, it was hoped, provide us with a shortcut to Wittgenstein’s attitude 
towards questions of ‘sideways-on’ glances and a related threat of idealism. 
The  debate  between  ‘new’  and  ‘traditional’  readings  does  not  bring 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of these issues into clear focus. Chapter Six ended, 
however,  with  a  hope  that  the  issue  of  ‘realism’  would bring  the  relevant 
issues into play.
The question for Chapter Seven is, then, this: ‘How much of a realist 
was  the  author  of  the  Tractatus?’  Pears  offers  us  a  relatively  simple  and 
straightforward answer:
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Wittgenstein’s early system is basically realistic. Any factual sentence 
can  be  completely  analysed  into  elementary  sentences  which  are 
logically  independent  of  one  another  because  they  name  simple 
objects. […] Once a name has been attached to an object, the nature of 
the object takes over and controls the logical behaviour of the name, 
causing it to make sense in some sentential contexts but not in others.235
In this chapter I will argue that both Pears’ interpretation and an alternative 
developed  by  Ishiguro  and  McGuinness  (from  which  Pears’  account  is  a 
recoil) are mistaken. This is to be seen as providing an analogous structure to 
the discussion as that developed in Part One. There we placed two readings, 
one  labelled  ‘banal’  the  other  ‘fantastical’,  at  the  extreme  ends  of  an 
interpretative spectrum and attempted to find a satisfactory position between 
the  two.  Here  Pears’  ‘world-driven’  view on the  one  side  and Ishiguro  / 
McGuinness’  ‘language-driven’  view  on  the  other  are  to  be  seen  as  the 
interpretative  extremes  to  which  we  will  be  seek  a  ‘middle-way’.  In  this 
chapter I will (tentatively) suggest that a McDowellian understanding of the 
relationship between language and the world is to be found in the Tractatus 
and provides the kind of ‘middle-way’ we seek. This will indeed bring us to 
‘sideways-on’ looks and idealism.
The structure is as follows. [7.2] sets out, in rough detail, the opposition 
between ‘world-driven’ and ‘language-driven’ interpretations of the Tractatus. 
[7.3]  argues  that  both must  be  rejected  as  readings  of  the  book.  Pears’ 
criticisms of the ‘language-driven’ view are persuasive, but do not point to 
the  ‘world-driven’  alternative  he  suggests.  [7.4]  sketches  the  McDowellian 
alternative,  inspired  by  a  remark  in  his  Mind  and  World.  [7.5]  links  this 
235 Pears (1987), p.88.
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alternative to the idea of a ‘sideways-on’ perspective. [7.6] argues that a threat 
of  idealism  emerges  in  Wittgenstein’s  treatment  of  the  ‘sideways-on’ 
perspective and, as with the  Investigations, it is a pressing question whether 
Wittgenstein embraced idealism or ultimately found a way to reject it.
[7.2] ‘World-driven’ versus ‘Language-driven’ Interpretations 
What is ‘basic’ or ‘uncritical’ realism? Pears tells us that:
[…] at the foundation of the system of the  Tractatus there is a grid of 
elementary possibilities  imposing certain  absolute constraints  on the 
logical structure of any language. That is uncritical realism[.]236
The world consists of elementary possibilities which are either realised or not 
realised. Pears’ suggestion is that, for Wittgenstein, there is no getting beyond 
or below this grid. “The grid is ultimate and any speculation that purports to 
go beyond it  is  senseless.”237 We cannot,  for example,  ask what the world 
would be like if an elementary possibility was not in a position to be realised. 
In ordinary discourse ‘my coffee mug is on the table’ can be realised or not 
realised  and it also might be the case that I have no coffee mug and so the 
possibility  (that  it  is  on  the  table)  is  not  there  to  be  realised.  This  third 
contingency is precisely what is impossible at the ultimate level of analysis 
Pears takes Wittgenstein to be proposing.
But  what  does  it  mean  to  talk  of  ‘the  ultimate  grid  of  elementary 
possibilities’? Pears argues that an elementary possibility is one with simple 
236 Pears (1987), p.26.
237 Pears (1987), p.25.
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objects  at  the  nodal  points.  Wittgenstein,  we  are  told,  offers  a  reductive 
argument to show that all everyday factual sentences can be analysed down 
to  sentences  in  which  only  simple  objects  are  named.  Pears  reads  the 
argument  as  follows:  If  there  were  any  complex  (non-elementary)  things 
named  in  the  complete  analysis  of  ordinary  factual  sentences,  then  the 
analysing sentences would have senses only if certain other sentences were 
true. This is because complex things would not be there to be named in the 
first place unless their components were arranged in a way required for the 
existence of the complex thing. But the sense of a sentence about a complex 
thing cannot depend on the truth of another sentence about its components. 
Therefore the analysis must go further; to a point where all the words stand 
for simple objects. 
Pears  spends  some  time  working  through  the  premises  of  this 
argument.238 For our purposes we need only concern ourselves with Pears’ 
claim that it pushes the level of complete analysis down to a point where all 
that remains are objects ‘devoid of internal structure’:
These simple objects are the pivots on which all factual discourse turns. 
So logic reveals the structure imposed on all factual discourse by the 
ultimate structure of reality. That is its connection with the world.239
Much has been made already of ‘simple objects’,  objects devoid of internal 
structure. But what could such objects be or, indeed, be like? One of the real 
238 For the record, these are: (1) “We picture facts to ourselves” (TLP 2.1); (2) “The possibility of propositions is based 
upon the principle of the representation of objects by signs” (TLP 4.0312); (3) “The postulate of the possibility of the 
simple signs is the postulate of the determinateness of the sense.” (TLP 3.23); (4) ‘All things are complex’ – this last 
premise is to be reduced to absurdity. Pears (1987), pp.73-4.
239 Pears (1987), p.27.
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interpretative difficulties is that Wittgenstein fails  to offer any examples of 
simple objects or offer much by way of explanation as to what they must be 
like.  Two  conceptions  of  objects  –  material  points  and  sense-data  –  are 
canvassed in the Notebooks but Wittgenstein evidently never settled on either 
of these. To say that objects are ‘devoid of internal structure’ is to say that 
when their corresponding names occur in propositions they do so without 
creating  any  inferential  connections  with  other  propositions.  Such 
propositions are elementary, unlike ‘This is red’ and ‘This is green’ – which 
are necessarily incompatible240.
This is interesting but baffling, because it tells us what objects are not 
like without  telling us  what  they are like.  They must  not  have any 
internal complexity, but we are left to guess how they manage without 
it. It is like the via remotionis in theology: God is described by listing the 
properties that he does not possess. 241
The objects of the  Tractatus are clearly not everyday objects that we can, for 
example,  bump  into  or  spill  our  coffee  over.  On  the  Tractarian  picture 
possible worlds are distinguished not by which objects are contained in them 
– as objects are constant across all possible worlds – but by the configuration 
and  combination  of  the  objects.  Pears’  interpretation  has  Wittgenstein 
believing that simple objects, whatever they may be, are ‘dominant partners’ 
in the object/name relationship. It is the object which explains the use of the 
name, the ways in which the name can figure in meaningful propositions is 
determined by the nature of the object. 
240 TLP 6.3751
241 Pears (1987), p.67.
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True, we attach names and we maintain their attachment (if the need 
arises),  but  the  nature  and  identity  of  each  object  is  fixed 
independently of anything done by us […] the question, whether we 
contribute  anything  to  the  constitution  of  that  world,  is  not  even 
asked.242
It is up to us what sign we use to attach to an object. But this has no bearing 
on the nature or identity of the object in question which exists independently 
of our attaching a name to it, and indeed our existing at all. What is clear on 
Pears’ interpretation, then, is that objects ‘set the standard’ for reference: the 
way simple objects are, and the inherent possibilities in such objects, explains 
the use of names in our language. 
Standing  opposed  to  ‘basic  realism’  is  a  shared  interpretation 
developed independently by Ishiguro and McGuinness. Ishiguro claims that 
Wittgenstein  rejected the idea that  the meaning of  a  name can be secured 
independently  of  its  use  in  propositions,  preferring  instead the  claim that 
meaning  of  a  name  can  only  be  secured  via  the  use  of  the  name  in 
propositions.  Her  thesis  is  that  the  existence  of  objects  adds  nothing 
whatsoever to the logical theory of the Tractatus. Correspondingly, the names 
of the Tractatus function as ‘dummy names’ – an analogy Ishiguro draws with 
proofs in elementary geometry:
For example, we say ‘Let a be the centre of the circle C’ and go on to 
deduce the various relations it has to other things. We cannot however 
go on to suppose that a is  not the centre  of the circle,  for a has no 
identity other than that of being just that. We may come to decide, after 
242 Pears (1987), p.29.
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using a dummy name ‘a’ that ‘a’ did not secure a reference. But as long 
as we use ‘a’ and talk of the object ‘a’ it is the centre of the circle C[.]243
And so, the objects names pick out are radically different from normal spatio-
temporal objects. The names we attach to such objects will behave (although 
Wittgenstein  might  not  have  explicitly  recognised  this244)  just  as  dummy 
names  behave.  Crucial  to  Ishiguro’s  interpretation  is  her  reading  of 
Wittgenstein’s context principle. This principle was identified in [5.1] and has 
surfaced throughout our discussion of the Tractatus. The principle, according 
to  Ishiguro,  means  there  is  no  securing  “a  reference  [for  a  name] 
independently  of  and  prior  to  its  occurrence  in  a  proposition.”245 We  can 
speak of ‘the object the name refers to’, but only because we know the kind of 
propositions  in  which  the  name  occurs.  The  key  for  Ishiguro  is  that  the 
Tractatus refutes the idea that a name is like a label  we tag onto an object 
which we can already – that is, prior to propositional use – identify.
McGuinness  reaches  a  similar  conclusion  through  grafting 
Tugendhat’s246 interpretation of Frege onto an interpretation of Wittgenstein. 
For Tugendhat, Frege’s  Bedeutung is best translated by ‘significance’, which 
itself is best understood as ‘truth-value potential’. In the case of names, two 
names ‘a’ and ‘b’ have the same truth-value potential if and only if whenever 
each  is  completed  by  the  same  expression  to  form  a  sentence,  the  two 
sentences have the same truth-value.
243 Ishiguro (1969), p.45.
244 Ishiguro (1969), p.46.
245 Ishiguro (1969), p.24.
246 Tugendhat (1970).
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An object in the  Tractatus which is the reference of a name or simple 
sign can be  viewed as  simply  the  truth-value  potential  of  a  certain 
expression. The semantic role of the supposedly possible simple sign or 
name is that of being combined with other simple signs or names to 
produce  exactly  the  same truth-value.  Any sign  which  in  the  same 
combinations will produce exactly the same truth-values is the same 
sign or has the same reference.247 
‘Reference’  is  relegated  on  this  interpretation  to  semantic  equivalence 
between expressions. McGuinness also endorses Ishiguro’s claim that, for the 
Tractatus,  there  is  no  securing  of  reference  prior  to  or  independently  of 
occurrence in a proposition.
Both  Ishiguro  and  McGuinness  accept  that  objects  are  required  for 
Wittgenstein’s  theory. So why are they so hostile to labelling the  Tractatus 
broadly ‘realist’ in nature? “The answer is that Wittgenstein’s objects are not 
concrete objects which may sensibly be said to exist or not.”248 McGuinness 
continues:
The answer to the question about realism then, is: Wittgenstein does 
indeed subscribe to the view Dummett attributes to Frege:
… the thoughts we express are true or false objectively, in virtue of how things stand 
in the real world – the realm of reference – and independently of whether we know 
them to be true or false (of whether we exist or can think at all);
however, from Wittgenstein’s point of view the words “the realm of 
reference” are a misnomer here. I have previously called it a myth, but 
I might equally call it rhetoric, to say as Dummett does:
… we do actually succeed in speaking about the actual objects,  in the real world, 
which are referents of the names we use, and not about any intermediate surrogates 
for or representations of them.249
247 McGuinness (1981), p.65.
248 McGuinness (1981), p.72.
249 McGuinness (1981), p.72. The quotations are from Dummett (1981), p.198, 196 respectively.
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If  we wanted to condense the disagreement  further  still  we might say the 
following: Pears offers  a ‘world-driven’  interpretation of the  Tractatus.  The 
objects dictate to or explain the workings of our language, in so far as names, 
once  attached  to  their  objects,  must  remain  faithful  to  the  inherent 
possibilities of those objects.  Ishiguro and McGuinness, on the other hand, 
offer a ‘language-driven’ interpretation of the Tractatus. It is the use of names 
within propositions that determines the nature of the object referred to. It is 
our language that sets the standard for denoting a particular object or not. 
This  is  a  deep-rooted  disagreement.  As  McGuinness  himself  accepts,  a 
disagreement here is a disagreement over the answer to “what is Wittgenstein 
doing  in  the  Tractatus?”250 Or,  more  specifically,  what  are  the  apparent 
metaphysical commitments of the early sections of the book actually about? 
Pears’ view appears to be that such remarks are meant to be taken seriously as 
describing an independently constituted metaphysical structure. McGuinness, 
on the other hand, appears to take Wittgenstein’s metaphysical comments not 
at face value:
It may seem, indeed, that [Wittgenstein] argues that propositions with 
sense are possible only because some more primitive operations are 
possible – notably the correlation of names with objects,  and it  may 
seem that he goes on to argue that these more primitive operations are 
possible  only  because  the  world  possesses  certain  characteristics. 
However, it will be clear on reflection that such arguments would be 
the sort of metaphysics that he condemns.251
250 McGuinness (1981), p.63.
251 McGuinness (1981), p.63.
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If  McGuinness  is  correct,  Wittgenstein’s  metaphysical  commitments  are 
meant to be read ironically or dismissively once we recognise their place in 
the picture we are finally meant to abandon.
[7.3] Rejecting the Supposed Choice
We have in play an apparent choice between competing interpretations of the 
Tractatus. What is the relationship between language and the world? How do 
the names of our language have the meaning they do? One option is to ascribe 
explanatory priority to world; the other to ascribe explanatory priority to the 
use of names in language. Evaluation of the disagreement has to start with the 
Tractatus itself. Unfortunately both sides of this dispute can point to sections 
of the book for support.
Pears’  view  will  appear  to  receive  support  from  the  picture  or 
representational theory of meaning. For example:
2.15 That the elements of the picture are combined with one another 
in a definite  way,  represents  that  the things are so combined 
with one another. […] 
2.1511 Thus the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it.
Not only is the aim of the picture theory to represent how things are in the 
world,  but  the  success  of  the  picture  depends  on  its  having  something 
identical with what it is picturing.  Chapter Five spent some time working out 
the implications of this. For our current purposes, there is no suggestion that 
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the picture sets the standard for the world to meet. If anything it appears to be 
the other way round. 
Ishiguro and McGuinness’ view could be taken to derive support from 
the context principle at TLP 3.3: “Only the proposition has sense; only in the 
context of a proposition has a name meaning.” This, if taken as a comment on 
reference, could plausibly be taken as saying that a name only refers in the 
context of its occurrence in a proposition. The following might also be taken 
as support for the Ishiguro / McGuinness line:
3.326 In order to recognise the symbol in the sign we must consider 
the significant use. 
3.327 The sign determines a logical form only together with its logical 
syntactic application. 
3.328 If  a  sign  is  not  necessary then  it  is  meaningless.  That  is  the 
meaning  of  Occam’s  razor.  (If  everything  in  the  symbolism 
works as though a sign had meaning, then it has meaning.)
This seems to be suggesting that if the symbolism we employ works just as if a 
name stood for an object, then that name does indeed stand for an object. It 
might  then  read Wittgenstein  as  saying that  use is  primary  and reference 
secondary. 
The Tractatus has evidence in favour of that both interpretative stances. 
What we need, then, is a critical evaluation of the two views: whether either is 
plausible as a view and whether either is plausible as Wittgenstein’s view. I 
will use Pears’ criticisms of his opponents to frame this discussion. The shape 
of my discussion will be to accept Pears’ criticisms but resist his conclusions. 
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Let  us  start  with  the  context  principle  and  what  impact  it  has  on 
‘world-driven’  versus  ‘language-driven’  interpretations.  Pears  accepts  that 
any  satisfactory  interpretation  of  the  context  principle  must  start  by 
recognising it  as  a  rejection of  a  Russellian view where  the attachment  of 
names  to  objects  is  like  the  attaching  of  labels  to  luggage,  all  the  work 
required for reference being completed once the labels are attached. Ishiguro 
and McGuinness, as we have seen, read the context principle as saying that 
“there  is  no  securing  of  reference  prior  to  occurrence  in  a  proposition.”252 
Pears maintains that we can allow for the recognition without going as far as 
the ‘language-driven’ interpretation. This, apparently more subtle, reading of 
the  context  principle  allows  for  a  Russellian  ‘ceremony’  where  a  name is 
attached to an object. But the name will continue to represent the object only if 
the name occurs in propositions in a way that displays real possibilities for 
the object. That is: the name must remain faithful to the inherent possibilities 
of the object. 
If 3.3 is taken in this way, it qualifies the direct attachment of names to 
objects but does not replace it with something completely different. The 
initial  act  of  attachment  is  necessary  for  representation  but  not 
sufficient.253
It is not immediately obvious what Pears means here. Matters are meant to be 
made  clearer  by  analogy  with  the  geometry  of  a  painting  of  a  room.  An 
individual dot of paint is to be correlated with a particular point in the room. 
252 McGuinness (1981), p.66.
253 Pears (1987), p.103.
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For example, a spot of blue paint is to stand for a part of my coffee mug. The 
overall message conveyed by the painting depends on the painting of other 
dots correlated with their own individual points in the room – another part of 
my mug, a point of the table and so on. “Now the qualification works like 
this:  the  painted  dots  must  present  real  possibilities  for  the  points  out 
there.”254  I  think  Pears  has  something  of  the  following in  mind.  There  is 
indeed  a  kind  of  ceremony  or  naming  game  that  takes  place.  This  name 
stands for this object, that name for that object, and so on. What the context 
principle amounts to, for Pears’ reading of Wittgenstein, is a qualification that 
the ceremony is required to link a name with its object but in and of itself it 
would never be enough to maintain that link. The link is held in place by the 
name remaining faithful  to  the  object  –  remaining faithful  to  the inherent 
possibilities of the object in question. And that is achieved by recognising in 
what contexts one can deploy the name meaningfully.
What evidence might be offered in favour of this reading of the context 
principle against that offered by McGuinness and Ishiguro? In the Notebooks 
Wittgenstein appears reluctant to push logical analysis to a point where the 
objects to which names are attached are not identifiable. For example:
My difficulty surely consists in this: In all propositions that occur to me 
there  occur  names,  which,  however,  must  disappear  on  further 
analysis. I know that such a further analysis is possible, but am unable 
to carry it out completely. In spite of this I certainly seem to know that 
if the analysis were completely carried out, its result would have to be 
a proposition which once more contained names, relations, etc. In brief 
254 Pears (1987), p.76.
208
it looks as if in this way I knew a form without being acquainted with 
any single example of it.
I  see  that  the  analysis  can  be  carried  further,  and can,  so  to 
speak, not imagine its leading to anything different from the species of 
propositions that I am familiar with.255
Part  of  what  appears  to  be  happening  in  this  remark  is  Wittgenstein’s 
awareness that complete analysis, even though it must be possible, is beyond 
his current capacity. But, argues Pears,  nothing in this passage or passages 
like it completely rules out being able to independently identify objects. It is 
not as though Wittgenstein is telling us that in principle such identification is 
impossible, rather that in practice we appear unable to do it. So, for Pears, a 
Russellian  ceremony is  not  being  ruled  out  by anything that  Wittgenstein 
says.
That a ‘ceremony’ itself presents little problem for the system of the 
Tractatus is suggested by the following: 
2.02331 Either a thing has properties which no other has, and then one 
can distinguish it straight away from the others by a description 
and refer to it;  or, on the other hand, there are several things 
which have the totality of their properties in common, and then 
it is quite impossible to point to any one of them.
As Pears quite rightly points out, this remark allows for one to identify an 
object by a definite description that it happens to uniquely satisfy. Ishiguro 
claims that objects cannot be given by definite description, on the Tractarian 
conception, because they are ‘independent of what is the case’. Her argument 
must be roughly this: Objects exist independently of what is the case. Objects 
255 NB, 16th June 1915.
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must, therefore, be identified independently of what is the case. Identification 
by  definite  description  is  not  independent  of  what  is  the  case.  Therefore, 
objects cannot be identified by definite description. Pears swiftly rejects this 
line  of  reasoning.  There  is  nothing  here  that  rules  out  using  definite 
descriptions  to  identify  objects  in  the  manner  of  2.02331.  Moreover,  just 
because something necessarily exists does not debar it from being picked out 
in such a way: “The necessary existence of the number 5 does not stop us 
telling a child that it is the number of toes on one foot.”256
Stemming from this disagreement over the context principle is Pears’ 
second  objection  to  the  ‘language-driven’  interpretation.  Ishiguro  and 
McGuinness maintain the following:
The  Tractatus view entails that it is the use of the Name which gives 
you the identity of the object rather than vice versa.257
Wittgenstein  does  indeed  mention  that  states  of  affairs  are 
combinations  of  objects  and  introduces  objects  themselves  into  the 
Tractatus before he says anything about the necessity for a proposition 
to be articulated and to consist of simple signs, but I believe that the 
order of his exposition reverses the order of his thinking.258
These remarks concern what we might call ‘direction of explanation’.  What 
Ishiguro  and  McGuinness  are  suggesting,  or  at  least  not  distancing 
themselves  from,  is  that  the  use  of  a  name  in  propositions  explains  or 
determines what object the name stands for. The reference of a name will be 
the object that meets the standard set by the use of the name in propositions. 
256 Pears (1987), p.107.
257 Ishiguro (1969), p.34.
258 McGuinness (1981), p.65.
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Pears’  objection  is  that  such  a  reading  cannot  be  reconciled  with 
Wittgenstein’s heavy emphasis on the contact between names and objects. For 
Pears,  names  represent  objects  by  being  attached  to  them  and  through 
continuous respect for the inherent possibilities of the objects:
4.0311 One name stands for one thing, and another for another thing, 
and they are connected together. And so the whole, like a living 
picture, presents the atomic fact.
As Pears rhetorically asks: “How could this possibly be said by anyone who 
believed that the references of the names were fixed after this bit of language 
had been set up?”259 The image suggested by 4.0311 is that a name picks out 
an object and the names combined together present a picture of the way the 
world is. To suggest that language is up and running before the references of 
the names are established – as Ishiguro and McGuinness seem to do – flies in 
the face of this. 
It is actually worthwhile pausing to consider the option we are now 
rejecting. What  would it mean to say that the references of names are fixed 
only  after the  relevant  tract  of  language  had  been  ‘set  up’?  To  ‘set  up’  a 
language must mean to construct a list of names, rules for how the names 
function,  how the  names  may legitimately  be  combined,  establish  various 
connectives and so on. We are being asked, on the ‘language-driven’ view, to 
imagine  all  that  being  in  play  yet  the  references  of  the  names  remaining 
undecided. But that just seems implausible. The whole point of constructing a 
259 Pears (1987), p.109.
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language is to talk about things, convey to others our thoughts on the passing 
show. To put it another way: ascribing reference to the names of our language 
cannot come after the language is up and running because it is part and parcel 
of constructing a language in the first place. 
Pears  criticisms  are  useful  not  just  because  they  successfully 
demonstrate how the opponent to his view is mistaken as interpretation of 
Wittgenstein, but they also serve to show that such a view is implausible as it 
stands.  It  is  worthwhile  noting  a  related  concern.  Dummett  subjects 
Tugendhat’s reading to detailed and rather devastating criticism. McGuinness 
(in  his  grafting  of  Tugendhat’s  Frege  onto  Wittgenstein)  actually  omits 
discussion of Dummett’s central objection: that Tugendhat’s account misses 
the  whole  point  of  Frege’s  introduction  of  Bedeutung.  Tugendhat’s  view 
amounts to assuming that the job of determining the truth-values of sentences 
has already been done; the whole semantic account of the language has been 
set out. This is because ‘truth-value potential’ can only be introduced after the 
semantics  of  the  language  have  been  given.  Frege  held  that  sentences 
containing names without a bearer do not admit of being true or false. To get 
this result would require the notion of a bearer of a name to already be in 
play.  In  the  case  of  proper  names,  then,  Frege’s  Bedeutung as  the  relation 
between a name and an object in the world must already be deployed.
Thus  the  primary  purpose  for  which  the  notion  of  reference  was 
introduced  has  been  assigned  to  something  else,  no  longer  called 
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‘reference’,  while  the  notion  of  the  truth-value  potential,  which has 
usurped this name, no longer has this function to perform.260   
The point of  Bedeutung, for Frege, is to point at something beyond language 
and  is  inexorably  linked  to  what  Dummett  calls  “Frege’s  realism”261.  For 
Dummett,  Frege  thinks  that  a  concept,  a  relation  or  a  function  is  ‘wholly 
extra-linguistic’ – in that the existence of such things does not depend on our 
having an expression for them as they are part of the real world. The only 
way we can grasp, say, what a referent of a predicate is is via language – but 
it  remains  independent  of  language.  Although  we  conceive  of  it  through 
language  we  take  it  as  an  expression  concerning  a  part  of  reality.  On 
Tugendhat’s interpretation of Frege, all this is lost. Truth-value potential is 
ineradicably language-dependent. As Dummett rather nicely concludes:
In philosophy we must always resist the temptation of hitting on an 
answer to the question how we can define such and such a notion, an 
answer which supplies a smooth and elegant definition which entirely 
ignores the purpose which we originally wanted the notion for.262
  
To summarise this in terms of what has gone before: ‘Truth-value potential’ 
(or,  we  might  say,  semantic  equivalence)  can  only  be  introduced  after 
language has been ‘set up’. But reference is different in precisely this regard: it 
cannot be introduced after such a process because the whole point of setting 
up a language is to talk about things in the world.  
260 Dummett (1981), p.202.
261 Dummett (1981), p.200.
262 Dummett (1981), p.203.
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I have suggested that the ‘language-driven’ view is not only mistaken 
but cannot be faithful to the author of the Tractatus. Must we now accept that 
the ‘world-driven’ view is the one Wittgenstein in fact endorsed? I think not. 
Earlier I quoted a passage from the Tractatus which Pears deploys against the 
‘language-driven’  view  of  Ishiguro  and  McGuinness.  A  similar  remark 
appears in the Notebooks:
One name is representative of one thing, another of another thing, and 
they  themselves  are  connected;  in  this  way  the  whole  images  the 
situation – like a tableau vivant.
The  logical  connection  must,  of  course,  be  one  that  is  possible  as 
between the things that the names are representatives of, and this will 
always  be  the  case  if  the  names  really  are  representatives  of  the 
things.263
This  does  indeed  point  against  Ishiguro  and  McGuinness.  Unfortunately, 
Pears  recoils  too far from that  interpretation.  Pears  tells  us that  the above 
quotation makes clear
that the things, with their inherent possibilities of combination, are the 
dominant partners in their relations with names. It also explains why 
the Tractatus begins with an account of objects and does not introduce 
pictures  until  2.1.  The  opening  ontology  is  not  something  we  are 
supposed to discount because it is an attempt to say things that can 
only be shown.264
But why think that Wittgenstein’s remarks point to a ‘world-driven’ story of 
explanation?  Certainly,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  anyone  who  endorsed  a 
‘language-driven’  view  of  these  matters  coming  out  with  such  remarks. 
263 NB, 4th November 1914.
264 Pears (1987), p.112.
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Names and objects must be connected so as to respect the way the objects are. 
But that does not entail that the objects are in anyway prior to the workings of 
our language. Pears’ mistake is to assume that just because Wittgenstein fails 
to offer priority in one direction that he must then be offering priority in the 
opposite  direction.  Pears  is  fond  of  calling  his  view  the  ‘middle  ground 
interpretation’,  with  Ishiguro  and  McGuinness  on  one  extreme  flank,  the 
equation  of  objects  with  sense-data  on  the  other.  But  a  genuine  middle 
ground would say that there is no priority at all.
Let me try and expand on this further. We have already seen Ishiguro 
and McGuinness claim that securing the referent of a name independently of 
its occurrence in a proposition is ruled out by the Tractatus:
[The  Tractatus] does not suppose that the elementary propositions in 
which use is made of certain names are connected with reality by the 
correlation of those names with objects independently identifiable. This 
is  because  the notion of  independent  identification of  objects  in the 
TLP sense is  an incoherent  one.  Only in a proposition does a name 
have meaning, so that there cannot be a pre-propositional act of giving 
a meaning to a name by, for example, pointing to an object.265
Pears wants to reject such a reading of Wittgenstein. For him, and as we have 
seen, Wittgenstein does indeed allow independent identification of objects (by 
definite description). But what could such a rejection amount to? We have a 
disagreement  over  ‘securing  the  reference  of  a  term  independently  of  the 
context  of  use  of  that  term.’  But  what  should  one  say  about  that  issue 
irrespective of the peculiarities of the Tractatus? It must come down to what 
265 McGuinness (1985), p.136.
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we take ‘securing a reference’ to mean. If ‘securing’ simply meant attaching a 
name  to  an  object  in  some  kind  of  ceremony  then  it  does  indeed  look 
plausible that one might secure the reference of a term independently of the 
context of its use. That looks more like  stipulating  than  securing  a reference 
though. This stands for this, that stands for that, and so on. We have already 
seen that this would not be good enough even for Pears. In order to secure a 
reference,  for his interpretation,  one must maintain the link between name 
and object. But another reading naturally presents itself here. In this sense, 
‘securing a reference’ is not like attaching a label to baggage or even attaching 
and  then  remaining  faithful  to  the  inherent  possibilities  of  the  baggage. 
Rather, it means placing it within the context of a whole language, how the 
corresponding  name  can  be  deployed  within  a  language.  We  ought  to 
recognise that attaching a reference to a name is part and parcel  of, rather 
than a separate step from, setting up a language. And if this is what is meant 
by  ‘securing’  nobody  ought  to  claim  that  the  referent  of  a  name  can  be 
secured ‘independently’ of its occurrence in propositions. We use words in 
propositions all the time, to somehow think that we could settle and maintain 
a link between names and their objects independently of such contexts looks 
both perverse and impossible. 
To put this in terms that have gone before: as far as Pears is correct to 
say that no view that the references of names are settled  after language has 
been  set  up  can  sensibly  be  attributed  to  Wittgenstein,  Pears  is  wrong to 
propose that  the references  of  names are settled  before language is up and 
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running. The correct answer has to be that the references of names are settled 
along with or as part of the setting up of language. Both the ‘language-driven’ 
and  ‘world-driven’  views  look  unpalatable  in  and  of  themselves  and  as 
interpretations of Wittgenstein. What we ought to do is reject the choice. But 
what are we to say then about the relationship between language and the 
world? 
[7.4] A McDowellian Understanding
I’ll take my cue from a suitably pithy remark in McDowell’s Mind and World. 
Having raised for discussion the view, roughly, that the kind of things one 
can think depends on the way the world is, McDowell comments:
The Tractatus is often read on these lines … Opponents of the kind of 
reading Pears gives sometimes tend to find in the Tractatus a thesis of 
priority in the opposite direction, or at least not to distinguish their 
interpretations  clearly  from  this  kind  of  thing.  (That  might  merit  a 
protest of idealism.) But I doubt whether either claim of priority is to 
be found in the Tractatus.266
This doubt of McDowell’s final sentence is the very position we find ourselves 
in. Before going further it might be instructive to pause over ‘priority’. The 
kind  of  priority  I  have  focused  on  so  far  is  one  of  explanation.  That  is,  a 
priority where  a is needed to explain  b. In order to explain why my coffee 
mug fails onto my office floor when I drop it I need to invoke a discussion of 
gravity.  McDowell’s  point,  or  at  least  part  of  it,  is  that  the  author  of  the 
Tractatus would have no truck for explanatory priority in any direction.  How 
266 McDowell (1994), p.28, footnote 5,.
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might this work? The idea must be that we don’t need a to explain b or  b to 
explain a because neither a nor b can be explained without the other. They are 
already interdependently meshed together. In our case, we cannot explain the 
structure of our language without the world yet equally we cannot explain 
the layout of the world without our language. This idea could also be cashed 
out in terms of conceptual priority. That is: I cannot conceive of b without first 
conceiving of  a.  The ‘world-driven’ view would be that one simply cannot 
conceive of language prior to or independently of the world; the ‘language-
driven’  view the opposite.  McDowell’s  suggestion should then  be  read as 
saying that we cannot conceive of the world without language, yet equally we 
cannot conceive of language without the world. One is not independent or 
prior to the other, both must stand or fall at the same time. 
But how can we offer a satisfactory account of the relationship between 
us and the world without accepting some priority one way or the other? It 
appears as though there is a gulf between the workings of our language and 
the world. The natural way of thinking here is that one side must be prior to 
the other; a secure foundation from which to bridge the divide.
Ordinary  modern philosophy addresses  its  derivative  dualisms in a 
characteristic way. It  takes its stand on one side of a gulf it aims to 
bridge,  accepting  without  question  the  way  its  target  dualism 
conceives  the  chosen side.  Then it  constructs  something  as  close  as 
possible  to  the  conception  of  the  other  side  that  figured  in  the 
problems, out of materials that are unproblematically available where 
it has taken its stand.267 
267 McDowell (1994), p.94.
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McDowell’s  suggestion, I  think, is that there is no gulf to cross in the first 
place  and hence  no need to  start  from one side  or  the other,  using those 
resources to construct a bridge. That may appear to be reductionism: on the 
one  hand we  could  attempt  to  reduce  language  to  the  world  –  language 
amounts to a mere mapping of the way the world is – on the other we could 
attempt to reduce the world to the workings of our language (and that might 
indeed merit a protest of idealism). Reductionism would attempt to remove 
the  apparent  gulf,  but  it  is  clearly  not  what  McDowell  has  in  mind.  His 
suggestion would be that our language and the world are already intertwined 
and connected such that there is no need to cross a gulf. Yet this is so without 
impinging on either side and without making one explainable by the other.   
All this talk of bridges and gulfs and divides is admittedly sketchy. We 
ought  to  bring  some  of  this  imagery  back  down  to  Earth.  What,  in 
McDowell’s eyes, would the faulty pictures look like here? The ‘world-driven’ 
view defended by Pears  says something like this:  we start  with a naming 
game and  then  go  on  to  build  a  language  out  of  it.  So  I  would  start  by 
assigning names to objects by definite description. I would then have a list of 
names and what  they stand for.  ‘Mug’  stands for  this  object  on my desk, 
‘window’ stands for the thing I’m gazing out of most days, and so on. Once I 
have completed that stage, I have a long list of names, I then go on to create a 
language. This is faulty, at least in part, for McDowell because it purports to 
start  from  a  position  prior  to  the  mastery  of  language  –  that  we  could 
somehow  conceive  of  the  relation  between  reality  and  our  way  of 
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characterising it  without already having a mastery  of  communication.  The 
‘language-driven’  view  offered  by  Ishiguro  and  McGuinness  starts  with 
propositions  that  make sense  and works  in  the  opposite  direction.  So  we 
proceed by listing all those propositions that make sense. For example: ‘My 
mug is red’, ‘That book has a red cover’, ‘The post-box is red’ and so on. Once 
we have established in which propositional contexts a word can meaningfully 
figure we can then go on to establish what the name refers to. This is wrong 
for  McDowell,  I  think,  because  it  starts  from  a  position  where  we  can 
communicate with one another yet is supposedly prior to talking about the 
world.  As  McDowell  puts  it  in  “Anti-Realism  and  the  Epistemology  of 
Understanding”: 
in theorizing about the relation of our language to the world, we must 
start in the middle, already equipped with command of a language; we 
cannot refrain from exploiting that prior equipment, in thinking about 
the  practice,  without  losing our hold  on the sense that  the practice 
makes.268 
McDowell claims that we cannot but start from such a position – a position 
already  encompassing  mastery  of  a  language.  If  we  adopted  (better: 
attempted to adopt) the position of a detached exile the whole project would 
come crashing down around our ears. 
The thought I want to extract from McDowell’s remark in  Mind and 
World is a relatively straightforward one. We were faced with what looked 
like a choice: either the  Tractatus maintains that reality sets the standard for 
268 McDowell (1998b), p.330.
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our language to meet or, alternatively, our language dictates to reality. The 
McDowellian thought is that we need not come down in support of either of 
those  dubious  views.  There  is  simply  no  priority  in  either  direction.  The 
question now is whether the  Tractatus really held the kind of view we have 
developed out of McDowell’s remarks.
One  advantage  of  the  McDowellian  reading  is  that  it  allows  us  to 
accept  what is  right  in  both the Pears  and Ishiguro/McGuinness accounts, 
instead  of  having  to  choose  between  them.  Ishiguro  and  McGuinness  are 
clearly correct in holding that the names of the Tractatus are indeed peculiar 
items, and reference to them is not a straightforward manner. Ishiguro is also 
right  in  her  claim  that  cashing  out  the  contrast  between  the  early 
Wittgensteinian theory of meaning and the latter as one between a ‘naming’ 
theory and a ‘use’ theory is misleading. There is indeed a ‘use’ element to the 
Tractatus,  although not  as  developed  or  as  comprehensive  as  in  the  latter 
work. We can also accept that Pears is right to recoil from the fully-fledged 
‘language-driven’ interpretation. The Tractatus assigns no priority to language 
over reality. In short, this interpretation offers us the opportunity to take what 
is right from the two competitors – give full justice to those parts of the book 
which appear to support their interpretations – without thereby accruing all 
their faults.   
Moreover,  a  McDowellian  reading  of  the  relationship  between 
language and reality in the Tractatus creates space for a much more satisfying 
reading of the context principle than that offered by the two competitors. On 
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the one side, the ‘language-driven’ view gives too much weight to the context 
principle as a principle concerning reference.  Ishiguro and McGuinness do 
not give proper content to Wittgenstein’s insistence on the strong connection 
between  a  name and its  object.  On the  other  side,  Pears’  interpretation  is 
deeply unsatisfying because it relegates the context principle in Wittgenstein’s 
thought  to  something  little  more  than  an  amending  principle.  I  think  the 
understanding generated along McDowellian lines offers the possibility of a 
satisfying  middle  ground  between  uncompromising  contextualist  and 
uncritical  realist  interpretations of the context  principle.   To explain this,  I 
want to start with this question: Why ought we to feel uncomfortable with 
‘uncompromising contextualism’? Moreover, what is ‘uncompromising’ about 
the reading offered by Ishiguro and McGuinness? 
Dummett has remarked that the context principle of Grundlagen is too 
‘thin’  for  the  kind  of  realism  about  mathematical  objects  Frege  wishes  to 
adopt.
The context principle, as enunciated in Grundlagen, can be interpreted 
as saying that questions about the meaning (Bedeutung) of a term or 
class of terms are, when legitimate, internal to the language.269 
For the Frege of this period, we know the meaning of a term when we know 
the conditions for the truth of any sentence containing that term. So, argues 
Dummett, any legitimate question regarding what the reference of a term is 
must be reducible to a question within the framework of language. But why is 
269 Dummett (1991a), p.192.
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this ‘thin’? On this rendering of the context principle, ‘ “The direction of  a” 
refers  to  something’  must  be  true  because  it  reduces  to  ‘The  line  a has  a 
direction’.  ‘  “The direction of  a” refers  to  the direction of  a’  comes out  as 
trivial because it simply reduces to ‘The direction of  a is the direction of  a’. 
Dummett  claims that  this  makes  the  context  principle  analogous  with  the 
redundancy theory of truth. That theory is ‘thin’ in the sense that ‘p is true’ 
just  reduces  to  ‘p’.  The  ‘thin’  reading  does  nothing  more  than  oppose 
nominalism.  Hence  it  is  questionable  whether  the  kind  of  realism  Frege 
defends is really supported by the context principle of Grundlagen.
Dummett argues that we need to adopt a more ‘robust’ reading if we 
are to make the context principle (as a comment on reference) viable as the 
basis  for the kind of  realism Frege wants.  The idea is  that  identifying the 
referent of a term must be seen as an ‘ingredient’ in coming to recognise the 
truth-value  of  a  sentence  in  which the  term occurs.  It  is  simply not  good 
enough, this thought runs, that our language works and the fact that it works 
guarantees that the terms we employ have a genuine reference. What we also 
need,  this  ‘robust’  story  demands,  is  an  explanation  of  how it  is  that  the 
referent of the term plays the role it does,  an explanation of our language 
working as it does. As Dummett puts it:
It  is not enough that truth-conditions should have been assigned, in 
some  manner  or  other,  to  all  sentences  containing  the  term:  it  is 
necessary also that they should have been specified in such a way as to 
admit  a  suitable  notion  of  identifying  the  referent  of  the  term  as 
playing a role  in the determination of  the truth-value of  a  sentence 
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containing it. With that further condition, the context principle ceases 
to be incoherent. 270
It is difficult to grasp what Dummett really means here. But I  think  I have a 
similar  concern  over  Ishiguro  and  McGuinness’  interpretation  of 
Wittgenstein’s context principle. Their interpretation, at least as far as I have 
characterised it in this chapter,  holds that the reference of a term is settled 
merely by looking at how the term is used in various propositional contexts. 
Moreover, if the term functions as if it genuinely refers to an object then it 
does in fact refer to an object. Such a principle fails to explain or account for 
how the objects the names stand for play a role in settling those contexts, how 
the world influences and moulds our language. It fails to offer an account of 
reference which is a matter of combination between us and the world. And, to 
deploy Dummett’s terminology, the principle in Ishiguro/McGuinness’ hands 
is too thin for what Wittgenstein required of it.
The obvious alternative  is  to  claim that  the context  principle  of  the 
Tractatus is, in Dummett’s sense, robust. As a comment on reference, it would 
be  saying  the  following:  a  name  refers  only  insofar  as  it  appears  in 
meaningful propositions, but it must be explained how the referent of that 
name plays  a  role  in  that  proposition  being  meaningful.  And,  again,  this 
interpretation allows us to accept what is right on either side of the debate, 
without also having to accept what looks clearly unpalatable.  Ishiguro and 
McGuinness are right that Wittgenstein was heavily influenced by Frege and 
‘bought  into’  the  context  principle  completely.  Pears  is  also  right  that 
270 Dummett (1991a), p.239.
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Wittgenstein,  in the  Tractatus,  was clearly heavily influenced by the strong 
relationship between  a  name and its  bearer.  But  in  order  to  respect  these 
insights  we do not  need  to  offer  an  extreme form of  contextualism or  an 
extreme form of realism.   
I  will  not  pretend  to  have  convinced  anyone that  the  McDowellian 
understanding of the Tractatus proposed here is the correct one. There would 
need to be a working out of the position through close textual analysis of the 
book  to  support  such  a  claim.  (That  strikes  me  as  a  worthwhile  research 
project.)  What I do hope to have shown, however, is that there is space for 
such an interpretation, that it avoids the pitfalls whilst reaping the benefits of 
other interpretations, and has no obvious flaws.
We began with the question: ‘How much of a realist was the author of 
the Tractatus?’ The conclusion is that Ishiguro and McGuinness are correct in 
claiming that the Tractatus seeks to undermine a certain kind of realism. This 
is the ‘uncritical’ or ‘basic’ realism that Pears attributes to Wittgenstein, where 
reality is prior to (dictates to) our language. But undermining that kind of 
realism  does  not  push  Wittgenstein  to  the  other  extreme.  Against 
McGuinness, Wittgenstein’s talk of the ‘realm of reference’ is not mere myth 
or empty rhetoric. We do succeed in talking about reality; our propositions 
are true or false in virtue of the way objects are combined in the world. Such 
objects are not merely a reflection of our ways of speaking about them. In 
other words: rejecting uncritical realism does not entail idealism. Moreover, 
225
once we consider the realism being rejected we might well wonder whether 
we should have ever been attracted to it in the first place.  
The  question  of  realism  was  raised  as  a  reaction  to,  and 
disappointment  with,  the  supposed  conflict  between  so-called  ‘new’  and 
‘traditional’  interpretations  of  the  Tractatus.  Our  initial  engagement  with 
Diamond did not bring into play the kind of issues that were the focus of Part 
One. Our current discussion, as I will go on to show in the next two sections, 
does however get the relevant issues in play. 
[7.5] The View From ‘Sideways-On’.
Sullivan has argued that establishing that the Tractatus “rejects any ‘side-on’ 
perspective is easy.”271 How so?
2.173 The picture represents its object from without (its standpoint is 
its form of representation),  therefore the picture represents its 
object rightly or falsely.
2.174 But  the  picture  cannot  place  itself  outside  of  its  form  of 
representation.
The form of a picture amounts to a standpoint on the reality it represents. The 
picture cannot, as it were, step outside of its own form. This places restrictions 
on what can and cannot  be represented from a certain  point  of  view.  But 
nothing here immediately looks like a view from ‘sideways-on’, in the sense 
developed  in  Chapter  Three  through  engagement  with  Dummett  and 
expanded through evaluation of McDowell in Chapter Four, as it leaves open 
271 Sullivan (2005), p.54.
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the option of moving to a different standpoint to represent what we could not 
represent from the original standpoint. But Sullivan now asks us to consider:
4.12 Propositions  can represent  the whole reality,  but  they cannot 
represent what they must have in common with reality in order 
to be able to represent it – the logical form.
To be able to represent the logical form, we should have to be 
able to put ourselves outside logic, that is outside the world.
Wittgenstein,  as  we examined in Chapter  Five,  is  insistent  that  the logical 
form of a proposition – that which the proposition must share with the reality 
it  is  representing  so  as  to  be  a  representation  of  it  –  cannot  itself  be 
represented. This highlights just how all-embracing the logical perspective is 
for Wittgenstein: there is only one logical perspective, the logical perspective, 
out  of  which  we  cannot  stand.  “We  cannot  think  anything  unlogical,  for 
otherwise we should have to think unlogically.”272 So we could, as it were, 
shuffle around within the logical perspective, getting different standpoints on 
our propositions. But what is being ruled out here by Wittgenstein is the idea 
that we can step outside of the singular unity of the logical perspective.
In  this  way,  establishing  that  the  author  of  the  Tractatus  rejected  a 
general view  from  ‘sideways-on’  is  indeed  easy.  To  step  outside  of  logic 
would be an attempt to view logic from the outside, from ‘sideways-on’. The 
shape  of  this  thought  is  analogous  with  that  developed  in  Part  One:  an 
attempt to step outside a practice and reflect on that practice. Recognising the 
impossibility of such a positioning with regard to logic is a general instance of 
272 TLP 3.03
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rejecting the view from ‘sideways-on’. Sullivan claims that any view of logic 
from ‘sideways-on’ is  rejected by the  Tractatus.  But  further  examination is 
required.  From all  that  has  been  said so  far  it  seems one  could  reject  the 
general conception of a view from ‘sideways-on’ – one where we, as it were, 
step outside of logic – yet advocate a specific kind of ‘sideways-on’ stances 
towards particular logical principles.
By way of example,  consider  Dummett’s  paper “The Justification of 
Deduction”.  The  central  question  there  is  how  both  the  validity  and 
usefulness  of  deductive  argument  can  be  accounted  for:  “How  can  any 
process possess both these features at once?”273 We naturally think that,  in 
some sense, the premises of deductive inference contain the conclusion, yet, at 
the  same  time,  deduction  is  a  fruitful  exercise  which  can  advance  our 
knowledge and understanding. Frege says that the connection is “as plants 
are contained in their seeds, but not as beams are contained in a house.”274 
Dummett complains that more is needed than mere analogy.
Dummett  sets  up  a  debate  between  views  labelled  ‘holism’  and 
‘molecularism’ about language. Holism argues that 
the meaning of an individual sentence is characterised by the totality of 
all  possible  ways  within  the  language  for  establishing  its  truth, 
including ones which involve deductive inference.275
The idea is that we cannot give or explain the meaning of a sentence fully 
without an account of the language of which it forms a part. Molecularism 
273 Dummett (1978), p.301.
274 Frege (1963), §88.
275 Dummett (1978), p.302.
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argues  that  each  sentence  possesses  an  individual  content  which  may  be 
grasped without knowledge of the entire language. Holism does seem to offer 
an answer to Dummett’s question. Deduction is useful because it allows us to 
arrive at firm conclusions; it is justified because it is part of an overall practice 
which is itself  justified.  Dummett  complains,  however,  that these apparent 
benefits  only  come at  great  cost.  Holism,  he  argues,  removes  our  natural 
inclination  to  seek  a  justification  of  deduction  because  there  simply  is  no 
justification for it  beyond the general justification of the language. Indeed, 
there  will  be no specific  justifications for  any of  our practices.  Dummett’s 
main problem with Holism is that it has thus forbidden us from offering a 
theory of meaning whatsoever. For:
No sentence  can  be  considered  as  saying  anything  on  its  own:  the 
smallest unit  which can be taken as saying something is the totality of 
sentences  believed,  at  any  given  time,  to  be  true;  and  of  what  this 
complex totality says no representation is possible -  we are part of the 
mechanism, and cannot view it from outside.276
Holism presents language as a bubble from which we cannot escape to give a 
representation of it. But equally we cannot move around within the bubble to 
justify or account for certain aspects of language, for the justification of one 
aspect is justification for all, accounting for one fragment of language involves 
accounting  for  it  all.  In  contrast,  argues  Dummett,  molecularism  at  least 
pushes  us  in  the  natural  direction  of  giving  justification  for  particular 
276 Dummett (1978), p.309.
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practices like deduction, and leaves open the possibility of giving a theory of 
meaning. Holism is just too pessimistic.
It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  even  on the  molecular  view complete 
independence is impossible. The meaning of a sentence depends on meanings 
of  the  words  involved,  the  words  themselves  feature  in  other  sentences. 
Dummett accepts that the fragments of language might be large. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to such a molecular view that there must be, 
for each sentence,  a representation of its  individual  content which is 
independent  of  a  description  of  the  entire  language  to  which  the 
sentence belongs[.]277
To put this in context with what has gone before: Dummett can accept that we 
cannot ‘step outside’ of logic but reject the idea that there is one all-embracing 
logical  perspective.  The idea appears  to be that different  fragments of our 
language  can  be  accounted  for  without  assuming  any  knowledge  of  the 
content of those fragments. More generally, different parts of logic could be 
brought into consideration independently of other areas of logic. This does 
not mean all of logic can be questioned in one go, no more than a ship at sea 
can be completely dismantled and reconstructed in one go, for there would be 
nowhere to stand to carry out such an investigation. But it does mean we can 
move  about  within  the  framework  of  logic  (analogous  to  moving  about 
onboard the ship) to ask for independent justification of individual fragments 
(to reconstruct this part or that whilst remaining afloat). 
277 Dummett (1978), p.304.
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In  conclusion,  showing  that  the  Tractatus rules  out  a  very  general 
‘sideways-on’ perspective on logic is, as Sullivan suggests, a straight-forward 
matter. Settling whether the book rules out other, more specific instances, of 
viewing certain domains from ‘sideways-on’ is not so easy. He could, for all 
that  has so far  been  said,  agree  with Dummett  and maintain that  specific 
‘sideways-on’ stances on particular logical principles are possible. At a more 
general  level,  whether  Wittgenstein  in the  Tractatus was concerned by the 
same ‘sideways-on’ standpoint that concerned him later in the  Investigations 
has yet to be considered.
[7.6] Wittgenstein and Idealism
Part One ended with the following thought: to give interesting and plausible 
content  to  Wittgenstein’s  remarks  on  rule-following  appears  to  demand 
reading the author of the  Investigations as being influenced by and tempted 
towards  a  kind  of  transcendental  idealism.  What  is  unclear,  however,  is 
whether such idealism was the terminus of Wittgenstein’s thought or rather a 
station to be passed through along the way (philosophical ‘therapy’ is meant 
somehow to reveal  that  transcendental  idealism is  the correct  answer to  a 
misguided  question  that  itself  ought  to  be  abandoned).   The  task  for  this 
section is to question whether evidence for either,  or indeed both, of those 
thoughts  can  be  found  in  the  Tractatus.  I  will  argue  that  there  is  such 
evidence. Before giving the detail, perhaps the general shape of what I want 
to argue will be illuminating. I will want to say that McDowell’s ‘no-priority’ 
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thesis is the kind of realism that is the only viable answer at the empirical 
level, at the level of language as a going concern. This realism is to be seen as 
going hand in hand with a kind of transcendental idealism.
Where  does  the  interest  in  idealism  appear  in  the  Tractatus?  The 
obvious place to look is Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism: 
5.62 In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be 
said, but shows itself.
That  the  world  is  my world,  shows itself  in  the  fact  that  the 
limits of the language (the language which I understand) mean 
the limits of my world.
5.64 Here we see that  solipsism strictly carried out coincides with 
pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point 
and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
This chapter has focused on the objects of the Tractatus and how reference to 
them is secured. How are we to get from that to idealism? The answer lies 
with logical form and the all-embracingness of logic: Wittgenstein’s rejection 
of a general ‘sideways-on’ perspective. We have seen Wittgenstein’s logical 
atomism in some detail. Objects are simple and independent of one another. 
But through this independence Wittgenstein builds a kind of unity. Objects 
are the fixed form of the world; as we have seen worlds are distinguished not 
by the objects they contain but by the combination of those objects. “Empirical 
reality is limited by the totality of objects. The boundary appears again in the 
totality of elementary propositions.”278 Crucial to this is Wittgenstein’s notion 
of logical space.  Wittgenstein tells  us that the facts in logical space are the 
278 TLP 5.5561
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world279. “Everything is, as it were, in a space of possible atomic facts. I can 
think of this space as empty, but not of the thing without the space.”280 This 
unity  points  to  the  evidence  needed  to  establish  not  only  the  interest  in 
idealism but Wittgenstein’s holism, the view that places him in opposition to 
Dummett [7.4].
3.42 Although a proposition may only determine one place in logical 
space, the whole logical space must already be given in it.
(Otherwise  denial,  the  logical  sum,  the  logical  product,  etc., 
would always introduce new elements – in co-ordination.)
(The logical scaffolding round the picture determines the logical 
space. The proposition reaches through the whole logical space.)
A proposition only picks out one place in logical space. But all of logical space 
is, in a sense, contained in or given by a single proposition. Wittgenstein’s 
holism is that in assessing one aspect of logic we thereby bring all of logic 
under consideration. There is no possibility of detaching fragments to discuss 
independently of the whole.
5.47 It is clear that everything which can be said beforehand about the 
form of all propositions at all can be said on one occasion.
For  all  logical  operations  are  already  contained  in  the 
elementary  propositions.  For  “fa”  says  the  same as  “(Эx).  fx. 
X=a”.
Where there is composition, there is argument and function, and 
where these are, all logical constants already are.
One  could  say:  the  one  logical  constant  is  that  which  all 
propositions,  according to their nature,  have in common with 
one another.
That however is the general form of proposition. 
279 TLP 1.13
280 TLP 2.013
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This is the all-embracingness of logic and the one single logical perspective. It 
is  in clear  opposition to  Dummett’s  molecularism.  As Moore rather  nicely 
puts it: logic, for Wittgenstein, “is the unity that attends every possibility.”
It is also the unity of the self-consciousness. I recognise it when I view 
the world self-consciously from my own particular point of view, and 
come to see everything as being how it is from that point of view. The 
world’s unity  is the possibility of its being represented from a single 
point  of  view.  What  cannot  be  represented  from my point  of  view 
cannot be represented, and is not part of the world. So the world is my 
world. How things are is how they can be truly represented as being, 
and how they can be truly represented as being is how they can be 
truly represented as being for me. 281   
Our task is to find the connection to idealism. Claims like “the world is  my 
world” certainly have an idealistic ring to them. The image suggested is one 
where the world is framed by my forms of representation. But such a claim is 
liable to strike one as false. Of course, we want to say, reality is not imposed 
on in such a way by us. It would amount to saying I can dictate the way the 
world is.  If  this were Wittgenstein’s view it  would appear to place him in 
direct conflict with the early, metaphysical, sections of the Tractatus. As I have 
laboured  to  show in  this  chapter  those  remarks  point  towards  a  kind  of 
realism,  albeit  not  the  basic  realism  advocated  by  Pears.  Moreover,  5.64 
suggests  a  unity  of  realism  and  idealism  –  that  the  two  strictly  thought 
through coincide. So the kind of realism I have attributed to Wittgenstein is 
supposed to sit comfortably with idealism. 
281 Moore (1997), p.150.
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The  idealism  must,  then,  be  transcendental  in  nature.  Part  of 
understanding that must come from seeing what has happened to the subject 
in statements like ‘the world is my world’. The subject here is not an empirical 
one, one that is part of the world, but rather a metaphysical one. Take the 
example of our visual field (TLP 5.6331). Something is clearly wrong with a 
first-person perspective that places the eye in the visual field.  The eye can 
have no place in a representation of the field as it is the perspective of the 
representation. A genuine first-person perspective would also not have any 
boundary drawn round it. In the same way, the subject should not be placed 
in the world but rather seen as the perspective of the representation of the 
world. So when Wittgenstein claims that ‘the world is my world’ the ‘my’ is 
not me, my physical body, but rather a perspective from which the world is 
viewed. So the idealistic claim is not one about the facts that make up the 
world, but about how the world is possible for us. Roughly the thought is: the 
world reveals a certain character to us, in doing so it reveals that the world 
and my world are one and the same.
In  discussion  of  rule-following  in  Part  One  the  harmony  between 
empirical realism and transcendental idealism was meant to be maintained by 
a distinction between saying and showing. All that could legitimately be said 
from within language as a going concern is ordinarily realist: anything else 
would,  at  best,  amount to spouting falsehoods. The same structure can be 
read in the Tractatus. Chapter Five dealt with the inexpressibility of form. The 
form of  our  propositions  cannot  be  said  but  only  shown.  The suggestion, 
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taken from the remarks on solipsism, is that transcendental idealism exhibits 
the same structure; it cannot be said that idealism is true but it reveals itself 
by showing to us that the world is my world, that I am not something in the 
world but rather something that holds the world together from a transcendent 
perspective.  Now, trying to say something intelligible about transcendental 
idealism,  from the  empirical  standpoint,  is  of  course  to  try  and say  what 
cannot be said. This interpretation of Wittgenstein aims to allow realism and 
idealism to cohere by using the saying / showing distinction.
The  question  arose  with  regard  to  the  Investigations whether 
transcendental idealism was the terminus of Wittgenstein’s thought or a stop 
along the line. A similar question arises with regard to the Tractatus. I want to 
end by sketching a way of developing the view that Wittgenstein ultimately 
‘diagnosed’ the faults  with transcendental  idealism even though he felt  its 
allure. Part Three will continue this discussion in greater detail.  
Say we drew the subject and its world in a way akin to the eye and its 
field of vision. It is clear that the boundary of the subject’s world would not 
be the boundary of all that is case. To capture the world completely would 
require an external perspective on the original drawing. Sullivan takes this 
not to point towards transcendental idealism, but rather show the futility of it:
Wittgenstein  diagnoses  it  instead  as  an  imposition  of  an  external 
representation that distorts the very thing it was invoked to capture, 
the internal connection between thought and the world. Once that is 
recognised  as  a  distortion  one  has  no  further  use  for  the  external 
236
perspective,  and  the  threat  of  the  idealist  reduction  it  carried  then 
simply lapses.282
The crucial point here seems to be the idea that the external representation of 
the subject and its world will not provide what we thought we were looking 
for in the first place. We have the subject in its world, the perspective external 
to that yet it does not provide us with the relationship between thought and 
the world. I think the idea is that once we follow Wittgenstein and accept the 
subject is not part of the world but rather somehow the limit of the world we 
recognise that the subject has been purged of all perspectival elements – it 
‘shrinks’.  The  subject  is  not  a  mindedness  in  one  direction  or  another;  it 
simply  is  the  general  perspective.  It  then  seems  that  there  is  nothing  for 
idealism to get a hold of at all. It is no longer an option to say that reality is 
constructed by a way of representing it. The world and my world, where this 
‘I’  is the purged subject,  are one and the same. Whether anything like this 
interpretation of the Tractatus is adequate will be considered in Part Three.
[7.7] Conclusion
This chapter began with the question: ‘how much of a realist was the author 
of  the  Tractatus?’  I  argued  that  both  the  ‘world-driven’  interpretation 
advocated by Pears  and the ‘language-driven’  interpretation developed by 
Ishiguro and McGuinness  should be  rejected.  Neither  view is  plausible  in 
itself  and  neither  seems  to  fit  the  Tractatus.  I  sketched  a  more  suitable 
alternative, inspired by a remark made by McDowell. Pursuing the question 
282 Sullivan (2005), p.56.
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and the subsequent attempted answers does, I argued, bring the same kind of 
issues of ‘sideways-on’ glances and threats of idealism into play with regard 
to the Tractatus as identified in Part One with the Investigations. It remains a 
pressing question whether the Tractatus embraces transcendental idealism or 
ultimately finds a way to reject it. Part Three has the task of connecting the 
issues of ‘sideways-on’ glances with idealism and saying something about the 
continuity,  or  lack  thereof,  of  Wittgenstein’s  attitude  towards  such  a 
connection.  
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Part Three:
Connections and Continuity
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Chapter Eight
 ‘Sideways-on’ Glances and Transcendental Idealism
[8.1] Introduction
Some stock taking is required. Part One examined the rule-following passages 
of the Investigations. I argued that, despite substantial difficulties in working 
out the details of the view, McDowell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein must be 
along the correct lines. In contrast to other interpretations, it offers us a chance 
of  reading  Wittgenstein  as  arguing for  a  position both non-banal  and not 
obviously false. Despite this, Part One did not reach a settled conclusion on 
the author of the Investigations. Wittgenstein was shown to be interested in a 
kind of standpoint: what was labelled a view from ‘sideways-on’. The rule-
following passages also display an interest in (and, we might say, temptation 
towards) a kind of idealism. This, I argued, is not the shallow idealism that 
Dummett  originally  read  in  Wittgenstein,  but  a  kind  of  transcendental 
idealism. No conclusion was reached on either of these issues, nor were they 
connected in any detailed way.
Part Two ended with the question of realism and the Tractatus: to what 
extent, if any, was Wittgenstein a realist? I argued that the correct reading of 
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the  book  cuts  between  the  ‘world-driven’  view  offered  by  Pears  and  the 
‘language-driven’ view offered by Ishiguro and McGuinness. Taking my cue 
from McDowell,  I  argued that  no claim of  priority  between language and 
reality is to be found in the Tractatus. Despite this, Part Two did not reach a 
settled conclusion. Wittgenstein was shown to be interested in the limits of 
thought and the possibility of a standpoint that could survey those limits. The 
remarks on solipsism show Wittgenstein was interested in a kind of idealism. 
Again,  I  argued,  this  idealism  is  transcendental  in  nature.  Again  no 
conclusion was reached on either of these issues, nor were they connected in 
any detailed way. 
This chapter forms Part Three. The aim is to bring together, as best I 
can, these results. The shape of the chapter is as follows: First, a connection 
between ‘sideways-on’ looks and transcendental philosophy is made. These 
two issues have been in play for some time without a substantial connection 
being made. [8.2] sketches a straightforward conception of how the two issues 
fit together. I draw on a recent debate between Moore and Sullivan. Rather 
than focusing on what these authors disagree about, I focus on their shared 
method  for  determining  whether  Wittgenstein  was  or  was  not  a 
transcendental  idealist.  Roughly,  the  measure  claims  that  insofar  one  is 
committed to rejecting the possibility of  a  view from ‘sideways-on’ one is 
rejecting  the  possibility  of  transcendental  reflection  on  the  given  domain. 
Second, I apply this measure to both the Tractatus and the Investigations. [8.3] 
uses a paper by Goldfarb to clear the ground for application of the measure to 
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the  Tractatus.  Goldfarb accuses certain realist interpretations of the book of 
failing to appreciate Wittgenstein’s opposition to an external perspective. This 
is both correct and useful in bringing out what the view from ‘sideways-on’ is 
for  the  author  of  the  Tractatus.  Goldfarb  is  in  error,  I  argue,  in  that  his 
alternative to realism is just as guilty of adopting this perspective. I go on to 
argue that applying the measure of [8.2] to the Tractatus yields the conclusion 
that Wittgenstein was no idealist. [8.4] uses a debate between Dummett and 
McDowell  to  clear  the  ground  for  the  measure’s  application  to  the 
Investigations.  Dummett demands that a theory of meaning should be ‘full-
blooded’.  I  examine  what  this  comes  to  and  McDowell’s  Wittgenstein-
inspired claim that the best one can hope for is a ‘modest’ theory. Dummett’s 
view features as one adopting a stance from ‘sideways-on’ that  so bothers 
Wittgenstein.  I  argue  that  McDowell’s  Wittgenstein  (and,  given  the 
conclusion of Part One, Wittgenstein himself) does not reveal the view from 
‘sideways-on’ to be mistaken or incoherent. We are simply told not to occupy 
the position because of the disastrous consequences of doing so. The result is 
that  applying  the  measure  of  [8.2]  has  the  author  of  the  Investigations 
committing  himself  to  presenting  limits  as  limitations  and,  hence,  to 
transcendental  idealism.  [8.5]  is  the  third  stage  in  which  the  results  are 
brought  together.  The  section  discusses  what  this  might  say  toward  the 
question of continuity and ends by raising a concern that, in the case of the 
Investigations, the measure is just too crude to capture Wittgenstein’s thought.
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[8.2] A Measure
What  is  the  relationship  between  transcendental  idealism  and  viewing 
something from an external perspective (as I have characterised it: viewing 
things  from  ‘sideways-on’)?  In  this  section  I  sketch  a  conception  of  the 
relationship  between  these  two  ideas.  In  a  recent  discussion  Moore  and 
Sullivan have disagreed over how Wittgenstein stood towards transcendental 
idealism at  different  stages of  his  philosophical  life.  They agree insofar as 
Kantian questions and the corresponding ‘transcendental twaddle’ were deep 
and pressing for Wittgenstein throughout. They disagree over whether and 
when Wittgenstein  actually  lapsed into  a  kind of  linguistic  transcendental 
idealism.  Very  roughly,  Moore  holds  that  it  is  in  the  Tractatus that 
Wittgenstein ‘succumbed’ to such an idealism whereas the Investigations finds 
a way to ultimately dissolve the appeal and threat of such a view. Sullivan 
holds the reverse: it is in the Investigations that Wittgenstein commits himself 
to transcendental idealism whereas the Tractatus dissolves any drive towards 
such a view. I do not want to tackle this disagreement, as it were, ‘head-on’. 
Instead I want to focus on part of the common ground in this debate. Moore 
and Sullivan agree on the method for deciding whether Wittgenstein was or 
was  not  an  idealist  of  the  relevant  type.  The  thought  is  that  whenever 
Wittgenstein represented limits as  limitations he started himself  on a path 
that  leads  to transcendental  idealism. It  is  here,  I  intend to show, that  the 
connection with a view from ‘sideways-on’ is to be made.  
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What does it  mean to present a limit as a limitation? We say that a 
space  is  limited  by  its  geometry.  There  are  no  points excluded  from that 
space.  If  we  accepted  only  Euclidean  geometry  we  might  say  that  its 
principles simply define what it is to be a spatial object. There is no boundary 
between geometrical points that fall within that space and those that do not. 
If, on the other hand, we distinguish between Euclidean and non-Euclidean 
geometry the limitations of the former are no longer equivalent to genuine 
limits. For now what we have is a contrast:  certain geometrical shapes are 
excluded  by  the  former  which  are  not  by  the  latter.  Limits  are  being 
represented as limitations: a boundary is being presented as sitting between 
something instead of there being no boundary at all. 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant remarks:
Since we cannot treat the special conditions of sensibility as conditions 
of  the  possibility  of  things,  but  only  of  their  appearances,  we  can 
indeed  say  that  space  comprehends  all  things  that  appear  to  us  as 
external, but not all things in themselves, by whatever subject they are 
intuited, or whether they are intuited or not. For we cannot judge in 
regard  to  the  intuitions  of  other  thinking  beings,  whether  they  are 
bound by the same conditions as those which limit our intuition and 
which for  us  are universally  valid.  If  we add to  the concept  of  the 
subject  of  a  judgement  the limitation under which the judgement  is 
made,  the judgement is  then unconditionally valid.  The proposition, 
that all things are side by side in space, is valid under the limitation 
that these things are viewed as objects of our sensible intuition.283
Here Kant is contrasting limits as limits with limits as limitations. The former 
holds that the limits genuinely are limits: the kind of thing nothing of the 
relevant kind can stand outside of. The latter holds that the limits are set by 
283   Kant (1933), A27/B43.
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something to do with us, our limitations. Kant claims that from the human 
perspective we can say that space belongs to all things that appear to us as 
external,  but we cannot make the claim that space belongs to all things in 
themselves. The limits of our intuition might not coincide with the limits of 
other thinking beings intuition because they might have different limitations. 
The  contrast  is  between  genuine  limits  and  mere  limits  for  us.  Kant  is 
defending the latter and he is, of course, a transcendental idealist. 
The content of the idealism that so vexed Wittgenstein was different. 
Wittgenstein was interested in understanding the limits of thought: what can 
be thought (what makes sense) and what cannot (does not). But the general 
shape, of which Kant’s discussion of space is one example, also holds good for 
Wittgenstein. A genuine limit is not something we can draw a boundary to or 
around. Presenting a limit as a limitation is to leave open the possibility of 
there being genuine thoughts beyond what,  for us,  is  the limit of thought. 
That would be to draw a boundary to highlight a contrast.
In  a  recent  paper  Sullivan  makes  a  connection  between  this  and 
idealism: “Adrian [Moore] and I are agreed that the crucial step in embracing 
or resisting idealism is in succumbing to or resisting the construal of limits as 
limitations.”284 But  where,  we  might  ask,  is  the  threat  of  idealism coming 
from? There is nothing here that entails a kind of transcendental idealism. The 
point, I take it, is that presenting limits as limitations invites a question that 
needs an answer: what could account for such a harmony between reality and 
our way of representing it?
284   Sullivan (unpublished), p.2.
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There  are  only  two  ways  in  which  we  can  account  for  a  necessary 
agreement  of  experience  with  the  concepts  of  its  objects:  either 
experience  makes  these  concepts  possible  or  these  concepts  make 
experience possible. The former supposition does not hold in respect of 
the categories (nor of pure sensible intuition); for since they are a priori 
concepts,  and therefore  independent  of  experience,  the ascription to 
them of an empirical origin would be a sort of generatio aequivoca. There 
remains, therefore, only the second supposition – a system, as it were, 
of the epigenesis of pure reason – namely, that the categories contain, on 
the  side  of  the  understanding,  the  grounds  of  the  possibility  of  all 
experience in general.285  
 
Both the limits and the limitations could have been fixed differently.  Here 
Kant  surveys  two  possible  answers  as  to  how  they  might  have  become 
aligned. Either reality makes concepts possible for us through imposing its 
will upon us, or concepts impose an order on reality. Kant clearly takes the 
second of these options to be the only plausible answer. (One might think that 
there is a third option: neither reality nor concepts impose on each other but, 
rather, something else shapes and maintains a harmony between them. Kant 
goes on to mock those who hold that God performs such a role.) According to 
Moore and Sullivan, Wittgenstein agreed with Kant: the only explanation for 
why it  is  that limits and limitations match is that our concepts  impose on 
reality.  And  so,  for  Wittgenstein,  we  must  adopt  a  form  of  linguistic 
transcendental idealism. 
Where is the connection with viewing things from ‘sideways-on’? The 
thought is that in order to represent limits as limitations one must be in a 
position to do so. The way I have characterised the issue is over whether a 
285 Kant (1933), B166/7
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contrast  is  in play or not:  whether  nothing of  the relevant  type can stand 
outside of the domain or whether a boundary sits between, contrasts, things 
that fall either side of that boundary. In order to make a contrast one must be 
in a position to see both sides of the boundary; one must, as it were, be above 
the terrain to view what falls on one side and what fails on the other. This is 
to  view  matters  from  ‘sideways-on’.  What  makes  presenting  limits  as 
limitations possible is the external perspective.
In summary, the measure is this: we will be in a position to ‘read off’ 
Wittgenstein’s  attitude  towards  transcendental  idealism  when  we  answer 
whether he was presenting the relevant limits as limitations. If he was, at least 
according  to  Moore  and  Sullivan,  he  succumbed  to  the  appeal  of  such 
idealism.  To  present  limits  as  limitations  invites  a  question  that,  for 
Wittgenstein as it was for Kant, the only viable answer one could offer is the 
transcendental  idealist  one.  We can only  get  to  the position of  presenting 
limits as limitations if an external perspective on the given domain is possible. 
That is: through being able to view the relevant terrain from ‘sideways-on’. 
That is a sketch of a line of thought. It neatly offers us a way of coming to 
conclusions that were conspicuous by their absence in both Parts One and 
Two. It also promises us something to say about the relationship between the 
early  and  later  periods.  The  task  now  is  to  bring  into  view  a  clearer 
conception of the kind of view from ‘sideways-on’ that motivated both the 
early and later Wittgenstein. The aim is to clear the ground so as to be able to 
deploy the measure of this section to Wittgenstein’s thought in both periods.
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[8.3] The Tractatus
To get  the relevant issues in play for discussion of the  Tractatus I  want to 
return to a discussion left ‘hanging’ in Chapter Five.  The Tractatus is clearly 
concerned with, amongst other things, the conditions for language being able 
to  represent  reality.  Wittgenstein’s  answer  is  that  this  is  only  possible  in 
virtue of a proposition and what it represents sharing a certain structure or a 
certain form:
2.17 What the picture must have in common with reality in order to 
represent it after its manner – rightly or falsely – is its form of 
representation.
And  so,  Wittgenstein  argues,  propositions  and  what  they  represent  must 
share a logical structure.
2.15 That the elements of the picture are combined with one another 
in a definite  way,  represents  that  the things are so combined 
with one another.
This  connexion  of  the  elements  of  the  picture  is  called  its 
structure, and the possibility of this structure is called the form 
of representation of the picture.
2.151 The form of representation is the possibility that the things are 
combined with one another as are the elements of the picture.
A  concern  raised  (and  not  answered)  in  Chapter  Five  was  how,  from 
Wittgenstein’s  point  of  view,  this  correlation  is  supposed  to  come  about. 
Simple names are proxies for simple objects. Language represents the world. 
Wittgenstein tells us that pictures reach out to reality (TLP 2.1511), that the 
correlation between elements are like feelers that touch reality (TLP 2.1515). 
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But the reader is still left puzzling as to how this is supposed to happen. In 
the Investigations, clearly reflecting on the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes:
Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, 
of the world. These concepts:  proposition, language, thought, world, 
stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each.286
The  concern  is  that  we  need  an  explanation  of  how this  harmony  comes 
about: how simple names and simple objects line up so neatly. The Tractatus 
itself offers no explanation.
This  has  not  stopped  commentators  offering  an  answer  on 
Wittgenstein’s behalf. One example is the so-called ‘dubbing interpretation’. 
The idea is  that  the harmony is  established by something we do.  That is, 
through an intentional act of some kind: this word stands for this object,  that 
word stands for  that object,  and so on. If  we are successful  in this  mental 
association  of  words  with  objects  then  language  and  reality  will  line  up 
neatly. In doing so we will map the layout of reality with our propositions. 
Pitcher,  for  example,  cites  evidence  from pre-Tractatus writings to  support 
such an interpretation: “By my correlating the components of the picture with 
objects, it comes to represent a situation and to be right or wrong.” (Notebooks 
26.11.14) 
And elsewhere in the  Notebooks,  he speaks of  my – presumably the 
speaker, writer, or thinker of a proposition – correlating names with 
things.  […]  But  how do  I  do  it?  From  what  Wittgenstein  says  [at 
Tractatus 3.11],  I  suspect  he  thought  that  correlating  elements  of  a 
picture (or proposition) with elements of reality is a mental act – the 
286  PI I §96
249
mental act, namely, of meaning or intending the former to stand for the 
latter.287
This interpretation is given fuller expression in Hacker’s  Insight and Illusion.  
Hacker seeks to show that – despite Wittgenstein’s claims to the contrary – 
there are deep epistemological and psychological assumptions in play in the 
Tractatus. Indeed, Hacker argues, the connection between names and objects 
depends on such assumptions. Again, Hacker cites pre-Tractatus remarks to 
defend this interpretation:
In  the  Notebooks 1914-16,  the  general  impression  is  given  that  such 
correlation  must  be  the  result  of  some  mental  act  of  meaning  or 
intending a certain word to signify an object one has in mind. It is an 
act of will which correlates a word with an object.288
Hacker  goes  as  far  as  to  claim  that  the  Tractatus ‘relegates’  philosophical 
semantics to psychology:
Whatever correlates a name with an object, be it mental act, some other 
mechanism or even the ‘rule’ embodied in ostensive definition, it must 
bring it about that the name is used in the future for the same object. 
How identity is established however, is, from the Tractatus viewpoint, 
a matter of psychology.289
 
In  summary,  then,  the  dubbing  interpretation  claims  that  the  harmony 
between language and reality is brought about by our correlating names with 
objects so that the names remain faithful to the inherent possibilities of the 
object.  This  correlation  is  a  mental  act,  it  is  something  we do.  I  said  that 
Hacker  gives  the  dubbing  interpretation  its  fullest  expression.  I  think, 
287   Pitcher (1964), p.88.
288   Hacker (1972), p.45.
289   Hacker (1972), p.56.
250
actually, it is an interesting question whether his settled view conforms to this 
thumbnail sketch. We will return to this shortly. 
Chapter  Seven  distinguished  between  two  incompatible  ways  of 
reading the Tractatus: a ‘world-driven’ interpretation and a ‘language-driven’ 
interpretation.  The  disagreement  was  shown  to  turn  over  quite  how 
Wittgenstein’s context principle is to be read. The former holds that reality 
dictates  to  (sets  the  standard  for)  language.  Pears  claims  that,  for 
Wittgenstein, simple objects are the ‘dominant partners’ in their relationship 
with simple names.  Once names are attached to objects  they must  remain 
faithful  to  the inherent  possibilities  of those objects.  As Pears puts  it:  “the 
nature and identity of each object is fixed independently of anything done by 
us […] the question, whether we contribute anything to the constitution of 
[the] world, is not even asked.”290 The ‘language-driven’ interpretation holds 
that language sets the standard for reality. There is, according to this reading 
of  Wittgenstein,  no  securing  of  a  reference  of  an  expression  prior  to  or 
independent of its occurrence in a proposition. For example, Ishiguro claims 
that the  Tractatus refutes the idea that a name is like a label we tag onto an 
object which we can already, prior to propositional use, identify. Thus, on this 
view, we cannot talk about ‘actual objects’ in the ‘real world’. Names are the 
dominant partners; they set the standard of fit. 
The dubbing interpretation, as so far presented, falls squarely into the 
world-driven camp. It makes clear that the world sets the standard of fit. For 
our  dubbing  to  be  successful,  we  will  have  to  dub  names  onto  objects. 
290   Pears (1987), p.29.
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Whether  things go  well  depends  on whether  we maintain a link with the 
inherent possibilities of those objects. Given that the interpretation falls into 
this camp and that I claimed in Chapter Seven that the ‘world-driven’ view is 
mistaken,  it  is  incumbent  on  me  to  show  how  and  why  the  dubbing 
interpretation goes wrong. And, indeed, I do think it is wrong.   
There is a tension here. I do not want to give the impression that any 
kind of dubbing is wrong. There appears to be a perfectly harmless kind of 
dubbing  that  takes  place  that  I  would  not  (indeed  could  not)  deny. 
Psychologists  and  linguistics  might  be  interested  in  our  attaching  certain 
signs to objects in the world. So, for example, the English word ‘horse’ means 
horse, the French word ‘cheval’  means horse and so on. That certain signs 
stand for certain things is something we have brought about and is contingent 
on the kinds of beings we are. If I were claiming that Wittgenstein rejected 
this  kind  of  dubbing  I  would  be  claiming  that  Wittgenstein  wanted  to 
obliterate psychology: maintain that it had nothing worthwhile to investigate. 
But  Wittgenstein’s  attitude  towards  psychology  was  not  like  that.  It  was, 
rather,  an  uninterested  shrug  of  the  shoulders:  ‘I  don’t  know  what  the 
psychologist might say here and, frankly, I don’t much care’. We need, then, 
to  distinguish  between  a  perfectly  harmless  kind  of  dubbing  that  might 
interest  psychologists  and  linguists  and  a  more  problematic  philosophical 
type  of  dubbing.  The  issue  for  the  philosopher  is  the  harmony  between 
language and reality.  The worry is  that  the harmony is  brought  about  by 
something. We can think about the world because the world is a certain way 
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that we can latch onto. The alternative would be that we can think about the 
world  because  language  imposes  a  structure  on  the  world.  I  think,  for 
Wittgenstein, looking at it in terms of direction is wrong. The McDowellian 
understanding  sketched  at  the  end  of  Chapter  Seven  argued  that,  for 
Wittgenstein,  the relationship between language and reality is an ‘internal’ 
one: not that one is dependent on, or a mere reflection of, the other but that 
each is equally internal to the other.
My strategy is to use an unpublished (but quite old) paper by Goldfarb 
as  a  foil  for  my  discussion.  I  want  to  draw  both  positive  and  negative 
conclusions  from  Goldfarb’s  remarks.  The  positives  will  be  that  Goldfarb 
quite  nicely  challenges  the  dubbing  interpretation  and  links  this  to 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of a kind of ‘external perspective’. The negatives will 
concern Goldfarb’s characterisation of this perspective:  I will claim that his 
alternative view is guilty of falling into the ‘language-driven’ camp and so 
adopts the very external perspective Wittgenstein is concerned to repudiate.
Here is Goldfarb’s conclusion in his own words:
My suggestion, bluntly put, is that there is no call for dubbings at all in 
Wittgenstein’s view; all talk of them and worry about their constitution 
ought to be jettisoned. Rather, the account rests content in language. 
All that we need to say or should want to say about a name’s going 
proxy is exhausted by logical form.291
Our first task is to see how he gets to this conclusion. Both Pitcher and Hacker 
claim that TLP 3.11 offers support to the idea that a mental act of dubbing is 
required to correlate names and objects.
291   Goldfarb (unpublished), p.10.
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3.11 We use the sensibly perceptible sign (sound or written sign, etc.) 
of the proposition as a projection of the possible state of affairs. 
The  method  of  projection  is  to  think  of  the  sense  of  the 
proposition.
The suggestion  is  that  the  ‘thinking’  referred  to  here  is  the  mental  act  of 
dubbing. Goldfarb claims this goes wrong in that it requires us to understand 
‘thinking’ as something apart from the system of the Tractatus. The dubbing 
interpretation of Wittgenstein takes him to be explaining basic features, such 
as  reference,  of  language in  mental  terms;  that  philosophy of  mind raises 
important questions that need to be tackled on its own terms. Goldfarb argues 
that, in fact,  Wittgenstein was driven by the thought that it is through the 
philosophy  of  language  that  these  and  other  problems  are  to  be  solved: 
language is the starting point of all philosophical inquiry.
To overstate it a bit: if unanalyzed notions of mental processes are to 
play  the  basic  role  in  the  account  of  language,  then  Wittgenstein’s 
taking  a  proper  account  of  language  as  solving  all  philosophical 
questions is completely undermined.292
 
To illustrate this point further, Goldfarb asks to consider what a thought is for 
the author of the  Tractatus: “The logical picture of the facts is the thought” 
(TLP 3) and “The picture is a fact” (TLP 2.141). Thoughts, then, are facts. If a 
thought is a fact it  will be made up of constituents.  So, to take Goldfarb’s 
example, the thought “α refers to a” contains constituents corresponding to 
the sign α and the object a. When seen like this a thought presupposes the 
very  thing  (a  correlation  between  words  and  reality)  that  the  dubbing 
292   Goldfarb (unpublished), p.5.
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interpretation says it is supposed to explain. For the thought to genuinely be a 
thought its constituents must already stand for elements of reality: the content 
of a thought depends on a working language already being in place. So, for 
the system of the  Tractatus, a thought could not be the link between names 
and  objects  the  dubbing  interpretation  requires.  As  Goldfarb  puts  it: 
“Everyday mental talk – like all everyday talk – receives its content only by 
fitting  into  the  Wittgensteinian  framework.”293 If  we  retain  the  idea  that 
something must provide the link between language and reality, that some sort 
of  dubbing  must  take  place  even  if  it  is  not  a  thought,  then  it  has  to  be 
something outside of the world. This is because the dubbing would have to 
happen prior to and independent of language. What this something might be 
is, Goldfarb claims, quite “unexplained and mysterious.”294
Whether  Hacker’s  final,  settled,  view  in  Insight  and  Illusion really 
conforms to the thumbnail sketch of the dubbing interpretation offered here is 
questionable. Goldfarb’s claim is that the dubbing interpretation has slipped 
into a ‘mystery-act’ interpretation: for the dubbings can no longer be seen as 
part of the world. I actually think that might be Hacker’s point. Hacker is well 
aware that, for Wittgenstein, we can only grasp language from, as it were, the 
‘inside’. This is clear from Hacker’s engagement with the perplexing remarks 
on solipsism: “The limits of my language  mean the limits of my world.” (TLP 
5.6)  Hacker  ends  up  reading  Wittgenstein  as  an  empirical  realist  and  a 
transcendental solipsist. Tied to this idea is Wittgenstein’s distinction between 
293   Goldfarb (unpublished), p.6.
294   Goldfarb (unpublished), p.9.
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saying and showing. For Hacker, the  Tractatus holds transcendental idealist 
theses  which,  although  profoundly  important,  are  literally  inexpressible. 
What the solipsist means is correct but it cannot be said; it shows itself.
Thus everything the realist wishes to say can be said; and nothing the 
Wittgensteinian solipsist wishes to say can be spoken of. There will be 
no practical disagreement between them, nor will they quarrel over the 
truth-values of propositions of ordinary language. But the analysis of 
such propositions will manifest the transcendental truths that cannot 
be said.295
So  Hacker’s  settled  view  is  a  lot  more  sophisticated  than  the  dubbing 
interpretation  so  far  considered.  If  we  are  now  to  ask  how the  harmony 
between language and reality is supposed to come about, it seems clear that 
Hacker would happily agree that the correlation is not made in the world but 
is rather part of the possibility of the world. Goldfarb is keen to play down 
the role of transcendental philosophy in the Tractatus. The position reached in 
Chapter Seven was that Wittgenstein was heavily influenced by and engaged 
with transcendental questions. 
As we have seen, Goldfarb’s alternative to the dubbing interpretation 
is that we jettison talk of dubbings altogether. Instead we should recognise 
that,  for  Wittgenstein,  logical  form  accounts  for  the  correlation  between 
names  and  objects.  Interestingly,  Goldfarb  claims  that  a  feeling  of 
uncomfortableness  on  leaving  matters  there  –  the  feeling  that  there  still 
should be more of an account of the correlation – rests on an “uncritically 
realist”296 view of objects and demand for an impossible ‘external perspective’. 
To illustrate his point Goldfarb outlines an objection that might be offered 
295   Hacker (1972), p.81.
296   Goldfarb (unpublished), p.11.
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against  his  recommendation  that  Wittgenstein’s  view  rests  content  with 
shared logical form: that some further account is required to avoid ambiguity. 
We  are  asked  to  imagine  a  case  where  distinct  objects  possess  the  same 
intrinsic  possibilities  of  combination:  a  and b  have the same logical  form. 
Suppose that the signs α and β share this logical form and that Φ stands for 
the property P. What are we to make of the expression Φα & ~Φβ? Does this 
represent the situation where a has P but b does not have P or the situation 
where b has P but a does not have P? It seems as though something more than 
simply shared logical form is required to avoid such ambiguity. But, argues 
Goldfarb:
We must examine the stance from which this formulation is made. In 
it, we set language on the one hand – the names α and β – against the 
substance of the world,  objects,  on the other.  Hence we presuppose 
possession of some external perspective that provides us with a grasp 
of objects apart from our understanding of the language.297
Goldfarb’s point is that such an external perspective is alien to the doctrines 
of the Tractatus. The perspective requires a conception of the layout of reality 
independent of language. We may be tempted to think that the Tractatus fails 
to offer a satisfying account of the correlation between names and objects. But 
the frustration comes about only if  we assume the kind of perspective the 
Tractatus rules out must be possible. In fact there is no need for anything more 
than an account of language.
297   Goldfarb (unpublished), p.11.
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The heart of my suggestion is thus that in the Tractarian view there can 
be  no  conception  of  the  world  apart  from  language.  The  notion  of 
object  is  given  only  via  operating  with  names.  There  is  no  realm, 
independently intelligible,  onto which language must latch. Rejected 
too  is  any  general  (external)  notion  of  reference,  of  a  proposition’s 
being about something. The task is not to explain, given objects on the 
one  hand  and  language  on  the  other,  how  language  represents 
configurations of objects. For it is only the structure of language that 
gives us the conceptions of objecthood and representation.298
I said that I wanted to make both positive and negative remarks on 
Goldfarb’s position. This is the place to make some positive noises. It should 
be  clear  that  I  am sympathetic  to  the  general  drift  of  Goldfarb’s  remarks 
insofar as they oppose reading a certain kind of realism into the Tractatus. The 
above quotation makes clear that, for Wittgenstein, reality does not dictate to 
language; there is no independently intelligible conception of the world that 
language must reflect.  I think that is correct exegesis of the  Tractatus. I am 
sympathetic  to  the  idea  that  no  further  account  or  explanation  of  the 
correlation  between  names  and  objects  is  required.  I  also  think  that 
Wittgenstein  is  interested  in  assessing  the  possibility  of  an  external 
perspective. Indeed, part of the task for this section is to look at Wittgenstein’s 
attitude to such a possibility.
The negative remarks centre on a worry that Goldfarb pushes matters 
too  far  and  ends  up  with  a  view  that  lapses  into  something  akin  to  a 
‘language-driven’ interpretation. Such a concern  seems to bother Goldfarb in 
places. He tells us that “Wittgenstein, on my reading, is no realist, but neither 
is he an anti-realist.”299 But Goldfarb is happy to endorse the following: 
298   Goldfarb (unpublished), p.13. 
299   Goldfarb (unpublished), p.13.
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Only given a proposition – and hence, on Wittgenstein’s account, only 
given the whole structure of language – can we talk of Bedeutung at 
all.  […]  Whatever  conception  of  objects  language  gives  us,  that  is 
simply what objects are.300
Such remarks  give language the priority.  Goldfarb’s  view is  one in which 
reference is relegated to semantic equivalence. Chapter Seven argued that the 
right thing to say, for Wittgenstein, is to reject the notion of priority either 
way.  Goldfarb  appears  to  think  that  he  can  avoid  his  interpretation  of 
Wittgenstein lapsing into anti-realism by showing that such a move would be 
just  as  guilty  of  attempting to  adopt  an external  perspective  as  the realist 
interpretation. The idea must be that the kind of view required to motivate 
anti-realism can only be had from placing language on one side, reality on the 
other and comparing them. Goldfarb’s position is supposed to cut down the 
middle. We are supposed to recognise that there is no alternative account of 
the world to realism or anti-realism, that to question what reality is really like 
is empty, because there is no external perspective that would be required for 
such things. 
The point may be put more positively. Wittgenstein is trying to teach 
what our talk of objects amounts to. From where we sit, we can say 
there are objects, “out there”. […] we can use these words, but what we 
thereby  do  is  merely  to  point  to  something  exhibited  by  language. 
What  we  cannot  do  with  them  is  stake  out  a  metaphysical,  realist 
position.301
My concern is that this simply will not do: it saddles the  Tractatus with an 
uninteresting  and  unappealing  kind  of  idealism.  It  might  be  useful  to 
300   Goldfarb (unpublished), p.13/14.
301   Goldfarb (unpublished), p.14.
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compare  and  contrast  Goldfarb  and  Pears.  In  Chapter  Seven  I  expressed 
sympathy with Pears’ ‘recoil’ from the language-driven interpretations of the 
book.  Pears  correctly  records  that  Wittgenstein  was  no  empirical, 
straightforward, idealist. My criticism was that this ‘recoil’ went too far: in 
resisting an idealist reading Pears offered a hard-nosed realist reading in its 
place. Such a realist picture could not make Wittgenstein’s context principle 
as central  as it  clearly is  for the  Tractatus.  In this section I  have expressed 
sympathy  with  Goldfarb’s  ‘recoil’  from  an  example  of  the  ‘world-driven’ 
strand of interpretation. Goldfarb is correct in holding that an uncritical kind 
of  realism  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  Tractatus.  My  criticism  here  is  that 
Goldfarb ‘recoils’ too far: he ends up adopting a ‘language-driven’ and hence 
idealist  interpretation.  So  both  Pears  and  Goldfarb  are  correct  in  their 
motivation for resisting a certain reading of Wittgenstein but both go too far 
in the opposite direction. It  is a nice symmetry,  but it  also highlights how 
difficult the middle ground is going to be to both find and occupy.
This concern with Goldfarb is still  at a very general level.  I want to 
offer  something  more  specific.  We  are  told  that  the  ‘ambiguity  objection’ 
(above) to Goldfarb’s view depends on adopting an incoherent position: an 
external perspective. This position involves a kind of triangulation between 
the  world,  language  and  ourselves.  It  is  only  by  adopting  the  incoherent 
external position that our worry whether a has P and b does not have P or 
vice versa can get hold. Goldfarb tells us that we should remain content with 
logical form. But what would the author of the Tractatus say here?
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5.5302 Russell’s definition of “=” won’t do; because according to it one 
cannot say that  two objects  have all  their  properties  in 
common.  (Even  if  this  proposition  is  never  true,  it  is 
nevertheless significant.)
2.0233 Two  objects  of  the  same logical  form  are  –  apart  from  their 
external properties – only differentiated from one another 
in that they are different.
2.202331 Either  a  thing  has  properties  which  no other  has,  and 
then one can distinguish it straight away from the others 
by description and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there 
are  several  things  which  have  the  totality  of  their 
properties in common, and then it is quite impossible to 
point to any one of them.
For if a thing is not distinguished by anything, I cannot 
distinguish it – for otherwise it would be distinguished.
The first passage claims that the statement ‘a and b have all their properties in 
common’  is  a  significant  one.  The  second  passage  claims  that  either  two 
objects  are  distinguished  and  we  can  distinguish  them  or  they  are  not 
distinguishable so we cannot distinguish them. It might then seem puzzling 
how it  could  be  that  ‘a  and  b  have  all  their  properties  in  common’  is  a 
significant proposition. The thought seems to be that it is only if a and b are 
distinguished that  one can make sense of  them as  not  distinguishable.  To 
recognise that the proposition would be significant must mean, then, that a 
and b are distinguished. From within language as a going concern a having P 
and b not having P is a different supposition to b having P and a not having P. 
The specific concern I have with Goldfarb is this: It is only if one is viewing 
matters  from outside  that  the worry  of  ambiguity  dissipates.   Goldfarb  is 
suggesting that one could simply flip the names a and b without there being 
any problem. Instead of a having property P, b would have property P. From 
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within language as a going concern, however, where we are interested not 
just in the names but the very objects themselves, it is something to worry 
about whether a has P or not and whether b has P or not.  The names are 
attached to certain objects for us and any flip is going to bother us. To dismiss 
the threat of ambiguity requires adopting a position outside of language as a 
going concern. It is only on the outside that we could be in a position to assess 
whether the flip creates problems or not. It requires an external perspective. 
The  conclusion  is,  then,  that  Goldfarb’s  interpretation  of  the  Tractatus has 
Wittgenstein adopting the very external perspective the book repudiates. 
What does this mean for the chances of setting the measure of [8.2] 
against  the  Tractatus?  The  measure  focuses  on  whether  Wittgenstein  was 
presenting limits as limitations. I argued that presenting limits as limitations 
is possible only when we are in a position ‘above’ the relevant domain; if we 
are viewing the domain from ‘sideways on’.  What Goldfarb’s  paper nicely 
brings out (but,  I  think, fails to avoid itself)  is  Wittgenstein’s  hostility to a 
‘sideways-on’ perspective. We cannot, argues Wittgenstein, step outside of a 
certain perspective in which we are placed: the single all-embracing logical 
perspective.  This  shows  that  the  very  possibility  of  presenting  limits  as 
limitations was not open to the author of the Tractatus: there is no contrastive 
notion,  limits  are  genuine  limits.  Therefore  there  is  no  question  to  which 
transcendental idealism would be but one answer. 
The  position  reached  is  akin  to  Sullivan’s  reading  of  the  book.  We 
examined this briefly at the end of Part Two. Once we accept Wittgenstein’s 
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claim that the subject is not part of the world but rather the limit of the world 
we recognise that the subject has been purged of all perspectival elements – it 
‘shrinks’.  The  subject  is  not  a  mindedness  in  one  direction  or  another;  it 
simply  is  the  general  perspective.  It  then  seems  that  there  is  nothing  for 
idealism to get a hold of at all. It is no longer an option to say that reality is 
constructed by a way of representing it. The world and my world, where this 
‘I’ is the purged subject, are one and the same. If we apply the measure of 
[8.2] this is the kind of result we get.  
[8.4] The Investigations
To clear the ground for the measure to be applied to the Investigations I want 
to  touch on a long-running debate  over what one ought to  expect  from a 
theory of meaning for a language. McDowell has claimed that certain anti-
realist views are guilty of adopting the kind view from ‘sideways-on’ that the 
later  Wittgenstein  sought  to  repudiate.  These anti-realist  views inform the 
‘fantastical’  readings of  the rule-following passages examined in Part  One. 
McDowell has used Wittgenstein as an ally against such views, most notably 
against Dummett’s view that a theory of meaning must be ‘full-blooded’. My 
aim here is not to resolve the issue; but rather to assess McDowell’s objection 
insofar as it represents what Wittgenstein thought. 
Dummett  has  long  held  that  a  theory  of  meaning  must  be  ‘full-
blooded’  and  not  ‘modest’.  I  use  these  terms  in  the  technical  sense  he 
introduced:
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[It is said that to] demand of the theory of meaning that it should serve 
to explain new concepts to someone who does not already have them is 
to place too heavy a burden upon it, and that all we can require of such 
a theory is that it give the interpretation of the language to someone 
who already has the concepts required. Let us call a theory of meaning 
which purports to accomplish only this restricted task a modest theory 
of  meaning,  and  one  which  seeks  actually  to  explain  the  concepts 
expressed by primitive terms of the language a full-blooded theory.302
Dummett’s commitment to full-bloodedness has surfaced in his requirement 
that a theory of meaning must not “take as already given any notions a grasp 
of which is possible only for a language-speaker.”303 In recent work Dummett 
has  maintained  that  an  explanation  of  how  language  works  “must  take 
nothing  for  granted.”304 Roughly,  then,  Dummett’s  requirement  is  that  a 
satisfactory theory of meaning must not use concepts that are intelligible only 
to individuals who already have a language relevantly similar to ours. The 
theory should, rather, seek to explain the concepts involved to someone who 
lacked them. Whilst this may sound straightforward, once we start to work 
out what the requirement actually means matters become much less clear.
The first  puzzle  is  that  full-bloodedness,  as  Dummett  sets  it  out  in 
“What is a Theory of Meaning? (I)” above, appears to demand that a theory of 
meaning explain each and every concept of a language to an individual who 
failed to have a grasp of them. As McDowell rightly points out, if that were 
Dummett’s view it would be crazy:
302   Dummett (1993a), p.5.
303   Dummett (1991), p.13.
304   Dummett (2006), p.37.
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any theory (of anything) would need to employ some concepts, so that 
a formulation of it would presuppose prior possession of them on the 
part of any audience to whom it could sensibly be addressed.305
In  his  “Reply  to  John  McDowell”  Dummett  accepts  this  point:  “there 
obviously  can  not  be  a  theory  that  could  be  grasped  by  someone who is 
devoid of all concepts.”306
As [McDowell] remarks, I got it more right in ‘Truth’: where it is not 
possible  to  convey  a  concept,  what  the  theory  of  sense  must  do  is 
explain what it is to have that concept, or, more exactly, what it is to 
use a given word as expressing that concept; this is why a theory of 
meaning must comprise an explicit  theory of  sense,  and not merely 
display sense in the strictly semantic core of the theory (the theory of 
reference or of semantic value). This account of a speaker’s possession 
of  a  concept  expressible  in  the  language  must  make intelligible  his 
acquisition of that concept by coming to speak the language: it must 
therefore describe a practice the mastery of which does not demand 
prior possession of the concept. The object is to explain what it is for 
the expressions of the language to have the meanings that they have. 
To do this, it must make the minimum presupposition concerning the 
conceptual resources required to understand the theory.307
This remark is, I think, crucial to understanding Dummett. There appear to be 
three positions in play – positions that might be occupied by individuals in 
the community in which the theory of meaning is being constructed.  First, 
there is the theorist or he who is offering the theory. Dummett makes clear 
that the explanation the theorist ought to aim at is to explain not the concept 
but  rather  what  it  is  to  have  the  concept.  This  is  cashed  out  in  terms  of 
describing a practice to be mastered. Second, there is the audience to whom 
the theory is aimed. This is the group wanting and assessing the theory of 
305   McDowell (1998d), p.88.
306   Dummett (1987), p.267.
307   Dummett (1987), p.267.
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meaning for a language. Third, there is the practitioner: the person actually 
engaging  in  the  practice  the  theorist  is  aiming  to  explain  or  describe. 
Dummett (as far as I know) never makes these three positions explicit. I think 
keeping them in mind helps illuminate what he goes on to say. Dummett tells 
us that the theory ought to describe a practice ‘mastery of which does not 
demand prior possession of the concept’ in question. This is best read as a 
comment about the practitioner. As I read Dummett the emphasis then shifts 
to  the  audience:  what  the  theorist  should  be  aiming  to  convey  to  them. 
Accepting  McDowell’s  comments  Dummett  maintains  that  we  could  only 
convey  the  theory  to  those  who  have  the  minimal  relevant  conceptual 
background.
I turn now to an example Dummett himself goes on to offer.
What is it to grasp the concept square, say? At the very least, it is to be 
able to discriminate between things that are square and those that are 
not. Such an ability can be ascribed only to one who will, on occasion, 
treat  square  things  differently  from things  that  are  not  square;  one 
way, among many other possible ways, of doing this is to apply the 
word “square” to square things and not to others.308
This  account  of  what  it  is  to  possess  the concept  square employs the very 
concept it is supposed to explain. If this were an attempt to confer possession 
of the concept  square to an individual who lacked it it would appear to be a 
total failure. In other words: it would be useless as an attempt to convey the 
concept to an audience. They would understand the description only if they 
308   Dummett (1993b), p.98.
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already had the concept. McDowell puzzles over this and attempts to explain 
why Dummett is happy with his example.
The point is, I conjecture, that it uses the word “square” only in first 
intention  –  that  is,  never  inside  a  content-specifying  “that”-clause. 
Thus, although the concept is employed, it is not, so to speak, displayed 
in its role as a determinant of content; a grasp of that role is not taken 
for granted.309
We ought, I argue, to read Dummett’s description of what it is to grasp the 
concept  square as  being  said  about  the  practitioner  by  the  theorist  to  an 
audience. It is an attempt to characterise what it is to have the concept square. 
It conveys practice to be mastered by the practitioner. McDowell claims (and 
Dummett  at least implicitly accepts) that this shows that the description is 
adequate:  it  does not rely on the practioner grasping the concept in a role 
‘determinant of content.’ That is, the concept is used in the description but 
never features in clauses like ‘believes that such and such is square’ or ‘asserts 
that this is square’ and so on.
To  help  see  this  I  turn  to  a  recent  discussion  where  Dummett 
distinguishes between different types of concepts: Those concepts ‘that have 
to do with the use of language’ and those concepts  not to do so. Dummett 
offers  a  non-exhaustive  list  of  such  concepts:  “telling,  saying  something, 
talking  about  something,  asking,  answering,  subject  matter,  denial, 
retraction”310 and so on. Square is clearly not a concept to do with our use of 
language. One immediate question is whether the same kind of explanation 
309   McDowell (1998d), p.91.
310   Dummett (2006), p.37.
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that Dummett finds satisfactory for square could be offered for concepts to do 
with our use of language. So would Dummett be happy with, for example, the 
following explanation of the concept says?
What is it  to grasp the concept  says? It  is to be able to discriminate 
between people who are saying things and those who are not. Such an 
ability can be ascribed only to one who will treat people saying things 
differently from those who are not; one way is to apply the word ‘says’ 
to a person and not to others.
I  do  not  think  so.  The  impression  Dummett  gives  is  that  the  distinction 
between concepts to do with our use of language and those not to do so maps 
a  distinction  between  absolute  and  relative  bans  on  use  in  explanations. 
Concepts  not  to  do  with  the  use  of  language,  such  as  square,  are  banned 
insofar  as  they  cannot  appear  within  content-specifying  that  clauses. 
Dummett  appears  to  think  that  concepts  to  do  with  our  use  of  language 
cannot  appear  at  all  in  our  explanations.  This  rules  out  the  attempted 
explanation of says. 
As we have seen, Dummett accepts that the theorist must make  some 
allowance on the part of the audience to whom the theory is addressed. They 
cannot be taken to be devoid of all conceptual resources altogether. It is not as 
though the theory should be able to be conveyed to a rock or a sofa. I think it 
is worth pursuing, however, quite what Dummett allows to be built into the 
‘minimal presupposition’ and whether it is really enough. By way of initial 
suggestion,  we  might  expect  Dummett  to  deploy  the  distinction  between 
concepts  to do and not to  do ‘with our use of  language.’  That is:  that  we 
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cannot assume the audience grasp concepts to do with our use of language 
whereas concepts not to do so could safely be assumed.  
But that would not be good enough. It is hard to think of the theorist 
explaining anything to the supposed Martians if he cannot assume they grasp 
concepts  such  as  expressing  a  thought  or  saying  something  or  asserting 
something and so on. Even quite straightforward things such as, say, the rules 
of a game look impossible - let alone complex concepts. Take an explanation 
of the rules of chess; the different possible movements of the types of pieces, 
the  conditions  for  victory  and so  on.   It  would be  a  waste  of  time if  the 
Martian  did  not  so  much  as  grasp  that  the  supposed  explanation  was 
purporting  to  be  an  explanation  of  something.  Dummett  argues  that  the 
explanation would have to satisfy the Martians “if they could be conveyed to 
them”311. But if we read his restriction in the way currently being suggested 
there simply is no way an explanation could convey anything whatsoever to 
such creatures. 
Dummett  uses  the  example  of  chess  to  illustrate  his  point  about 
language. We can imagine a case where we train a Martian to play chess. We 
somehow convey to it the rules of the game, how one wins and so on. The 
Martian could then get to the point where it could move the pieces around in 
accordance with the rules and in that way imitate playing chess.  But such 
creatures cannot be said to actually be playing chess. The difference between 
the Martian and a competent  player  of  chess is  that the player grasps the 
point of playing. It may seem obvious to us: the point of playing chess is to 
311 Dummett (2006), p.37.
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win. The Martian may well have gathered from our explanations what the 
conditions for victory are, but those explanations do not convey the point of 
playing. Dummett’s view is that we will only have succeeded in our task of 
explaining the game to the Martian if we can convey that point. It is to win, 
rather than, say, to lose or to play as quickly as possible. We could get the 
Martian to imitate speaking our language, to learn what each sentence of the 
language  means.  But  we  will  only  succeed,  for  Dummett,  if  we  can  also 
convey the point  of  communicating – we cannot assume that  the Martian 
grasps this.  Again, we ought to  wonder how plausible this  story is.  If  we 
cannot assume that the Martian recognises the aim of communicating how are 
we to be expected to communicate with it? My concern is that if this reading 
of the requirement is faithful to Dummett then it is not a requirement one can 
meet.  There  simply  do  not  appear  to  be  the  conceptual  resources  for  the 
theorist to engage with. Or, in other words, there simply has to be more built 
into the ‘minimal presupposition’ than is currently on offer. 
A better  idea  is  perhaps  this:  the  theorist  cannot  explicitly  use  any 
concepts that ‘have to do with our use of language’ in his explanations. The 
idea is that one should aim at offering an explanation without deploying the 
very  concept  one  is  seeking  to  explain.  This  kind  of  interpretation  is 
suggested by the following: 
[On] pain of circularity, we cannot  use these concepts in framing our 
explanation:  we  cannot  take  for  granted  an  implicit  grasp  of  these 
[those ‘to do with the use of language’] concepts, for they are among 
the things that have to be made explicit if our explanation is to make 
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perspicuous what we already know without being able to say what it is 
we know.312 
On the reading of Dummett’s requirement we would allow those offering the 
explanation  to  assume  that  the  Martian  understands  communication  as, 
roughly speaking, human beings conceive it  and assume that it  recognises 
that  they  are  trying  to  tell  it  something.  In  essence,  assume that  they  are 
rational  creatures  much  the  same  as  us.  This  builds  much  more  into  the 
conceptual resources allowed in the ‘minimal presupposition’. In doing so, I 
think it makes Dummett’s view look much more plausible. Whether Dummett 
himself  would go along with this  is  another  matter  (and one beyond our 
current remit).
So  where  have  we  got  to?  The  initial  characterisation  of  the 
requirement  for  full-bloodedness  has  given  way  to  a  sophisticated  and 
difficult  notion. It  looked as though Dummett  was demanding a theory of 
meaning explain each and every concept to an individual who lacked them. In 
reply to McDowell Dummett makes clear that the theory of meaning should 
describe a practice mastery of which does not require a prior grasp of the 
concept.  I  attempted  to  throw  light  on  this,  and  Dummett’s  puzzling 
examples, by distinguishing three positions: theorist, audience and practioner. 
Quite the extent of the ‘minimal presupposition’ Dummett allows on behalf of 
the theorist about the target audience was also discussed. I am certain that 
there is much more to be said about Dummett’s requirement. But I think we 
have enough in play for our purposes. 
312   Dummett (2006), p.37.
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McDowell’s central objection to Dummett’s restriction is rooted in the 
idea  that,  for  Dummett,  understanding  what  a  sentence  means,  or what  a 
person  means  by  the  words  he  uses,  is  to  be  represented  as  consisting  in 
behavioural responses. This should be seen as a comment on what is grasped 
by the practioner: what is grasped by someone who has mastered the practice 
the  theory  of  meaning seeks  to  describe.  These  behavioural  responses  are 
taken to be purged of all the relevant conceptual material – they cannot, for 
example,  be  represented  as  grasping  the  thought  that  p.  The  interesting 
question is why McDowell is so confident that Dummett’s (and anti-realist’s 
in general)  account of meaning must end up like this. In “Wittgenstein on 
Following a Rule” McDowell tells us that according to anti-realism
people’s  sharing  a  language  is  consisted  by  appropriate 
correspondences  in  their  dispositions  to  linguistic  behaviour,  as 
characterised  without  drawing  on  command  of  the  language,  and 
hence not in terms of the contents of their utterances.313
This  is  developed  out  of  the  anti-realist  thesis  that  we understand  certain 
concepts  only  when  we  can  distinctively  manifest  our  understanding. 
McDowell’s  characterisation  of  the  anti-realist  is  that,  for  such  a  person, 
initiation  into  a  language  consists  in  acquiring  certain  behavioural 
propensities  that  are  describable  without  using  the  notion  of  meaning. 
McDowell claims that such a view is flawed: all the anti-realist can present is 
individuals  who match in certain respects,  who make similar noises when 
prompted. There is no room here for meaning to get into the picture, no room 
313   McDowell (1998g), p.249.
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for  us  to  make  sense  of  a  person  using  words  to  express  thoughts  or 
judgements.  McDowell  takes  the  anti-realist  (Kripke  and  Wright  are  his 
targets)  to  attempt  to  “humanize  this  bleak  picture”314 by  introducing  the 
notion of  community – a group of  individuals  doing the same thing.  But, 
argues McDowell,
if  regularities  in  the  verbal  behaviour  of  an  isolated  individual, 
described in norm-free terms, do not add up to meaning, it  is  quite 
obscure  how it  could  somehow make all  the  difference  if  there  are 
several individuals with matching regularities.315 
If the individual is wooden it is difficult to see how a collection of wooden 
individuals could magically bring meaning back into the picture. So, argues 
McDowell, the anti-realist conception of a linguistic community degenerates 
“into  a  picture  of  a  mere  aggregate  of  individuals  whom  we  have  no 
convincing reason not to conceive as opaque to one another.”316 
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  see  how  McDowell  brings 
Wittgenstein’s  remarks  on  rule-following  to  bear  on  the  question  of  full-
bloodedness. McDowell uses those passages in his attack on Dummett. So, for 
example:
“How am I able to obey a rule?” – if this is not a question about causes, 
then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I 
do.
If  I  have exhausted the justifications  I  have reached bedrock, 
and my spade is turned.  Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply 
what I do.”
314   McDowell (1998g), p.252.
315   McDowell (1998g), p.252/3.
316   McDowell (1998g), p.253.
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(Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake 
not  of  their  content,  but  of  their  form.  Our  requirement  is  an 
architectural  one;  the  definition  a  kind  of  ornamental  coping  that 
supports nothing.)317 
McDowell equates the idea that we can keep digging, keep putting our spade 
in even though we have reached rock bottom, with Dummett’s  restriction. 
The  anti-realist  is,  then,  taken  to  be  someone  whose  account  of  language 
consists in ‘sub-bedrock’ terms. A ‘sub-bedrock’ explanation of meaning is a 
characterisation of what someone means by the words they use in meaning-
free  terms.  The  anti-realist,  McDowell  tells  us,  fails  to  appreciate 
Wittgenstein’s warning that the ground we have reached really is the end of 
the matter and we cannot dig any further.  We cannot offer a meaning-free 
explanation of meaning. Put this way, McDowell’s opposition to Dummett’s 
restriction  is  an  instance  of  the  former’s  opposition  to  any  reductionary 
account of meaning. In essence, McDowell is claiming all anti-realist pictures 
cannot escape from a wooden input/output model.
Building on the ‘wooden’ claim, McDowell enlists Wittgenstein as both 
ally and inspiration for his main objection to full-bloodedness. We are asked 
(once again) to consider Wittgenstein’s example318 of a pupil being ordered to 
carry  on  the  series  ‘+2’.  He  finds  it  natural  to  continue  ‘998,  1000,  1004, 
1008…’.  Rather  than  ‘998,  1000,  1002,  1004…’  Wittgenstein’s  point,  argues 
McDowell,  is  that  any  stretch  of  linguistic  behaviour  can  be  made  out  to 
cohere with an indefinite number of patterns. In the addition case, the pupil’s 
behaviour up to 1000 coheres with both ‘+2’ and, say, ‘+2 up to 1000, +4 up to 
317   PI I §217.
318   PI I §185.
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2000…’ and so on. Indeed, the behaviour coheres with disjunctions such as 
‘+2 or …’.
If  we  have  to  capture  the  pattern  in  someone’s  writing  a  series  of 
numerals otherwise than in terms like “obeying the instruction to go 
on adding 2”, there are always alternative patterns that fit any stretch 
of such behaviour[.]319
McDowell  argues  that  Dummett  is  right  to  resist  psychologism  about 
meaning – the thought that meaning resides beneath linguistic behaviour – 
and  instead  argue  that  meaning  must  be  observable  in  the  linguistic 
behaviour  itself.  But  Dummett  goes  wrong,  McDowell  continues,  in  the 
‘wooden’ limitations of such linguistic behaviour.
The implication is this: if the fact that speakers mean this rather than 
that by, say, a word did consist in the sort of thing Dummett says it 
must  consist  in,  it  could not  lie  open  to  view  in  their  linguistic 
behaviour.320
McDowell’s claim is that if linguistic behaviour is ‘wooden’ then the best we 
could  ever  hope  for  is  a  hypothesis  about  what  another  person  means. 
McDowell  takes  Wittgenstein’s  point  to  be  that  avoiding  psychologism 
involves humanising linguistic behaviour: allowing others to come into direct 
contact with the content of what people are saying and doing. In short, this 
amounts  to  a  rejection  of  the  ‘wooden’  input-output  picture  of  linguistic 
behaviour.
319   McDowell (1998a), p.115.
320   McDowell (1998a), p.116.
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What are we to make of McDowell’s Wittgenstein-inspired objection to 
full-bloodedness?  Crucially,  it  seems  right  to  say  that  a  genuine 
Wittgensteinian thought is being brought to bear. Mere behaviour is, in and of 
itself, never going to be enough to characterise meaning. Meaning cannot be 
reduced  down  to  such  simple  ‘soundings  off’.  The  reason  why,  for 
Wittgenstein, is that to think otherwise is to leave oneself facing a paradox 
about meaning. We examined this paradox in [1.2.2]: If going ‘998, 1000, 1004’ 
and going ‘998, 1000, 1002’ are both – on some interpretation –in accordance 
with the rule ‘+2’, then whatever I do can be seen to be following the rule. This 
worry is expressed at §198 and repeated in the first paragraph of §201:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a 
rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the 
rule. The answer was: if any action can be made out to accord with the 
rule,  then it  can also  be made out  to  conflict  with  it.  And so there 
would be neither accord nor conflict here.321
So, if any action can be seen, by an interpretation, to be a ‘correct’ manner of 
following the rule, then the whole notion of ‘correctness’ appears to have been 
lost.  McDowell  appears  to  be  on  safe  ground  insofar  as  he  is  reporting 
Wittgenstein. 
For our purposes here it makes sense, I think, to bracket the question 
whether Dummett (and indeed anti-realists in general) are really committed to 
the kind of behaviourism McDowell claims that they are. It is indeed odd to 
think  of  Dummett  as  an  example  of  someone  missing  the  importance  of 
321   PI I §201.
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rationality  in  language.  Dummett  accepts  that  the  use  of  language “is  the 
rational activity  par excellence.”322 Whilst I want to note this, it is beyond the 
remit of this section to pursue this disagreement any further. 
What is relevant to this section is an assessment of the Wittgensteinian 
view McDowell has sketched. On McDowell’s interpretation the view from 
‘sideways-on’  does  not  appear  to  be  dissolved  or  ultimately  revealed  as 
empty.  On  the  contrary:  adopting  the  standpoint  is  quite  intelligible.  We 
would be required to adopt an external perspective on our ‘forms of life’, the 
kind  of  considerations  we  all  find  natural.  The  objection  offered  to  full-
bloodedness tries to point us away from adopting an external perspective. It 
does so not by claiming that there is something wrong in the motivation for 
full-bloodedness:  that  there  is  something  suspect  in  wanting  a  theory  of 
meaning to achieve such a position. Nor does the objection say that once we 
adopt the perspective required we find it was not what we expected after all. 
The objection simply says: do not occupy such a position because paradox 
will result. Crucially, though, to make that objection one needs to have the 
whole of the terrain in view. As I described it in [8.2], one needs to stand 
‘above’ the landscape to survey it. That is: the ‘sideways-on’ is required for 
the  ‘+2’  objection  to  make  any  sense.  So  far  from  rejecting  the  external 
perspective full-bloodedness seems to demand, the Wittgensteinian objection 
requires  that  very  standpoint  in  order  to  raise  its  objection  to  full-
bloodedness.
322  Dummett (1987), p.256.
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It  might  be  useful  to  put  this  in  terms  of  meaning.  McDowell’s 
Wittgenstein holds that meaning cannot be reduced.  In particular meaning 
cannot be reduced to mere behavioural responses to certain environmental 
stimuli. We cannot, as it were, explain away what it is that the practioner of 
the language understands by certain words in terms independent of meaning. 
The  crucial  question  is:  ‘why  not?’  McDowell’s  answer,  based  on 
Wittgenstein’s reflections on following a rule, is that there simply will not be 
enough to capture meaning in the materials we have remaining. But to be in a 
position  to  assess  whether  there  will  or  will  not  be  enough  conceptual 
material requires a perspective above the terrain. The reductionism is faulty 
not because of something incoherent in the position it seems to require but 
because adopting that position runs into problems of the ‘+2’ variety.
On this line of thought the  Investigations does not dissolve or reveal 
ultimately  to  be  empty  the  view  from  ‘sideways-on’.  On  the  contrary: 
McDowell’s  objection  to  full-bloodedness  seems  to  show  Wittgenstein 
requires that very perspective. What does this mean for applying the measure 
of [8.2]? Does Wittgenstein present limits as limitations and, hence, commit 
himself to idealism? There is evidence to say that he does.  Consider again 
§217. The question raised is what justification one might have for following a 
rule in a certain way. Why am I justified in carrying on ‘1002, 1004…’? We are 
asked to imagine a case where we offer a number of purported justifications 
as to why this way to go is right as opposed to any other way. Wittgenstein 
accepts that justification will eventually give out: we reach bedrock and can 
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go no further. Then, we are told, all there is left to say is: ‘This is simply what 
I do’. This is a contrastive account. It builds in a certain perspective on the 
final thing to say about justification: this is simply what I do as opposed to 
what some other creature might do. It presents a boundary; something sitting 
between certain actions on one side and certain other actions on the other 
side. It presents a limit as a limitation: something perspectival is in play. In 
contrast, a genuine limit here would leave the answer: ‘There is nothing more 
to say: this is simply what the rule ‘+2’ requires.’ 
[8.3] argued that Goldfarb’s  interpretation of the  Tractatus presented 
Wittgenstein as adopting the very external perspective he was concerned to 
repudiate.  The problem there was with the interpretation:  Goldfarb’s  view 
ended up collapsing into a language-driven interpretation and its associated 
problems.  This  section  has  reached  a  similar  position,  but  a  different 
conclusion  presents  itself.  McDowell’s  interpretation  of  Wittgenstein,  in 
particular  the  way  in  which  Wittgenstein  is  deployed  against  Dummett’s 
demand  that  a  theory  of  meaning  be  full-blooded  and  not  modest,  has 
Wittgenstein having to adopt an external perspective. This is the view from 
‘sideways-on’  that  Wittgenstein seems so keen to repudiate.  In contrast  to 
Goldfarb’s  interpretation,  McDowell  has  Wittgenstein  right.  Indeed,  the 
central  conclusion  of  Part  One  was  that  if  anyone  comes  close  to  an 
interpretation  of  Wittgenstein  that  has  the  reflections  on  rule-following 
coming  out  as  interesting,  plausible  and  coherent  it  is  McDowell’s 
interpretation.  The  problem  with  the  Investigations  -  that  it appears  to  be 
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presenting limits as limitations - is not the interpreter but the position being 
interpreted.  The author of  the  Investigations may have wanted to expose a 
certain perspective as ultimately empty, but his remarks require that such a 
position  can  be  adopted.  Wittgenstein  does,  it  seems,  succumb  to 
transcendental idealism.
[8.5] Conclusion
This chapter  has brought together  the results  of  Parts  One and Two. [8.2] 
sketched a conception, prominent in the recent literature, of the relationship 
between transcendental  idealism and the view from ‘sideways-on’.  Such a 
conception  promised  a  measure  by  which  one  could  determine  whether 
Wittgenstein was or was not a transcendental idealist. The supposition is that 
if Wittgenstein was presenting limits as limitations (as opposed to genuine 
limits) he was a transcendental idealist. To present a limit as a limitation is to 
propose a boundary between certain parts of a domain: a boundary to what 
can be thought, what makes sense, what can be experienced and so on. If one 
presents limits as limitations one needs to supply an account of the harmony 
between reality and the way we represent it. The proponents of the measure 
maintain that, for Wittgenstein, the only suitable answer to that question is 
transcendental idealism. This connects transcendental idealism to ‘sideways-
on’ looks in the following way: in order to present limits as limitations one 
must  be  in  a  position  to  do  so;  survey  what  lies  on  either  sides  of  the 
boundary. If Wittgenstein can be shown to be rejecting or ultimately revealing 
as empty the view from ‘sideways-on’ he will have removed possibility of 
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asking the question to which transcendental idealism is the answer. Or so the 
measure proposes.
[8.3] applied the measure to the Tractatus, using a paper by Goldfarb to 
clear  the  ground.  I  argued  that  Goldfarb  correctly  reports  that  the  naïve 
‘dubbing’ interpretation of the book is unsatisfactory, as is the kind of realism 
on  which  it  is  based.  Goldfarb  highlights  Wittgenstein’s  opposition  to  an 
external perspective (a view from ‘sideways-on’) that would require stepping 
outside  of  the  single  all-embracing  perspective  of  logic.  I  argued  that 
Goldfarb’s paper was in error in the alternative it attributed to Wittgenstein: 
Goldfarb’s  interpretation  ended  up  itself  adopting  the  very  external 
perspective  Wittgenstein  was  concerned  to  repudiate.  In  rejecting  the 
possibility of a view from ‘sideways-on’ Wittgenstein can be seen as rejecting 
the possibility of presenting limits as limitations. According to the measure 
this yields the result that the author of the  Tractatus was no transcendental 
idealist.
[8.4] applied the measure to the  Investigations,  using a debate in the 
philosophy of language as background. Some time was spent working out 
quite what Dummett’s demand that a theory of meaning for a language be 
‘full-blooded’ as opposed to ‘modest‘. I argued that Dummett’s view is best 
understood  by  distinguishing  three  positions:  theorist,  audience  and 
practioner. McDowell’s central criticism to full-bloodedness was assessed not 
as an objection to Dummett but insofar as it accurately reported Wittgenstein. 
I argued that McDowell does report Wittgenstein right, but the objection this 
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poses to full-bloodedness requires a realisation of what things look like from 
the external perspective that is supposedly under attack. The position is held 
to  be  faulty  because  of  the  paradox  that  results  in  occupying  it.  The 
Investigations, it seems, does present limits as limitations and so, according to 
the measure, succumbs to transcendental idealism.
I now have to say something about the connection between the two 
periods. With the  Tractatus the measure is a useful tool. The book paints a 
picture which is, at heart, a simple and straightforward one. This lends itself 
to the kind of measure proposed in [8.2]. I am satisfied the conclusion reached 
in [8.3] is the right one from an interpretive point of view. I am much less 
satisfied  with  the  conclusion  reached  in  [8.4].  We  saw  in  Part  One 
(particularly  the  exegesis  of  §§185-242  in  Chapter  One),  the  Investigations 
paints a complex and anything but straightforward picture. Different themes 
overlap  and  interrelate  in  ways  which  appear  at  first  glance  to  be 
incompatible and matters which appeared clear of a first reading are slippery 
to keep a grasp on through detailed evaluation. Part One struggled to find a 
reading of Wittgenstein that had him saying something both non-banal and 
plausible.  Even when it  was  settled that  McDowell  has Wittgenstein  right 
there remained a worry as to what precisely McDowell's interpretation came 
to. That is enough to raise a general concern that the measure of [8.2] is likely 
to  be  too  crude  and  simplistic:  the  Investigations will  not  lend  itself  to  a 
straightforward ‘reading off’ of a position. This, of course, does mean I think 
the Tractatus is ‘easy’ to understand and the Investigations ‘hard’. The point is 
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the clarity of the system of the Tractatus lends itself to the measure in a way 
the Investigations does not.
This  is  all  very  general.  Let’s  see  if  the  general  concern  can  be 
demonstrated in something specific. As indicated above, Moore and Sullivan 
agree on the measure to be used. They disagree with the results the measure 
yields.  They end up reading passages of the  Investigations very differently. 
Commenting on §217, Moore recognises the position we reached in [8.4]:
Wittgenstein does seem to be guilty of some fundamental error, then. 
He does seem to suggest that we need a shift of direction here; that we 
need to appeal to limitations rather than to limits; that we need, in yet 
another metaphor, to dig beneath bedrock and say, as [Sullivan] nicely 
puts it, what  would  occupy the place of a further justification if only 
there were such a place. And, in suggesting these things, he does seem 
to  cast  the  limits  in  question,  which  depend  on  the  limitations in 
question, as themselves  limitations.  In  sum,  he  seems  to  embrace 
transcendental idealism.323 
Moore thinks that this is the wrong way to read Wittgenstein. He proposes 
that in the rule-following passages Wittgenstein was not concerned with the 
question:  ‘What  justifies  you in  carrying  on a  certain  way?’  This  commits 
Moore to saying that in §217 Wittgenstein is not discussing justification but 
some other question like: ‘How do you know what to do here?’ or ‘How are 
you able to obey a rule?’ Offering a justification would, argues Moore, at a 
very general level be a way of answering those latter questions. “It is because 
my having those justifications is, at that level, how I know what to do; is how I 
am able  to  obey the rule.  (This  is  a  ‘grammatical’  point,  not  an empirical 
323  Moore (unpublished), p.5.
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one.)”324 Eventually reasons or justifications would give out. We would be left 
saying ‘This is  simply what I  do.’  If  this were an answer to a question of 
justification it would, Moore agrees, be presenting a limit as a limitation. But, 
he  argues,  it  is  perfectly  harmless  as  an  answer  to  the  latter  kinds  of 
questions: ‘How do you know what to do here?’ and so on.
The upshot, for Moore, is that Wittgenstein was not presenting limits 
as limitations after all, and so could not have succumbed to transcendental 
idealism. Part of Moore’s answer is to say that the contingencies Wittgenstein 
highlights are part of the framework of our ways of carrying on. Crucially, 
limits are not being made to rest on limitations:
It is our grasp of limits. In particular, it is which limits we grasp. If we 
had been  different  in various specifiable  ways,  we would have had 
different rules. But that is not to say, what would indeed be absurd to 
say,  that  the  rules  we  actually  have  would  themselves  have  been 
different.325
This  thought  also  appears  in  Points  of  View.  There  Moore  tells  us  that 
Wittgenstein  is  right  to  highlight  just  how  deep  contingency  goes.  To 
recognise this, however, is not to say that had our practices been different 2 + 
3, say, would not have equalled 5, or that if our language had been different 
there  could  have been  male aunts.  The idea is  that  if  the practices  of  our 
language had been different we would not have had the rules or concepts we 
in actual fact have. It remains the case that 2 + 3 must equal 5 and that the 
324  Moore (unpublished), p.6.
325  Moore (unpublished), p.7.
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concepts male and aunt exclude each other. Contingency does indeed go deep 
for Wittgenstein.
But in so far as this means that there is  a contingent grounding for 
what is necessary, it neither threatens the necessity nor indicates any 
dependence  of  the  form  of  reality  on  any  aspect  of  our 
representations.326
In short, there is no drive towards idealism.
Moore‘s view, as so far reported, might strike the reader as puzzling. 
The idea has been that, despite what might look like evidence to contrary, the 
author of the  Investigations does not present  limits  as  limitations.  As such, 
there is no question of idealism. This means Moore is forced to say things 
about the rule-following passages that might appear at first glance to sound 
strange. Notably that Wittgenstein was not interested in the question: ‘what 
justifies  you  going  that  way?’  But  there  is  another  strand  of  thought  in 
Moore’s work that I have yet to bring out; something that brings us much 
closer to McDowell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. It is the idea, the third 
theme in Chapter One, encountered in Wright’s reading in Chapter Three and 
developed by McDowell  as  seen in Chapter Four,  that  Wittgenstein was a 
Quietist.  It  was  developed  in  Part  One  in  connection  with  Wittgenstein’s 
avowed ‘anti-theoretical’ stance. Here is how Moore introduces it: 
when I say that Wittgenstein was not a transcendental idealist, I do not 
mean that he confronted  these  issues  and  rejected  transcendental 
idealism,  still  less  that  he  embraced  some other  “ism”  in  its  stead. 
326  Moore (1997), p.133.
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Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy would not have allowed for 
that. For Wittgenstein philosophy was a kind of therapy. Its purpose 
was to cure us whenever, through the misuse of our own language, we 
became troubled by unanswerable  pseudo-questions  posing as deep 
problems.327
The discussion of McDowell’s interpretation of the rule-following passages in 
Chapter  Four  introduced  similar  considerations.  It  was  unclear  whether 
McDowell’s  Wittgenstein  was  supposed  to  be  embracing  transcendental 
idealism or ultimately using the appeal of the doctrine as a stage to a kind of 
Quietism. Moore envisages Wittgenstein as rejecting transcendental idealism 
by rejecting the questions to which it would be the right answer. Questions 
like: ’what justifies you in going such a way?’ or ’what does meaning addition 
by  ‘+’  consist  in?’  If  these  questions  were  genuine  pressing  questions  the 
answer Wittgenstein would offer is that, ultimately, our ways of carrying on 
depend on what we all find natural. Moore’s point is that there is something 
wrong, for Wittgenstein, in the questions themselves. 
I need to end with something about continuity, even if the final fate of 
McDowell’s interpretation is left unresolved. As expected in the Introduction, 
there  is  both  deep  continuity  and  deep  discontinuity  in  Wittgenstein’s 
thought. Parts One and Two showed how the same kind of worries about the 
limits  of  thought,  what  makes  sense  and  what  does  not  run  throughout 
Wittgenstein’s  work.  In  both  periods  there  is  a  clear  worry  about  the 
possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ perspective. The shape of Wittgenstein’s 
discussions is also strikingly similar: in that a kind of transcendental idealism 
327 Moore (1997), p.126.
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appears  as  both  threatening  and appealing  in  Wittgenstein’s  thought.  The 
discontinuity  appears  in  the  approach  Wittgenstein  offers  in  reply  to  the 
threat. In the Tractatus, transcendental idealism is identified and discussed. It 
is taken on, as it were, on its own terms and revealed ultimately to be empty. 
In the Investigations, transcendental idealism is the only answer that looks to 
have Wittgenstein’s support: if there are genuine and pressing questions here 
then the transcendental idealist answer is the right one. Wittgenstein’s reply, 
if  indeed  there  is  one,  appears  to  be  that  the  question  itself  is  faulty. 
Recognising this  obliterates  the appeal  of  the idealism.  The conclusion we 
have reached here is that the straight solution of the Tractatus has something 
going for it; the more ‘round-about’ solution of the Investigations is a lot more 
questionable.  Applying the measure of [8.2] yields the result  that the later 
Wittgenstein was a transcendental idealist. The worry raised in this section is 
whether the simplistic measure could ever do full justice to the interrelated 
and  overlapping  themes  of  the  Investigations or,  indeed,  the  subtlety  of 
Wittgenstein’s approach to idealism. We are left, then, holding that perhaps a 
full  recognition  and  understanding  of  Wittgenstein’s  avowed  Quietist 
approach can yield a different conclusion to that of the measure. It is going to 
depend on whether the proposed ‘therapy’ really dissolves the motivation for 
asking the questions to which transcendental idealism is the best answer or it 
simply amounts to a ‘do not occupy that position because it has disastrous 
consequences.’ Clearly it will be a hard act to pull off.
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